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INTRODUCTION

Therapeutic jurisprudence (“TJ”) is a school of thought suggesting
that legislatures, regulators, attorneys, and judges consider the extent to which
rules, laws, and procedures impact the psychological well-being of those upon
whom the law acts.1 The desire for positive psychological impact should not
be the only, or even the primary, consideration when weighing appropriate
legal action using TJ.2 Rather, without limiting focus, TJ explicitly favors an
1.
Kathy L. Cerminara, Therapeutic Jurisprudence’s Future in Health Law:
Bringing the Patient Back into the Picture, INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY, Mar.–Apr. 2019, at 56,
58; see, e.g., David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xvii (David B. Wexler ed., 1996).
2.
See, e.g., Wexler & Winick, supra note 1, at xvii.

Id.

The therapeutic jurisprudence heuristic suggests that the law itself can be
seen to function as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent. Legal rules, legal
procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as lawyers and judges) constitute social
forces that, like it or not, often produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences.
[A]nd that we ask whether the law’s antitherapeutic consequences can be reduced,
and its therapeutic consequences enhanced, without subordinating due process and
other justice values.
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interdisciplinary approach and counsels us to “consult [other] disciplines,
consider the law’s therapeutic or anti-therapeutic effects on those it affects,
and, importantly, see if the other disciplines have solutions to offer to remedy
any anti-therapeutic effects of the law.”3 If data about the law’s psychological
effects or potential solutions does not yet exist, TJ scholarship can urge
research in that direction.4
Within the field of health law, TJ analysis of the effects of laws, rules,
or procedures may also include consideration of physical outcomes resulting
from mental states as significant factors.5 As Professor Scott Burris and
colleagues explained, “[i]t is past time for a [real] recognition in our health
system that law is a ubiquitous treatment, one to which hundreds of millions
of people are routinely exposed.”6 Professor Burris is a proponent of legal
epidemiology, which quantitatively analyzes the effect of law on health.7 TJ
may be seen as the mental health law equivalent of legal epidemiology,
examining law as a treatment producing mental health outcomes among those
it affects.8
Chief among those health law affects are patients.9 Professor Mark
Hall, for example, has proposed a patient-centered approach to health law,
indicating that the law’s effects on patients’ mental and physical health should

3.
Kathy L. Cerminara, Today’s Crusades: A Therapeutic Jurisprudential
Critique of Faith-Based Civil Rights in Health Care, 13 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 19 (2019).
4.
See, e.g., Wexler & Winnick, supra note 1, at xvii.

Id.

[T]he therapeutic jurisprudence lens enables the identification of
questions in need of empirical research. Speculation about the therapeutic
consequences of various legal arrangements or law reform proposals can itself be
useful, but empirical research is often necessary to determine whether the law
actually operates in the way that theory assumes.

5.
6.

Cerminara, supra note 1, at 58–59.
Scott Burris et al., The “Legal Epidemiology” of Pandemic Control, NEW
ENG. J. MED., May 27, 2021, at 1973.
The imperative is to scale up the infrastructure for at least three kinds of
research: study of the mechanisms, effects, side effects, and implementation of laws
designed to influence health, such as Covid control measures; research on how the
legal infrastructure of the U.S. health system—the allocation of powers and duties,
as well as limits on authority—influences the effectiveness of the system; and
perhaps most important for addressing health equity, studies of how laws that may
appear to have no health purposes—such as the tax code, minimum wage, and labor
rules—shape the social determinants of health.

Id. at 1975.
7.
8.
9.

See id. at 1973.
See id.; Cerminara, supra note 1, at 58.
See Cerminara, supra note 1, at 57–58.
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be primary considerations.10 Yet effects on providers, family members, and
friends should not be ignored.11 Ultimately, because “the ‘central objective’
of the health care industry ‘is individual health and well-being,’” this Article
will focus primarily on patients.12 Consideration of the effects on providers,
family members, and friends will be included, but only to the extent they affect
patients psychologically or physically.13
COVID-19 provides an excellent opportunity for TJ analysis, for
isolation and no-visitation policies within nursing homes produced loneliness
and despair that resulted in sub-optimal physical conditions among patients.14
This Article will begin by situating COVID-19 within a long line of
pandemics, illustrating the need for preparation for the next pandemic the
world will eventually encounter.15 Because this Article, in the tradition of TJ
scholarship, will propose continued future monitoring and collection of
medical and social science data, it will next review the structure of nursing
home regulation and trace its relevant development in the United States during
COVID-19 for non-legal researchers in the relevant fields.16
Then, through analyzing “patients’ actual experiences . . . with
physicians, . . . other care providers, hospitals, and other facilities,” this Article
will discuss the demonstrable mental and physical harm that regulatory
policies inflicted upon residents in nursing homes, using Florida as a statelevel exemplar.17 Finally, this Article will collect, analyze, and propose
10.
See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 468
(2002) [hereinafter Hall 2002]; Mark A. Hall, Musings on Patient-Centered Law and Ethics, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2010) [hereinafter Hall 2010].
11.
Cerminara, supra note 1, at 58.
12.
Id.; see discussion infra Section III.C; Hall 2002, supra note 10, at 468;
Hall 2010, supra note 10, at 1466.
13.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
14.
See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, Nursing Homes, COVID-19, and the
Consequences of Regulatory Failure, 110 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2021) (manuscript at
1, 3–4); Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Health Inequity and the Elderly: The Impact of PandemicPolicy, Bioethics, and the Law 89–90, 93–94 (2021); ANNE MONTGOMERY ET AL., EXPERIENCES
OF
NURSING
HOME
RESIDENTS
DURING
THE
PANDEMIC
2
(2020),
http://altarum.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-publication-files/Nursing-Home-ResidentSurvey_Altarum-Special-Report_FINAL.pdf.
15.
See discussion infra Part II.
16.
See discussion infra Part II.
[T]he therapeutic jurisprudence lens enables the identification of
questions in need of empirical research. Speculation about the therapeutic
consequences of various legal arrangements or law reform proposals can itself be
useful, but empirical research is often necessary to determine whether the law
actually operates in the way that theory assumes.

Wexler & Winick, supra note 1, at xvii.
17.
Hall 2002, supra note 10, at 467; see discussion infra Section III.C.
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improvements for consideration during the next pandemic, since there surely
will be another pandemic.18 As both federal and Florida regulators recognized
during COVID-19, their initial regulatory activities were overwhelmingly
anti-therapeutic. Regulation in the next pandemic should, if necessary, at all,
move through that initial phase more quickly. Then regulators should move
quickly to replicate the steps they took in the latter phase of the COVID-19
pandemic, as long as doing so is consistent with the medical and public health
evidence.19
II.

THE LATEST IN A LONG LINE OF PANDEMICS

“Very few phenomena throughout human history have shaped our
societies and cultures the way outbreaks of infectious diseases have,” COVID19 being no exception.20 Following the first recorded pandemic in 430 BC,
“pandemic outbreaks have decimated societies, determined outcomes of wars,
[and] wiped out entire populations . . . .”21 Throughout history, diseases such
as the bubonic plague, leprosy, influenza, measles, and poliomyelitis—to
name a few—have claimed the lives of millions, taking a tremendous toll on
the worldwide population with each outbreak.22
These outbreaks have “also paradoxically cleared the way for
innovations and advances in sciences (including medicine and public health),
economy, and political systems.”23 Measures to control the effects of
pandemics have evolved through the centuries, influenced by scientific

18.
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
19.
See discussion infra Part III; Press Release, Fla. Gov. Press Office,
Governor Ron DeSantis Announces Task Force to Explore the Safe and Limited Re-Opening
of Long-Term Care Facilities (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/covid19/Governor%20Ron%20DeSantis%20Announces%20Task%20Force
%20to%20Explore%20the%20Safe%20and%20Limited%20Re-Opening%20of%20LongTerm%20Care%20Facilities.pdf.
20.
See DAMIR HUREMOVIĆ, BRIEF HISTORY OF PANDEMICS (PANDEMICS
THROUGHOUT HISTORY) IN PSYCHIATRY OF PANDEMICS 7 (2019).
21.
Id.; see also Jocelyne Piret & Guy Boivin, Pandemics Throughout History,
11 FRONTIERS MICROBIOLOGY, Jan. 15, 2021, at 1, 1.
22.
See HUREMOVIĆ, supra note 20, at 14, 20; Seema Mohapatra, Law in the
Time of Zika: Disability Rights and Reproductive Justice Collide, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 325, 431
(2019); Measles History, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/history.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
23.
HUREMOVIĆ, supra note 20, at 7; see also MARIO ARTURO RUIZ ESTRADA &
ALAM KHAN, GLOBALIZATION AND PANDEMICS: THE CASE OF COVID-19 13 (2020),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3560681.
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knowledge, available resources, and regulatory and societal systems.24 As
pandemics became a very real threat in a globalized world, the need for
international regulatory mechanisms to identify emerging health threats
prompted the creation of International Health Regulations (“IHR”) in 1969.25
Since its creation, the IHR has undergone several revisions, the most
recent of which was promulgated in 2005.26 As an international treaty, the
IHR is legally binding, meaning that all countries must report events of
international public health importance.27 Among other things, it established
the criteria to be used in order to determine if an event should be considered
“a public health emergency of international concern” (“PHEIC”).28 In the
twenty-first century alone, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) has
declared multiple diseases as PHEICs, COVID-19 being one of them.29
COVID-19 emerged and spread quickly.30 In December 2019, an
outbreak of a new respiratory illness was detected in Wuhan, China.31 By
January 2020, the WHO had declared the new illness a PHEIC, which was
named COVID-19 on February 11, 2020.32 In March 2020, the WHO declared
24.
See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS &
RESPONSE:
A
WHO
GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT
3
(2009),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/44123/9789241547680_eng.pdf?sequence=1&
isAllowed=y; Dean T. Jamison et al., Universal Health Coverage and Intersectoral Action for
Health, in 9 DISEASE CONTROL PRIORITIES: IMPROVING HEALTH AND REDUCING POVERTY, 3, 11,
223 (Dean T. Jamison et al. eds, 3d 2018).
25.
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 1 (3d.
ed. 2005) (ebook) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 2005].
26.
See id.
27.
See id. (“The IHR are an instrument of international law that is legallybinding on 196 countries, including the 194 WHO Member States.”); International Health
Regulations, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/health-topics/international-healthregulations#tab=tab_1 (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
28.
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 2005, supra note 25, at 1.
29.
Id. at 9 (defining PHEIC as “an extraordinary event . . . [that may] constitute
a public health risk to other [countries] through the international spread of disease and [may] .
. . require a coordinated international response.”); Lawrence O. Gostin & Meryl Justin Chertoff,
Lockdowns, Quarantines, and Travel Restrictions, During COVID and Beyond: What’s the
Law, and How Should We Decide?, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2021),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210322.450239/ (explaining that the
WHO has designated five previous diseases as PHEICs including “H1N1, Ebola (twice), the
Zika virus, and polio. . . .”).
30.
Identifying the Source of the Outbreak, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/aboutepidemiology/identifying-source-outbreak.html (last updated July 1, 2020).
31.
Id.
32.
Timeline:
WHO’s COVID-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2022).

2022]

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN NURSING HOMES

336

COVID-19 a pandemic after discovering that more than one million cases had
been confirmed worldwide.33 By May 2020, the number of deaths from
COVID-19 had surpassed 100,000 in the United States.34 The speed with
which the virus developed and spread confounded scientists who were
attempting to research the virus and policy makers attempting to govern
through it.35
COVID-19 was, and still is, a serious public health threat caused by
SARS-CoV-2 from the coronavirus family.36 The virus passed from animals
to humans in a mutated form, causing severe respiratory illnesses.37 It is easily
spread from person to person through respiratory droplets produced when an
infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks.38 The effects of the disease range
from mild to severe, and some infected individuals may display no symptoms
whatsoever.39 Adults over sixty-five years of age and those of any age with
underlying health conditions are at a higher risk of experiencing more severe
symptoms of the disease than others.40 As of February 18, 2022, the WHO
reported over 418 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 globally and over 5.8
million deaths.41 As of March 30, 2022, the United States accounted for a
confirmed and presumptive eighty-one million of those cases, tragically
resulting in over nine hundred thousand deaths.42
As the pandemic progressed new variants of COVID-19 have
emerged, having a significant impact on transmissibility and severity of the
virus, as well as posing challenges to its effective control.43 Measures that can
33.
Domenico Cucinotta & Maurizio Vanelli, WHO Declares COVID-19 a
Pandemic, 91 ACTA BIOMEDICA 157, 157 (2020).
34.
Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, United States
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Death Toll Surpasses 100,000 (May 28, 2020),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0528-coronavirus-death-toll.html.
35.
See id.; R. Tamara Konetzka, Improving the Fate of Nursing Homes During
the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Need for Policy, 111 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 632, 632 (2021).
36.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/dotw/COVID-19/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
37.
See id.; Nita Madhav et al., Pandemics: Risks, Impacts, and Mitigation, in
9 DISEASE CONTROL PRIORITIES: IMPROVING HEALTH AND REDUCING POVERTY 315, 318 (Dean
T. Jamison et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018); Identifying the Source of the Outbreak, supra note 30.
38.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), supra note 36.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://covid19.who.int (last updated Apr. 14, 2022, 8:36 PM).
42.
United
States,
WORLDOMETER,
http://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/ (last updated Apr. 18, 2022, 8:20 PM).
43.
The Effects of Virus Variants on COVID-19 Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Mar. 1, 2021), http://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/the-effects-of-virusvariants-on-COVID-19-vaccines.
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further control the spread of pandemics vary according to pathogen-specific
and population-level factors, including methods of transmission, population
density, population susceptibility to infections, migration, and movement
patterns, among others.44 Many efforts to curb the impact of COVID-19 have
paralleled those implemented in prior pandemics and have included: (1)
limiting or eliminating interactions between infected and uninfected
individuals, achieved by implementing patient isolation, social distancing
practices, school closures, and quarantines; (2) reducing levels of
infectiousness of patients exhibiting symptoms by providing antibiotics and/or
instituting infection control practices; and (3) reducing susceptibility of
individuals not infected through vaccination.45
III.

A REGULATORY ODYSSEY THROUGH NURSING HOME RESIDENTS’
VISITATION RIGHTS

While states generally regulate health care facilities as an exercise of
their police power, federalism greatly complicates any health care regulation
within the representative democracy of the United States.46 During PHEICs
or other public health emergencies, the federal Centers for Disease Control
(“CDC”), the federal Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and
the federal Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) wield a great deal of
power, either because of the borderless nature of infectious disease or due to
the power of the purse.47 Yet the states govern health care quality and safety
through facility licensure, as an exercise of their traditional police powers.48
During the COVID-19 pandemic, such cooperative federalism has faced bitter
44.
See Madhav et al., supra note 37, at 319, 329.
45.
Id. at 329.
46.
E.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to
State Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121, 122 (1993) (citing Michael S. Morgenstern,
The Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Citizens from Communicable Diseases, 47
U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 541 (1978)) (“In the early days of the Republic, regulation of health care
lay primarily within the province of the states and local governments”). There is an ideological
debate over whether the United States is a representative democracy or a republic. See George
Thomas, ‘America Is a Republic, Not a Democracy’ Is a Dangerous — and Wrong — Argument,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2020), http://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/yes-constitutiondemocracy/616949/; but compare BERNARD DOBSKI, AMERICA IS A REPUBLIC, NOT A
DEMOCRACY 1–2 (2020), http://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/FP-80.pdf, with
Eugene Volokh, Is the United States of America a Republic or a Democracy?, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/05/13/is-the-united-states-of-america-a-republic-or-a-democracy/.
47.
See, e.g., Heather D’Adamo et al., Coronavirus Disease 2019 in Geriatrics
and Long-Term Care: The ABCDs of COVID-19, 68 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 912, 913 (2020).
48.
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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partisanship and politically motivated infighting, sometimes sending
conflicting messages to nursing home operators.49 As legal and medical
scholar James Hodge has opined, “COVID-19 . . . has severely tested the
boundaries of federalism, revealing substantial drawbacks of a nation of
sovereign states attempting to respond to a disease that ignores boundaries.”50
This section first will outline nursing home regulation in Florida and
the state’s interaction with federal regulators, as a primer for non-legal
researchers using this Article to design future empirical studies or craft future
policy. Second, it will lay groundwork for a discussion of visitation limitations
by explaining how, under normal conditions, state and federal law both
guarantee nursing home residents’ rights to in-person visitation. Finally, it
will trace the odyssey traveled by those regulators as COVID-19 rapidly
developed and spread.
A.

Nursing Home Regulation in Florida

Dissecting Florida’s experience instead of another state’s is
appropriate because as of 2021, Florida had one of the largest elderly
populations in the nation.51 As an important illustration of state-level
regulation, Florida nursing home facilities are regulated at the state level by
the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”).52 The state
retains the sole discretion to revoke or deny a facility licensure; AHCA
provides annual licensures and performs regular inspections to ensure facilities
are meeting state and federal standards.53 During COVID-19, the Florida
49.
See, e.g., D’Adamo et al., supra note 47, at 913; James G. Hodge, Jr.,
Nationalizing Public Health Emergency Legal Responses, 49 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 315, 316
(2021) (“Foundational principles of cooperative federalism support the notion that federal and
state governments share responsibility for preserving the nation’s health. States are reserved
inherent police powers to generally protect public health and safety. Enumerated powers
ascribed to the federal government are limited, but supreme.”) (footnote omitted).
50.
Hodge, supra note 49, at 316. The competing government powers,
regulatory overlay, and conflicting guidance all support the conclusion that “[u]nless we find
the political will to fundamentally change the way we pay for and deliver long-term care, we
will never make meaningful improvements and cannot be prepared for the next pandemic.”
Konetzka, supra note 35, at 633.
51.
Matthew Giovenco, Article, Lessons the Long-Term Care Industry can
Learn from the Covid-19 Pandemic, 51 STETSON L. REV. 123, 124 (2021) (explaining that
“nearly 4.5 million elders call Florida home” and the number of nursing homes in Florida is the
“sixth highest in the nation”).
52.
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R.59A-4.106 (2020).
53.
About the Agency for Health Care Administration, AGENCY FOR HEALTH
CARE ADMIN., http://ahca.myflorida.com/Inside_AHCA/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 19,
2022); see 42 C.F.R. § 482.1 (2020).
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Department of Health (“DOH”) worked closely with AHCA to ensure
compliance with all regulatory guidance.54 While this Article uses Florida as
an example, many states have similar, if not identical, regulatory
infrastructure.55
At the federal level, the HHS regulates nursing homes through the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”).56 Florida nursing
homes that accept funds through Medicare and Medicaid programs are bound
to adhere to state and federal law, and they are also subject to the regulatory
oversight of the CMS.57 CMS sets quality and safety standards for all
participating health care facilities often referred to as “conditions of
participation.”58 One of the conditions CMS imposes on facilities is the
requirement that the facilities maintain infection control programs.59 The
penalties for violation of CMS requirements, however, are not as drastic as the
potential state-level penalty of ultimate de-licensure.60 HHS, as noted earlier,
controls through the power of the purse.61 While the vast majority of nursing
54.
COVID19 Alerts for Facilities and Medicaid Providers, AGENCY FOR
HEALTH CARE ADMIN., http://ahca.myflorida.com/COVID-19_alerts.shtml (last visited Apr. 19,
2022).
55.
See Angela T. Chen et al., Long-Term Care, Residential Facilities, and
COVID-19: An Overview of Federal and State Policy Responses, 21 J. AM. MED. DIRS. ASS’N
1186, 1187 (2020).
56.
Alan F. Levitt & Shari M. Ling, COVID-19 in the Long-Term Care Setting:
The CMS Perspective, 68 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 1366, 1366 (2020).
57.
See id.; FLA. ADMIN. CODE R.59A-4.106; Kohn, supra note 14, at 5.
58.
42 C.F.R. § 483.1 (2020).
Consolidated Medicare and Medicaid requirements for participation
(requirements) for Long Term Care (LTC) facilities (42 CFR part 483, subpart B)
were first published in the Federal Register on February 2, 1989 (54 FR 5316). The
requirements for participation were recently revised . . . . [P]ublished in a final rule
that became effective on November 28, 2016.

Nursing
Homes,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-andCertification/GuidanceforLawsAndRegulations/Nursing-Homes (last updated Feb. 22, 2022,
5:19 PM).
59.
AM. SOC’Y FOR HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK
FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 338 (Roberta Carrol ed., 2010).

Id.

[S]pecific requirements . . . include (1) the designation of an infection
control officer and development of relevant policies that address the identification
and control of infections and communicable diseases, (2) the development and
maintenance of a log system to track such conditions, and (3) the imposition of
responsibility and accountability onto the [long-term care facilities’] CEO, the
medical staff, and director of nursing services [to ensure] . . . improvement and
training programs are implemented to address issues identified by the infection
control officer and implementing corrective action plans in problem areas.

60.
61.

See 42 C.F.R. § 488.406 (2020).
See D’Adamo et al., supra note 47, at 913.
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homes accept federal Medicare and Medicaid funding, and such funding
comprises a significant part of their budgets, failure to comply with conditions
of participation will not result in de-licensure.62 In this way, states and
localities remain the more powerful governments in this arena, consistent with
police power to ensure the health and safety of residents residing in the state.63
Given such regulatory interaction and overlay, efforts to curb the
impact of COVID-19 among patients in nursing homes proved especially
challenging.64 In Florida, nursing homes comprise a subset of a broader
category of “[l]ong-term care facilit[ies],” defined to include “nursing home
facilit[ies], assisted living facilit[ies], adult family-care home[s], board and
care facilit[ies], or any other similar residential adult care facility.”65 The
population of nursing homes, while not exclusively older adults, is comprised
primarily of older adults.66 As older adults and those of “any age with
underlying medical conditions,” the nursing home population is at the highest
risk for contracting the virus.67
These groups of people are also at the highest risk for the most serious
consequence of the disease—death.68 The attributes of the disease itself, the
susceptibility of the population, and the close-quartered structure of nursing-

62.
42 C.F.R § 488.406; see BRIAN O. BURWELL & WILLIAM H. CROWN, PUBLIC
FINANCING OF LONG-TERM CARE:
FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES 4 (1994)
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_legacy_files//40966/fedstes.pdf?_ga=2.190094
504.269899329.1648690452-362558260.1648690452.
63.
See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Universal Masking in the United States: The
Role of Mandates, Health Education, and the CDC, 324 JAMA 837, 838 (2020) ("Historically,
states and localities have assured the public’s health, with the CDC providing funding, technical
guidance, and coordination.").
64.
See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 14, at 3–5; Chen et al., supra note 55, at 1187;
D’Adamo et al., supra note 47, at 912.
65.
See FLA. STAT. § 400.0060(6) (2020).
66.
Meagan Cline, Facts and Statistics About U.S. Nursing Homes, FIGHT
NURSING HOME ABUSE (Oct. 18, 2019), http://www.fightnursinghomeabuse.com/factsstatistics-nursing-homes/. It is estimated that “[a]cross the U.S., there are around 1.4 million
people living in nursing homes.” Id. Of those, only an estimated fifteen percent are under the
age of sixty-five, the majority being persons between 85–95 years old. Id.
67.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), supra note 36.
68.
D’Adamo et al., supra note 47, at 912.

Id.

One of the defining features of COVID-19 is the predilection for infection
of older adults and individuals with chronic underlying health conditions, resulting
in higher attack rates and mortality. Given that older adults experience a greater
number and severity of chronic diseases and disabilities . . . it is not surprising that
older adults residing in long-term care facilities (LTCFs) have the greatest
susceptibility to COVID-19, as well as the poorest outcomes from this infection.
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home-living all produced what has been hailed the “perfect storm.”69 Because
of that, early efforts to contain and prevent the spread of COVID-19 among
residents in nursing homes proved to be vital.70
B.
Florida and Federal Recognition of Nursing Home Residents’ Right
to In-Person Visitation
In response to COVID-19, federal and state governments restricted
visitation to nursing home facilities in Florida by, inter alia, suspending
existing rights.71 By suspending the laws discussed below, facilities were free
to restrict visitation in contravention to a resident’s Bill of Rights, and
essentially, that is exactly what the facilities did.72
Chapter 400, Florida Statutes, codifies some of the basic rights to
which all Florida nursing home residents are entitled.73 Inherent in these rights
is a legislative intent to ensure residents have unencumbered visitation and
communication with the people they love.74 Florida’s statute, in pertinent part,
specifically affords residents:
The right to private and uncensored communication,
including, but not limited to, . . . visiting with any person of the
residents’ choice during visiting hours, and overnight visitation
outside the facility with family and friends . . . without the resident’s
losing his or her bed. Facility visiting hours shall be flexible, taking
into consideration special circumstances such as, but not limited to,
out-of-town visitors and working relatives or friends. Unless
otherwise indicated in the resident care plan, the licensee shall, with
the consent of the resident and in accordance with policies approved
by the agency, permit [groups and individuals providing social
69.
Joseph G. Ouslander & David C. Grabowski, COVID-19 in Nursing
Homes: Calming the Perfect Storm, 68 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2153, 2153 (2021); Konetzka,
supra note 35, at 632.
70.
See, e.g., Ouslander & Grabowski, supra note 69, at 2153; Interim Infection
Prevention and Control Recommendations to Prevent SARS-CoV-2 Spread in Nursing Homes,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/hcp/long-term-care.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2021) (referring to an older version).
71.
See, e.g., Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002 (Mar. 11, 2020);
Memorandum from Director, Quality, Safety & Oversight Grp., to State Surv. Agency Dirs.,
Guidance for Infection Control & Prevention of Coronavirus Disease 2019 in Nursing Homes
(Revised) 2 (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter CMS Memorandum QSO-20-14NH]; D’Adamo et al., supra note 47, at 913.
72.
See Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002; 42 U.S.C. § 1395i–
3(c)(3); FLA. STAT. § 400.022(b).
73.
See FLA. STAT. § 400.022.
74.
See id. § 400.022(b).
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services] . . . access to the facility during visiting hours for the
purpose of visiting with and providing services to any resident.75

Many of these protections are further guaranteed by the Federal
Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 (“FNHRA”) and its implementing
regulations, which codify the rights of patients residing in any facility
accepting federal funds.76 As noted, the majority of nursing homes in America
participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs, subjecting them to the federal
parameters of the FNHRA.77 One of the many protections afforded by the
FNHRA is a resident’s right to visitation, which flatly declares:
A nursing facility must: . . . (B) permit immediate access to a
resident . . . by immediate family or other relatives of the resident;
(C) permit immediate access to a resident . . . by others who are
visiting with the consent of the resident; [and] (D) permit reasonable
access to a resident by any entity or individual that provides health,
social, legal, or other services to the resident . . . .78

Thus, Florida law secures the right to visitation for all in-state nursing
home residents, whereas the FNHRA provides additional federal visitation
rights to all residents of Florida nursing homes which accept federal funds.79
Both state and federal regulations are in place to ensure nursing home facilities
honor those rights and provide an adequate standard of care, discussed in
greater detail below.80
C.

Restrictions on the Right to Visitation

75.
Id.
76.
See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395i–3(c)(3); MaryBeth Musumeci & Priya
Chidambaram, Key Questions About Nursing Home Regulation and Oversight in the Wake of
COVID-19, KFF (Aug. 3, 2020), http://www.kff.org/coronavirus-COVID-19/issue-brief/keyquestions-about-nursing-home-regulation-and-oversight-in-the-wake-of-COVID-19/.
77.
See Musumeci & Chidambaram, supra note 76 (“Medicare is the primary
payer for about [twelve] percent of nursing home residents . . . [whereas] Medicaid is the
primary payer for [sixty-two] percent of nursing home residents . . . .”).
78.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(3).
79.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 400.022(b); see FLA. STAT. § 400.021(12) (defining
“nursing home facility” to mean any facility licensed according to this chapter and who
“provides nursing services as defined in part I of chapter 464 . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(j)
(defining the term “skilled nursing facility” to have “the meaning given such term in section
1395i–3(a) of this title.”).
80.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i–3(h)(1); FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1); Kohn, supra note
14, at 5.
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While both federal and state regulations relating to COVID-19
addressed a variety of measures aimed to limit the spread of the virus, one of
the most crucial factors the regulations addressed—and the one that garnered
heartbreaking and sustained media coverage—was the limitation of visitors.81
Those pre-existing rights were eliminated and modified over time as scientists
learned more about the virus.82 This TJ analysis thus differs from most
traditional TJ analyses, which probe the impact of a singular or static law or
type of law passed through traditional legislative and judicial processes.83
1.

Initial Orders

Acting pursuant to their respective emergency powers, Florida
Governor Ron DeSantis and former President Donald Trump restricted
visitation to nursing homes through a series of executive and emergency orders

81.
See, e.g., Ally Mauch, Florida Woman Takes Dishwashing Job to See
Husband in Nursing Home After 114 Days Apart Due to COVID-19, PEOPLE (July 11, 2020,
5:15 PM), http://people.com/human-interest/florida-woman-takes-dishwashing-job-to-seehusband-in-nursing-home-coronavirus/; Jason Karlawish et al., Continued Bans on Nursing
Home Visitors are Unhealthy and Unethical, WASH. POST (July 13, 2020, 8:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/13/residents-good-nursing-homes-shouldconsider-re-allowing-visitors/; Banned from Nursing Homes, Families See Shocking Decline in
Their
Loved
Ones,
NPR
(June
9,
2020,
12:09
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2020/06/09/870159589/banned-from-nursing-homes-families-seeshocking-decline-in-their-loved-ones; Ron Haviv, Could This Be the Last Time We See Our
Dad?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
2020),
http://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-baruch-haviv-death.html;
Cait McVey, Her Mother’s Health Is Declining in Isolation, but She Still Can’t Visit, BAY NEWS
9 (July 28, 2020, 9:01 PM), http://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/news/2020/07/29/pinellascounty-mother-daughter-separated-4-months-because-of-nursing-home-coronaviruslockdown; Chen et al., supra note 55, at 1187.
82.
See Chen et al., supra note 55, at 1188–89.
83.
See Wexler & Winick, supra note 1, at xvii. This statement should not be
read to narrow TJ scholarship to an analysis of only legal substance. See Cerminara, supra note
1, at 58–60. While this Article is analyzing substance, and thus the statement refers to traditional
TJ scholarship doing the same, Wexler and Winick have proposed an analysis of (and TJ
scholars have analyzed) three categories of subjects: legal substance, legal procedures, and the
roles played by legal actors. Wexler & Winnick, supra note 1, at xvii. “Legal rules, legal
procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as lawyers and judges) constitute social forces
that, like it or not, often produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences.” David B.
Wexler, New Wine in New Bottles: The Need to Sketch a Therapeutic Jurisprudence “Code”
of Proposed Criminal Processes and Practices, 7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 463, 463 (2014)
[hereinafter New Wine in New Bottles]; see also David B. Wexler, The DNA of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, in THE METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICE OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 1, 4
(Nigel Stobbs et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter The DNA of Therapeutic Jurisprudence].
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and agency regulations, which had “the force and effect of law.”84 Their
actions, taken at similar times and in similar forms, suspended existing statutes
and effectively created temporary new law.85 The regulations affecting
nursing homes discussed here are just a few of the thousands of “laws and
orders . . . issued by federal, state, and local authorities . . . in an effort to
reduce disease transmission” during the first six months of the COVID-19
pandemic.86
Both Florida and the federal government commenced regulatory
activity in March of 2020.87 Within days of declaring a state of emergency in
Florida on March 8, 2020, DeSantis issued the first order restricting visitation
to nursing homes.88 This initial order barred only “certain individuals” and
identified seven subsets of persons who were restricted from visiting Florida
nursing homes; the subsets ranged from the general, such as “[a]ny person
showing or presenting signs or symptoms . . .” to the more specific, such as
“[a]ny person who traveled on a cruise ship . . . .”89
Within days, Trump declared a national emergency and CMS
provided federal guidance to nursing home facilities on prevention and control
practices, which included visitation restriction recommendations.90 CMS
initially counseled that all facilities nationwide should “restrict visitation of all
visitors and non-essential health care personnel, except for certain
compassionate care situations, such as an end-of-life situation.”91 While CMS
gave individual facilities the autonomy to determine the propriety of visitation
during end-of-life situations on a “case-by-case basis,” CMS advised rigorous
screenings of such persons “(including clergy, bereavement counselors, etc.)
for fever or respiratory symptoms.”92 Any person showing symptoms of
84.
See, e.g., Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-51 (Mar. 1, 2020); Fla. Exec. Order No.
20-52 (Mar. 9, 2020); Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002 (Mar. 11, 2020); Press
Release, Fed. Emergency. Mgmt. Agency, COVID-19 Emergency Declaration (Mar. 14, 2020),
http://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210318/covid-19-emergency-declaration.
85.
See Legislative Oversight of Emergency Executive Powers, NAT’L CONF.
STATE LEG. (Jan. 20, 2022), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislativeoversight-of-executive-orders.aspx.
86.
Burris et al., supra note 6, at 1973.
87.
See, e.g., Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-51; Press Release, Fed. Emergency
Mgmt. Agency, supra note 84.
88.
See Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002. Florida Governor Ron
DeSantis took all regulatory action affecting nursing homes through the state’s Division of
Emergency Management (“DEM”), whom he designated as the State Coordinating Officer on
March 9. Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-52.
89.
Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002.
90.
CMS Memorandum QSO-20-14-NH, supra note 71, at 2.
91.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
92.
Id.
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respiratory infection was not “permitted to enter the facility at any time, even
in end-of-life situations.”93
When visitation was “necessary or allowable” CMS advised that
facilities enhance the possibility of safety by suggesting that visitors refrain
from all physical contact with patients.94 Facilities were further advised to
“[c]ancel communal dining and all group activities, such as internal and
external group activities.”95 In lieu of traditional visitation, CMS urged
facilities to consider:
a)

Offering alternative means of communication for people who
would otherwise visit, such as virtual communications (phone,
video-communication, etc.).
b) Creating/increasing listserv communication to update families,
such as advising to not visit.
c) Assigning staff as primary contact to families for inbound calls
and conduct regular outbound calls to keep families up to date.
d) Offering a phone line with a voice recording updated at set
times (e.g., daily) with the facility’s general operating status,
such as when it is safe to resume visits.96

Two days after Trump’s declaration and CMS’s guidance, DeSantis
acted quickly to bring Florida’s visitation policies in line with the newly
minted federal standards.97 On March 13, 2020, DeSantis issued an order
banning visitation to all Florida nursing homes for a period of thirty days and
expressly suspended Florida Statute section 400.022(1)(b)—the state law
affording nursing home residents the right to visitation.98 By way of this order,
DEM specifically instructed facilities to: “[P]rohibit the entry of any
individual, to the facility except in the following circumstances: (a) Family
members, friends, and visiting residents in end-of-life situations; (b) Hospice
or palliative care workers caring for residents in end-of-life situations; (c) Any
individuals providing necessary health care to a resident . . . .”99
2.

The Next Wave of Regulation and Reaction in Florida

93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 4.
95.
CMS Memorandum QSO-20-14-NH, supra note 71, at 3.
96.
Id. at 3–4.
97.
See, e.g., Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002 (Mar. 11, 2020);
Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-005 (Mar. 13, 2020).
98.
Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-005; see also FLA. STAT. §
400.022 (2020).
99.
Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-006 (Mar. 15, 2020) (emphasis
added).

2022]

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN NURSING HOMES

346

Both Florida and CMS guidance on visitation remained fluid during
the entire period during which COVID-19 ravaged the country, consistent with
the fluidity of the scientific findings on the new virus and its mode of
transmission.100 Throughout, consistent with principles of federalism, CMS
guidance and requirements spoke in terms of the permissive (“should”) rather
than the mandatory (“must” or “shall”) and always noted that facilities must
also comply with state and local regulations.101 In March 2020, at the very
beginning of all of this regulation, it advised that: “If a state implements
actions that exceed CMS’s requirements, such as a ban on all visitation
through a governor’s executive order, a facility would not be out of
compliance with CMS’ requirements. In this case, surveyors would still enter
the facility, but not cite for noncompliance with visitation requirements.”102
Between March, when the first regulatory action occurred, and late
summer, state regulation changed quickly in Florida.103 In May, the DEM
reaffirmed all of the visitation restrictions currently in place and indicated that
they would continue indefinitely.104 As nursing home facilities in Florida
followed these orders, deaths and increased disability among residents in
nursing homes continued to spike, raising concerns about policies and
resources used to mitigate the risk among this particularly vulnerable
population.105 During those months, state and national media were flooded
with heartbreaking personal accounts of people separated from their elderly
loved ones—by law.106 Spouses, children, and other caregivers were denied
100.
See id.; CMS Memorandum QSO-20-14-NH, supra note 71, at 2; Chen et
al., supra note 55, at 1187.
101.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Director, Quality, Safety & Oversight Grp.,
to State Surv. Agency Dirs., Prioritization of Surv. Activities 3 (Mar. 20, 2020) [hereinafter
CMS Memorandum QSO-20-20-All] (using “should adhere” to explain the guidelines);
Memorandum from Director, Surv. & Certification Grp., to State Surv. Agency Dirs., Nursing
Home Visitation–COVID-19 (Revised) 2–3, 5 (Apr. 27, 2021) [hereinafter CMS Memorandum
QSO-20-39-NH]; CMS Memorandum QSO-20-14-NH, supra note 71, at 2–3.
102.
CMS Memorandum QSO-20-14-NH, supra note 71, at 2.
103.
See Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002; but see Fla. Div.
Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-007 (May 18, 2020). These restrictions remained in effect
from March long into the summer months of 2020, to extend in accordance with the State of
Emergency continued by Governor Ron DeSantis. See Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No.
20-007; Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-52.
104.
Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-007.
105.
Chen et. al, supra note 55, at 1186; Mary Ellen Klas, Why Are Coronavirus
Deaths Doubling in Florida’s Nursing Homes?, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/health/2020/12/23/florida-nursing-home-coronavirus-deathsare-doubling-advocates-blame-testing/.
106.
See, e.g., McVey, supra note 81.
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access to their family members for months with no end in sight.107 Many of
those potential visitors described watching their loved ones deteriorate through
plate glass and cell phone screens.108 Spouses even took volunteer jobs at their
loved ones’ nursing homes in desperate attempts to circumvent the ban on
visitation keeping them apart.109
By June of 2020, visitation policies in health care facilities were being
challenged in Florida state courts. 110 Noting that patients and facilities could
suffer catastrophic harm if visitation restrictions are “found to be improper and
cannot be utilized,” one judge dismissed an action challenging a local
hospital’s visitation policy.111 Civil Circuit Judge Michael Robinson stated,
“[i]t is not in the public interest for courts to assume and micro-manage the
delivery of medical services in a pandemic. We do not want to open up the
proverbial Pandora’s box . . . .”112
IV.

RECOGNITION OF THE VALUE (AND ADOPTION) OF THERAPEUTIC
RATHER THAN ANTI-THERAPEUTIC POLICIES

As the uproar over visitation policies dominated headlines, both levels
of government formed independent nursing home commissions or task forces
responsible for drafting policy recommendations to help “inform immediate
and future responses to COVID-19 in nursing homes.”113 In a press release
announcing the formation of the Florida task force, DeSantis stated:
In an effort to protect our most vulnerable, we made the difficult
decision in March to prohibit visitation to these facilities. While
these measures were necessary, it has taken an emotional toll on our
107.
See Andrew Soergel, Feds Tell Nursing Homes to Open for Visitors, AARP
(Sept. 18, 2020), http://www.aarp.org/caregiving/health/info-2020/feds-ask-nursing-homes-toopen-for-more-visits.html.
108.
See Andy Markowitz & Emily Paulin, AARP Answers: Nursing Homes and
the Coronavirus, AARP (Nov. 6, 2020), http://www.aarp.org/caregiving/health/info2020/nursing-homes-coronavirus-faqs.html; Mauch, supra note 81.
109.
Mauch, supra note 81.
110.
See Angie DiMichele, Judge Blames the Coronavirus for Preventing
Woman From Having Hospital Visits, SUN SENTINEL (June 5, 2020, 4:47 PM), http://www.sunsentinel.com/coronavirus/fl-ne-judge-denies-injunction-hospital-visit-20200605dhuyt3pcszcm3dxp3w46fzuwpu-story.html.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Announces
Independent Commission to Address Safety and Quality in Nursing Homes (Apr. 30, 2020),
http://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-announces-independent-commissionaddress-safety-and-quality-nursing-homes.
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families. I look forward to the ideas that arise from this task force
on how we can continue our mission to protect the vulnerable while
allowing for the much-needed human connection of spending time
with family and friends.114

Effectively, governments began to recognize, or at least question, how
anti-therapeutic the initial, strict limitations on visitation had been.115 This
Section will first discuss the conclusions and policy recommendations of both
commissions and measures adopted thereafter. Then, it will explain why
visitation and other methods of social connection are imperative to the health
and wellbeing of all nursing home residents. Finally, it will detail the negative
effects of the initial policies.

A.

Recommendations and Reactions

In September of 2020, the light at the end of a long, dark tunnel finally
came into view for nursing home residents and their families.116 Florida’s task
force and the federal nursing home commission released their respective
findings within weeks of each other, both adamantly recommending that
family visitation be safely, but immediately, resumed.117 Both the state and
the federal governments (eventually) reacted in ways that benefited nursing
home residents psychologically.118
1.

A Report and Reaction in Florida

Florida’s Task Force on the Safe and Limited Reopening of LongTerm Care Facilities (the “Task Force”) released its report first, on September

note 113.

114.
115.

Press Release, Fla. Gov. Press Office, supra note 19.
Id.; see also Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., supra

116.
See, e.g., CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING
HOMES, COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 1 (2020), http://edit.cms.gov/files/document/covid-finalnh-commission-report.pdf.
117.
See id.; TASK FORCE ON THE SAFE AND LIMITED RE-OPENING OF LONG-TERM
CARE FACILITIES, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNOR DESANTIS 1–2 (2020),
http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/covid19/Final%20Report%209-1-20.pdf.
118.
TASK FORCE ON THE SAFE AND LIMITED RE-OPENING OF LONG-TERM CARE
FACILITIES, supra note 117, at 2.

349

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

1, 2020.119 The Task Force made three final recommendations: (1) resume
immediate visitation for Essential Caregivers and Compassionate Care visitors
(defined categories of persons); (2) resume general visitation “if the facility
meets certain indicators of low virus risk;” and (3) reopen only after facilities
had developed “policies and procedures that support the safety of all residents
and visitors.”120 A press release announcing the report’s release noted that:
“[h]uman connection and visitation are vital to meeting the mental and
emotional needs of those in long-term care. The visitation restrictions have
been extremely challenging on individuals in these facilities and their loved
ones, and the Task Force recommendations support residents safely
reconnecting with their families.”121
Florida nursing home residents saw near-immediate relief in the
aftermath of the Task Force’s recommendations.122 On the very day the Task
Force publicized its recommendations, DeSantis ended the five-month ban on
visitation.123 The order afforded each resident the right to designate two
essential caregivers and two compassionate caregivers, and further directed
facilities to develop an “agreeable [visitation] schedule in concert with the
resident and visitor, including evenings and weekends . . . .”124 The order also
provided for general visitation to resume as long as a detailed list of criteria
had been met.125
Visitation restrictions eased progressively over the winter months of
2020; residents were even allowed to leave facilities to spend time with family
and friends for the holidays, although they were required to quarantine if they

119.
See Press Release, Agency for Health Care Admin., Task Force on the Safe
and Limited Re-Opening of Long-Term Care Facilities Releases Visitation Recommendations
(Sept. 1, 2020) (on file with http://ahca.myflorida.com/docs/AHCA_E-BlastTask_Force_on_the_Safe_and_Limited_Re-Opening_of_LongTerm_Care_Facilities_Releases_Visitation_Recommendations.pdf); TASK FORCE ON THE SAFE
AND LIMITED RE-OPENING OF LONG-TERM CARE FACILITIES, supra note 117, at 1.
120.
Press Release, Agency for Health Care Admin., supra note 119; TASK
FORCE ON THE SAFE AND LIMITED RE-OPENING OF LONG-TERM CARE FACILITIES, supra note 117,
at 10.
121.
Press Release, Agency for Health Care Admin., supra note 119; Shawna
De La Rosa, Florida Task Force Releases Long-Term Care Facility Visitation
Recommendations,
STATE
REFORM
(Nov.
10,
2020),
http://stateofreform.com/featured/2020/11/florida-task-force-releases-long-term-care-facilityvisitation-recommendations/.
122.
See De La Rosa, supra note 121.
123.
See Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-009 (Sept. 1, 2020); Press
Release, Agency for Health Care Admin., supra note 119.
124.
Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-009.
125.
Id.
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failed their facilities’ screening protocols upon return.126 By March of 2021,
only one requirement relating to visitation remained at the state level: facilities
had to, at a minimum, “maintain visitation and infection control policies in
accordance with all state and federal laws and . . . continue to monitor all
[CMS] and [CDC] prevention guidance.”127 By May 2021, DeSantis
eliminated all remaining COVID-inspired, visitation-related regulatory
requirements.128
2.

The Federal Commission Recommendations and the Government’s
Response

The Federal Coronavirus Commission on Safety and Quality in
Nursing Homes expressed the same concerns as Florida’s Task Force and
issued similar policy recommendations.129 In its final report dated September
2020, the Commission wrote, “[b]eyond experiencing the ravages of the
disease itself, residents have been traumatized by the impact of nursing homes
restricting visitors and curtailing group activities in an effort to mitigate spread
of this virus.”130 It continued, “[t]he resulting physical and mental harm—and
increased vulnerabilities—to residents is common knowledge and
troubling.”131
The Commission’s report identified “four key problems” with limited
and no-visitation policies.132 Much as this Article suggests, the Commission’s
first finding was that “[a]lthough visitation restrictions have partially protected
the physical health of residents, the practice also has resulted in unintended
harm.”133 Citing “loneliness, anxiety, and depression due to prolonged
126.
Bailey LeFever, Florida Families May Take Long-Term Care Residents
Home for the Holidays, State Says, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/health/2020/11/05/florida-families-may-take-long-term-careresidents-home-for-the-holidays-state-says/. Two weeks after DeSantis directed the issuance
of Emergency Order Number 20-011, AHCA sent an email-blast to long-term care facilities
clarifying the visitation rules announced in the October Order and directing facilities to release
residents for the holidays following reports of public confusion. See id.
127.
Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 21-001 (Mar. 22, 2021).
128.
Fla. Exec. Order No. 21-101 (May 3, 2021).
129.
See CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING HOMES,
supra note 116, at iii, iv, viii–x; TASK FORCE ON THE SAFE AND LIMITED RE-OPENING OF LONGTERM CARE FACILITIES, supra note 117, at 1–2.
130.
CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING HOMES,
supra note 116, at iii.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. at 32.
133.
Id.; see discussion supra Section III.C.
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separation from families and loved ones,” the Commission concluded that
visitation bans “caused significant distress for families . . .” and
“compromise[d] the ability of families and guardians to validate resident wellbeing . . . .”134 As a second key finding, the Commission expressly recognized
that “the extent of this unintended harm has not been adequately assessed.”135
The third problem the Commission identified was that “[v]irtual
visitation often provides an insufficient substitute to address resident
needs.”136 As this Article will later explain, its insufficiency as a substitute is
“even more acute when combined with limitations due to differing physical
and cognitive abilities; resident, family, and/or staff unfamiliarity with proper
equipment . . . and internet availability.”137
Finally, the Commission concluded that “[v]isitation guidance is
currently unclear.”138 In its own words, “CMS and its federal partners have
issued directives and guidance pertaining to visitation during the pandemic in
multiple documents, making it challenging for nursing homes to meet (and
CMS to enforce) federal expectations or leverage evolving flexibility.”139 To
alleviate the harms it had identified, the Commission made four concrete
policy recommendations, each with corresponding action steps.140 The first
was to “[e]mphasize that visitation is a vital resident right.”141 The second was
to “[u]pdate and release consolidated, evidence-based guidance on effectively
planning for and implementing virtual visitation tools and techniques.”142
Third, the Commission recommended providing the requisite resources to help
nursing home staff “assess and improve the mental health and psychosocial
well-being of residents during and after the pandemic.”143 Finally, the
Commission recommended “[a]ssess[ing], streamlin[ing], and increas[ing] the
accessibility of COVID-19-related directives, guidance, and resources on
visitation into a single source.”144
CMS expressly “recognize[d] that physical separation from family
and other loved ones has taken a physical and emotional toll on [patients] and
134.
Id.
135.
CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING HOMES,
supra note 116, at 32.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
See CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING HOMES,
supra note 116, at viii.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
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their loved ones” in a variety of ways.145 It therefore revised its then-current
visitation guidelines, providing that “[v]isitation can be conducted through
different means based on a facility’s structure and residents’ needs,” but still
requiring, among other infection control practices, “[f]ace covering[s] or
mask[s] (covering the mouth and nose) and social distancing [of] at least six
feet between persons . . .”146 It suggested outdoor visitation—socially
distanced whenever possible—but shifted its presumption regarding indoor
visitation from negative to positive: “[f]acilities should allow indoor visitation
at all times and for all residents (regardless of vaccination status), except for a
few circumstances when visitation should be limited due to a high risk of
COVID-19 transmission (note: compassionate care visits should be permitted
at all times).”147 CMS still recommended limited visitor movement within the
facility, visitation somewhere other than a patient’s room when patients share
rooms, social distancing, face coverings, and monitoring/limiting the number
of visitors in the facility at any given time.148 CMS permitted communal
dining and other activities with specified precautions to ensure safety.149
By March 2021, CMS had altered its tone even further to suggest that,
instead of banning visitation in the vast majority of cases, facilities should
“[h]ave a facility plan for managing visitation, including [the] use of
restrictions when necessary.”150 It encouraged nursing homes to “facilitate inperson visits whenever possible” and counseled facilities to refer to their
previous guidance as well as that of their state and local health departments.151
B.

Why Visitation Matters

Visitation rights—as guaranteed under both the FNHRA and various
state laws—are essential to the mental and physical well-being of nursing

145.
CMS Memorandum QSO-20-39-NH, supra note 101, at 1.
146.
Id. at 2.
147.
Id. at 3, 5..
148.
Id. at 3.
149.
Id. at 7.
150.
Memorandum from Alison Beam, Acting Sec’y of Health, Pa. Dep’t of
Health, to Health Alert Network, UPDATE: Core Infection Prevention and Control Measures
for Long-Term Care Facilities 5 (Sept. 24, 2021) (on file with the Pennsylvania Department of
Health); Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations to Prevent SARS-CoV-2
Spread in Nursing Homes, supra note 70 (referencing the CDC’s previous guidelines that have
since been updated).
151.
Memorandum from Alison Beam, Acting Sec’y of Health, Pa. Dep’t of
Health, to Health Alert Network, supra note 150, at 5.
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home residents.152 Studies have found a strong correlation between having
visitors in close proximity and positive behaviors, such as smiling and
alertness.153 More specifically, visits from family and close friends have been
found to have several positive health effects on nursing home residents,
including higher life satisfaction and increased life expectancy.154 Increased
family involvement has also been found to improve quality of life and
influence residents’ psychosocial or functional outcomes.155
Various research studies have also addressed the benefits of family
involvement within the specific context of nursing homes.156 “Family
involvement is a multidimensional construct . . . ” that includes not only
personal contact through visitation, but also “socio-emotional care, advocacy,
and the provision of personal care.”157 That involvement includes, but is not
limited to, assistance with grooming, touching, holding hands, having
conversations, cheering the resident up, and generally monitoring the quality
of care provided by staff at the facility.158
Such actions and behaviors performed by families during visitations
have been associated with positive outcomes, even among the mentallyimpaired elderly.159 Studies have found that residents receiving more visits
demonstrated less psychosocial impairment.160 Family members involved in
resident care have even reported a decrease in the need for medications.161 The
specific connections of family involvement and the positive outcomes seen in

152.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(3); FLA. STAT. § 400.022(1)(b); see Vernon L. Greene
& Deborah J. Monahan, The Impact of Visitation on Patient Well-Being in Nursing Homes, 22
GERONTOLOGIST 418, 423 (1982).
153.
Helen M. Hendy, Effects of Pet and/or People Visits on Nursing Home
Residents, 25 INT’L. J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 279, 284–85 (1987); Chen et al., supra note 55, at
1189.
154.
See Linda Noelker & Zev Harel, Predictors of Well-Being and Survival
Among Institutionalized Aged, 18 GERONTOLOGIST 562, 564 (1978).
155.
Greene & Monahan, supra note 152, at 423.
156.
See, e.g., Joseph E. Gaugler, Family Involvement in Residential Long-Term
Care: A Synthesis and Critical Review, 9 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 105, 116 (2005).
157.
Id. at 105.
158.
See, e.g., Jennifer Baumbusch & Alison Phinney, Invisible Hands: The
Role of Highly Involved Families in Long-Term Residential Care, 20 J. FAM. NURSING 73, 81
(2014); Maree Petersen et al., The Space of Family Care-Giving in Australian Aged Care
Facilities: Implications for Social Work, 46 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 81, 84 (2014).
159.
Miriam S. Moss & Paul Kurland, Family Visiting with Institutionalized
Mentally Impaired Aged, 1 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 271, 276 (2008).
160.
Greene & Monahan, supra note 152, at 422; Kathryn Hoehn Anderson et
al., Patients with Dementia: Involving Families to Maximize Nursing Care, 18 J.
GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 19, 24 (1992).
161.
Anderson et al., supra note 160, at 22.
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the residents have also been studied in detail, finding biological and
psychosocial associations with those positive outcomes.162
Visits, whether with family or friends, promote social interaction.163
Positive social interactions have a strong correlation to older adults’ mental
health and well-being, helping them to maintain a sense of meaning and selfworth, and feel understood and appreciated.164 Maximizing opportunities for
social interactions is especially important in facilities because nursing home
residents’ opportunities for social interactions decline considerably simply as
a result of transitioning into such facility.165 Visits from families and friends
provide socioemotional support and serve as a link to the outside world by
providing updates on friends, families, and neighbors.166 Such support also
may contribute to residents’ psychological well-being.167
Interaction with families also impacts other biological and
psychological aspects of well-being associated with physical touch.168 In
many instances, families assist with grooming or simply touch or hold hands
with residents.169 Studies have found a marked correlation between physical
touch and the functioning of the body, demonstrated through the decrease of
cortisol levels and the lowering of blood pressure in stressful situations.170
Hugging has also been found to strengthen the immune system, relieve pain,

162.
Greene & Monahan, supra note 152, at 422.
163.
Id. at 418.
164.
See Neal Krause, Stressors Arising in Highly Valued Roles, Meaning in
Life, and the Physical Health Status of Older Adults, 59 J. GERONTOLOGY: SOC. SCIS. S287,
S288 (2004) [hereinafter Stressors Arising in Highly Valued Roles]; Neal Krause, Evaluating
the Stress-Buffering Function of Meaning in Life Among Older People, 19 J. AGING & HEALTH
792, 792 (2007) [hereinafter Evaluating the Stress-Buffering Function of Meaning in Life
Among Older People].
165.
See Stressors Arising in Highly Valued Roles, supra note 164, at S288.
166.
Heying Jenny Zhan et al., The Role of the Family in Institutional Long-Term
Care: Cultural Management of Filial Piety in China, 20 INT’L. J. SOC. WELFARE S121, S123
(2011).
167.
Id. at S131.
168.
Hidenobu Sumioka et al., Huggable Communication Medium Decreases
Cortisol
Levels,
3
SCI.
REPS.
1,
1
(2013),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3805974/pdf/srep03034.pdf.
169.
See id.; Zhan et al., supra note 166, at S131.
170.
Sumioka et al., supra note 168, at 1; Kathleen C. Light et al., More Frequent
Partner Hugs and Higher Oxytocin Levels are Linked to Lower Blood Pressure and Heart Rate
in Premenopausal Women, 69 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 5, 6 (2005); Lillian Koziol, The Importance
of
Human
Touch,
SENIORITY
MATTERS
(Apr.
23,
2012),
http://www.senioritymatters.com/blog/importance-human-touch.
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decrease heart rates, and play a role in the possible prevention of Parkinson’s
disease.171
Other roles played by family members that contribute to residents’
well-being include their role as overseers of the care their loved ones receive
and advocates for better communication with staff regarding the residents’
needs, both roles potentially result in better levels of care and improved quality
of life for residents.172 For those in palliative care or hospice, conversations
about goals of care are essential for quality care, and those conversations often
take place with family members or other loved ones present.173
These positive physical and psychological outcomes of visitation as
the result of nursing home residents’ interaction with families and friends are
striking.174 They provide substantial support for considering the best
therapeutic alternatives when considering, limiting, or eliminating such an
important source of wellbeing and quality of life for the institutionalized elders
in our society.175
C.
The Negative Results of the Limitations on and Prohibition of
Visitation During COVID-19
Despite the proven benefits of visitation, nursing homes naturally had
to concern themselves with the potential for the virus’s spread between and
among patients and staff.176 Not only was health at stake, but nursing home
operators also were financially incentivized to reduce infections within their
171.
Sumioka et al., supra note 168, at 1; Light et al., supra note 170, at 5;
Koziol, supra note 170.
172.
Gloria Puurveen et al., From Family Involvement to Family Inclusion in
Nursing Home Settings: A Critical Interpretive Synthesis, 24 J. FAM. NURSING 60, 61 (2018);
Amy Restorick Roberts & Karen J. Ishler, Family Involvement in the Nursing Home and
Perceived Resident Quality of Life, 58 GERONTOLOGIST 1033, 1034 (2018).
173.
See Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Social Isolation and Health, HEALTH AFFAIRS 1
(June 2020), http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20200622.253235/full/brief-socialisolation-mortality-Holt-Lunstad.pdf; Jean Abbott et al., Ensuring Adequate Palliative and
Hospice Care During COVID-19 Surges, 324 JAMA NETWORK 1393, 1393 (2020).
174.
See Puurveen et al., supra note 172, at 61.
175.
See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED
& PREVENTIVE PSYCH. 179, 179 (1996). “Therapeutic jurisprudence…which focuses on the
law’s impact on emotional life, is a perspective that recognizes the law itself can be seen to
function as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent.” Id.; Julianne Holt-Lunstad et al., Loneliness
and Social Isolation as Risk Factors for Mortality: A Meta-Analytic Review, 10 PERSPS. ON
PSYCH. SCI. 227, 227 (2015) [hereinafter Loneliness and Social Isolation as Risk Factors for
Morality: A Meta-Analytic Review]; Puurveen et al., supra note 172, at 61; Sumioka et al.,
supra note 168, at 1.
176.
See Chen et al., supra note 55, at 1187; Jennifer Abbasi, Social Isolation —
the Other COVID-19 Threat in Nursing Homes, 324 JAMA 619, 620 (2020).
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walls.177 Not only was isolation a likely method of limiting infection, it was
initially required by regulatory authorities.178 One observer in late July 2020
described nursing home owners as living “in complete fear of getting exposed
for an infection control violation,” leading them to be very strict about
visitation.179
While the trauma associated with COVID-19 caused psychological
harm throughout the country, strict visitation policies and imposed isolation
exacerbated the mental and physical harm experienced by residents in
America’s nursing homes.180 Visitation restrictions are a common infection
control mechanism yet “little is known about their effects.”181 A literature
review published in early 2021 summarized seventeen articles written on the
negative health effects of COVID-19 related visitation restrictions, concluding
“the . . . pandemic had several impacts on patient health, the health and
wellbeing of family members, and the provision of care.”182 One nursing
home medical director emphasized the “psychological toll on patients and
families separated from loved ones . . . .” and explained “[t]he isolation can be
particularly difficult in nursing homes, where separation is magnified by
illness and geography.”183 The nursing home industry itself worried about
such effects of isolation after passing through its initial fear of contagion.184
177.
See 42 C.F.R. § 488.406; Musumeci & Chidambaram, supra note 76;
Nursing Home Enforcement – Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE
SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-andCertification/SurveyCertificationEnforcement/Downloads/NH-Enforcement-FAQ.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2022).
178.
See CMS Memorandum QSO-20-14-NH, supra note 71, at 2.
179.
Abbasi, supra note 176, at 619.
180.
See Jill Krueger, Legal Strategies for Promoting Mental Health and
Wellbeing in Relation to the COVID-19 Pandemic, in COVID-19 POLICY PLAYBOOK: LEGAL
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SAFER, MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE 120, 120 (March 2021),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3808335.
The COVID-19 pandemic may be viewed as a mass trauma experienced
throughout the United States and the rest of the world. . . . By July 2020, more than
50 [percent] of respondents to a Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracking Poll
indicated that worry or stress about the new coronavirus had negatively affected their
mental health.

Id. (citing Liz Hamel et al., Coronavirus: Reopening, Schools, and the Government Response,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jul. 27, 2020), http://www.kff.org/coronavirus-COVID-19/report/kffhealth-tracking-poll-july-2020/).
181.
Karin Hugelius et al., Consequences of Visiting Restrictions During the
Covid-19 Pandemic: An Integrative Review, 121 INT’L J. NURSING STUD., June 5, 2021, at 1, 1.
182.
Id.
183.
Marcus D. Ruopp, Letter to the Editor, Overcoming the Challenge of
Family Separation from Nursing Home Residents During COVID-19, 21 JAMDA 984, 984
(2020).
184.
See Abbasi, supra note 176, at 620.
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Alice Bonner, a long-term care geriatric nurse and senior advisor at the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, said that by August 2020, “concerns
about social isolation had become ‘absolutely pervasive’ across the
industry.”185
Social isolation “is associated with medical risks, increased healthcare
costs, and limited access to key caregiver, financial, medical, or emotional
support . . . .”186 Those in nursing homes were not technically isolated, of
course.187 Doctors, nurses, and various other health care workers, including
non-medical staff such as aides and janitors, still had routine contact with
residents.188 But “social isolation” has been defined as, “an objective deficit
in the number of relationships with, and frequency of, contact with family,
friends, and the community,”189 which many residents experienced due to the
no- and low- visitation regulatory requirements.190
Further, nursing home residents might as well have been absolutely
isolated in terms of contact and personal connections.191 For them, bans or
later limitations on the number of visits and visitors resulted in a social life
comprised exclusively of brief interactions with ghostly figures swathed in
personal protective equipment such as gowns, masks, and face shields.192 For
a population that may also exhibit various forms and levels of dementia, that
may have been worse than having no visitors at all.193 Such conditions, for

185.
Id.
186.
Ashwin A. Kotwal et al., Social Isolation and Loneliness Among San
Francisco Bay Area Older Adults During the Covid-19 Shelter-in-Place Orders, 69 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 20, 21 (2021) (explaining a study which addressed a broader population of
older adults than those in nursing homes).
187.
See Abbasi, supra note 176, at 619.
188.
See id. at 619–20.
189.
Kotwal et al., supra note 185, at 20; Carla Perissinotto et al., A Practical
Approach to Assessing and Mitigating Loneliness and Isolation in Older Adults, 67 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 657, 657 (2019).
190.
See, e.g., Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002; Fla. Div.
Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-005; Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-006; Fla. Div.
Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-007.
191.
See Catherine Crawford Cohen et al., Infection Prevention and Control in
Nursing Homes: A Qualitative Study of Decision-Making Regarding Isolation-Based Practices,
24 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 630, 630–31 (2015).
192.
Abbasi, supra note 176, at 620 (explaining that a nursing home director had
noted that “staff’s face shields, masks, and physical distance—all necessary for infection
control—probably contributed to the residents’ distress”).
193.
See id.
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example, multiply the chances of delirium and potentially increase its severity
when it develops.194
Even if some nursing home patients reported minimal feelings of
social isolation, loneliness can often resemble isolation in terms of its mental
and physical effects.195 Loneliness has been defined as “a discrepancy
between one’s actual and desired level of social connection, and it is associated
with depression, anxiety, functional disability, physical symptoms such as
pain, and death.”196 “Unfortunately, loneliness [itself can] cause a host of poor
[health] outcomes such as depression, anxiety, physical morbidity, and
mortality.”197 Many large-scale studies across multiple settings have
demonstrated that “experiencing loneliness or social isolation increases risk
for earlier death.”198
Indeed, the physical effects of social isolation and loneliness can be
startling.199 Multiple studies have concluded that “poor social connection
increase[s] [the] risk of developing heart disease by twenty-nine percent and
risk for stroke by thirty-two percent.”200 Evidence similarly suggests that
social isolation and loneliness are associated with type two diabetes and
negatively affect general health, as demonstrated by, for example, the
probability of developing a cold.201 Lack of social connection through
communal dining and visitation have been linked to failure to thrive; since
companionship often serves as a trigger for eating, some patients refuse food
and lose weight when no longer experiencing it.202 Patients also experienced
194.
Sharon K. Inouye, The Importance of Delirium and Delirium Prevention in
Older Adults During Lockdowns, 325 JAMA 1779, 1779 (2021) (addressing hospital and ICU
settings specifically, and also noting that delirium is an important presenting symptom of
COVID-19 infection).
195.
See Kotwal, et al., supra note 185, at 21.
196.
Id. (addressing broader population of older adults than those in nursing
homes).
197.
Amit Shrira et al., COVID-19-Related Loneliness and Psychiatric
Symptoms Among Older Adults: The Buffering Role of Subjective Age, 28 AM. J. GERIATRIC
PSYCH. 1200, 1201 (2020).
198.
Holt-Lunstad, supra note 173, at 2; see also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS.,
ENG’G, AND MED., SOCIAL ISOLATION AND LONELINESS IN OLDER ADULTS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR
THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM xi (2020), http://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/25663/socialisolation-and-loneliness-in-older-adults-opportunities-for-the.
199.
See e.g., Hugelius et al., supra note 181, at 1; MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra
note 14, at 2; Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Euthanasia in the Days of Covid-19, AM. COUNCIL ON
SCI. & HEALTH (April 8, 2021), http://www.acsh.org/news/2021/04/08/euthanasia-days-covid19-15460.
200.
Holt-Lunstad, supra note 173, at 3.
201.
Id.
202.
Abbasi, supra note 176, at 620.
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mental health consequences in the form of depression, anxiety, aggression,
reduced cognitive ability, and overall dissatisfaction.203
Families experienced worry and anxiety, fueling an increased need for
information from health care providers.204 Health care providers also
experienced an increase in ethical dilemmas, demands for communication, and
the need to provide support to families and patients.205 Conversations about
goals of care for those in palliative care or hospice—essential components of
quality care—were inhibited because they often require the presence of family
members or other loved ones, who were absent by necessity.206
Research demonstrates an association between lack of human contact
and a decline in cognitive function, although the concrete causes and
mechanisms involved in that association remain unclear.207 Social isolation
and loneliness both have been associated with a long list of adverse functional,
mental, and physical health outcomes, including increased falls, functional
decline, malnutrition, cardiovascular disease, increased depression, and
dementia.208 Social isolation and loneliness have also been associated with a
heightened risk of mortality.209
Nursing home patients who actually contracted COVID-19
experienced increased depression, anxiety, and worsening dementia amongst
those already exhibiting it.210 Increased depression and anxiety can accelerate
the rate of prescribing antipsychotic medications, which may connect to
separate research indicating that “social isolation significantly contributes to
deaths of despair such as drug and alcohol-related deaths and suicide.”211
203.
See, e.g., Hugelius et al., supra note 181, at 1; MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra
note 14, at 17; Billauer, supra note 199; Press Release, Agency for Health Care Admin., supra
note 119, at 1.
204.
Hugelius et al., supra note 181, at 1.
205.
See Julianne Holt-Lunstad, The Double Pandemic of Social Isolation and
COVID-19: Cross-Sector Policy Must Address Both, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (June 22, 2020),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200609.53823; Sujith J. Chandy et al.,
Collateral Effects and Ethical Challenges in Healthcare Due to COVID-19 A Dire Need to
Support Healthcare Workers and Systems, 10, J. FAM. MED. & PRIMARY CARE, 22, 25 (2021).
206.
Abbott et al., supra note 173, at 1393.
207.
See Catherine Offord, How Social Isolation Affects the Brain, SCIENTIST,
(July 13, 2020), http://www.the-scientist.com/features/how-social-isolation-affects-the-brain67701.
208.
See id.; Walter Sepulveda-Loyola et al., Impact of Social Isolation Due To
Covid-19 on Health In Older People: Mental and Physical Effects and Recommendations, 24 J.
NUTRITION, HEALTH & AGING, 938, 939 (2020).
209.
Loneliness and Social Isolation as Risk Factors for Mortality: A MetaAnalytic Review, supra note 175, at 234–35.
210.
See Abbasi, supra note 176, at 619.
211.
Id. at 620; Holt-Lunstad, supra note 173, at 3.
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Thus, generally speaking, “[t]he psychological and socioeconomic
impacts of [COVID-19] are unprecedented in our lifetimes . . . .”212 While
there is limited research on the direct impact of the prohibition on visitation
on nursing home residents’ mortality and morbidity rates, previous research is
clear: being socially connected in meaningful ways is key to health and
survival.213 Thus, policies designed to eliminate visitation with the intent to
protect residents from the harm of contagion may also have been
unintentionally harmful to their overall well-being.214
V.

LESSONS LEARNED

[TJ] does not suggest that therapeutic considerations should trump
other considerations. Therapeutic consequences are merely one
category of important factors that should be taken into account.
Others include individual autonomy, integrity of the fact-finding
process, community safety, and efficiency and economy. [TJ] does
not purport to resolve the questions of what should be done when
values conflict; instead, it sets the stage for their sharp
articulation.215

Consistent with this reminder from the founders of TJ, the most
important consideration when analyzing government regulation during a
pandemic must be public health, as arguably reflected in Wexler and Winick’s
reference to community safety.216 Yet “[t]he mental health of our citizenry,
no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent
importance.”217 There is room for TJ-inspired consideration of the mental
health of individuals, as the nursing home commissions and later federal and
state regulatory actions eventually recognized.218
Because nursing homes house vulnerable populations of elders and
individuals with severe disabling conditions, it is imperative that the public
health balance in a pandemic policymaking includes attention to their
212.
D’Adamo et al., supra note 47, at 912.
213.
Holt-Lunstad, supra note 205.
214.
See id.; Chen et al., supra note 55, at 1188–89; CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON
SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING HOMES, supra note 116, at 32.
215.
Wexler & Winick, supra note 1, at xvii.
216.
See id.
217.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (recognizing a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege in part because of its mental and emotional benefits).
218.
TASK FORCE ON THE SAFE AND LIMITED RE-OPENING OF LONG-TERM CARE
FACILITIES, supra note 117 at 1–2; CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING
HOMES, supra note 116, at 7–8; see also Wexler & Winick, supra note 1, at xx (explaining TJ
aspires to “stimulate thought, further scholarship, and needed law reform.”).
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residents’ social and mental health concerns during times of crisis, such as
future pandemics.219 When regulating during a pandemic, public health
officials must balance both public health and individual rights.220 While the
balance will always vary depending on the level of knowledge about the
disease at hand, both federal and state statutes should better recognize that the
“medically frail” nursing home population both is “highly susceptible to
infectious disease” and enjoys important pre-existing rights to mental and
physical health.221 Federal and state governments have used those statutes to
express their concern for nursing home residents’ safety, quality of care
received, and legal rights.222 They have been forced to do so because nursing
homes have inspired concerns about quality, cost, and accessibility of care for
many years.223 Policymakers should not minimize any of those concerns
during a pandemic, even at the beginning of one, and even with respect to a
disease that erupted as quickly as COVID-19 did.224 Epidemiologists were
219.
See Kohn, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that nursing home operators
themselves predicted a health crisis).
220.
Robert Gatter & Seema Mohapatra, COVID-19 and the Conundrum of
Mask Requirements, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 17, 19–20 (2020),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulronline/?utm_source=scholarlycommons.law.wlu.
edu%2Fwlulronline%2Fvol77%2Fiss1%2F2&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCove
rPages.
221.
See Kohn, supra note 14, at 3–5 (describing nursing homes residents as
“highly susceptible to infectious disease” because of the “congregate nature” of the care and the
“medically frail” condition of the residents); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(2) (federal statute affording
residents quality of care that promotes their mental, physical, and emotional health); FLA. STAT.
§ 400.022(b) (2020) (Florida’s state equivalent of the federal regulation); discussion supra Part
II.
222.
COMM. ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE, INST. OF MED.,
DIV. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE 1 (Gooloo S.
Wunderlich & Peter O. Kohler eds., 2001).
223.
See id.; Charlene Harrington et al., Key Issues in Long-Term Services and
Supports Quality, KFF (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/key-issues-inlong-term-services-and-supports-quality/. Professor Nina Kohn argues nursing homes that
long-term-care facility health policy choices have enabled “nursing homes to make choices that
have long endangered the health and welfare of their residents.” Kohn, supra note 14, at 3;
Konetzka, supra note 35, at 633–34 (concurring that “quality of nursing home care has been a
long-standing challenge” and describing the long-term care sector as “an industry known for
quality problems.”); Giovenco, supra note 51, at 123 (describing how COVID-19 has “shed
light on a crisis that has plagued America for decades — neglect, mismanagement, and
inadequate [care] in nursing homes and . . . long-term care facilities (”LTCs”)).”
224.
See Giovenco, supra note 51, at 123–24 (highlighting that neglect has
“plagued America for decades”). As emphasized previously, this Article analyzes only TJ
considerations, it will not address potential legal arguments contesting the disregard of patients’
rights to visitation. See discussion supra Part I; e.g., Giovenco, supra note, at 130 (raising
concerns regarding age discrimination, equal protection, and substantive due process).
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operating in the dark, as were treating medical professionals, when COVID19 took only three months to transform from initial detection of a deadly new
illness to the WHO’s pandemic declaration.225 Yet, as public health expert Jill
Krueger has explained, “promoting social connections to combat loneliness
should be as much a priority as infectious disease control measures.”226
Professor Scott Burris and others have noted that “[l]aw has
significant health effects. Failure to study these effects and translate that
knowledge into better law reflects problems of culture, not science.”227
Toward that end, just as Professor Burris urged with regard to investigating
the law’s effects on physical health, “[p]ast mistakes are water under the
bridge, but now is the time to invest in the research and research infrastructure
to learn what we need to know going forward.”228
It is unlikely that the unfettered visitation rights guaranteed by states
and FNHRA’s Patients’ Bills of Rights can be maintained in the face of an
infectious disease outbreak rising to the level of a pandemic, but we now
know, from hard experience, that the ability to interact with other human
beings is vital to the mental health of all persons, and particularly nursing
home residents.229 Research on the mental health effects of low-visitation and
no-visitation policies during COVID and its variants is crucial to striking the
proper and necessary balance between public health and residents’ rights in
the future.230 With such evidence in hand, researchers should begin now to
collect and analyze data relating to at least the following three “lessons
learned” during the COVID-19 pandemic.

58.

225.

See discussion supra Part II; Cucinotta & Vanelli, supra note 33, at 157–

226.
Krueger, supra note 180, at 121–22 (explaining that “interacting” is one of
the “core pillars of wellbeing” within the field of positive psychology). “The COVID-19
pandemic may be viewed as a mass trauma experienced throughout the United States and the
rest of the world.” Id. at 120.
227.
Burris et al., supra note 6, at 1975. While TJ and Legal Epidemiology share
many parallels, the former focuses more on psychological health rather than physical health.
See id. at 1973; David C. Yamada, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Foundations, Expansion, and
Assessment, 75 UNIV. MIA. L. REV. 660, 660 (2021).
228.
Burris et al., supra note 6, at 1974.
229.
See discussion supra Part II; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(3); FLA. STAT. §
400.022(1)(b) (2020) (codifying Florida’s state equivalent of the FNHRA).
230.
See Konetzka, supra note 35, at 633 (“[T]here is an urgent and clear role
for better policy [in America’s nursing homes].”). “TJ is not a packet of materials one simply
learns and then applies; instead, it is an ongoing process of analysis, insight, proposal(s),
discussion, revision, evaluation, further revision and growth.” The DNA of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, supra note 83, at 3.
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A.
Nursing Home Residents Must Have Unfettered Access to No Fewer
Than One Patient Advocate or Family Member As Soon As Possible During
Future Pandemics
State and federal governments guarantee in-person visitation to
nursing home residents under normal circumstances for numerous, sound
reasons.231 Such in-person visitation produces numerous mental health
benefits, which have been the focus of this Article.232 The benefits of a simple
touch are immense, as revealed in part through residents’ responses to a
nationwide survey conducted between July and August of 2020.233 One
respondent said, “I don’t feel the touch of my family and I need that. I feel
like they don’t love me anymore.”234 Another emphasized, “I miss hugs and
touch, especially from my family members!”235
In addition, in-person visitation reveals aspects of resident care that
friends and family members cannot observe if they are not present.236 The
physical presence of those with the residents’ best interests at heart can assist
with care at understaffed facilities, thus improving overall quality of care.237
For example, one respondent writing on behalf of her mother explained that
the family had transferred her from the facility in which she was living by the
spring of 2020 after “she lost [eight] pounds in . . . three-week[s] . . . .”238 The
transfer, which the respondent characterized as “the best decision [her] family
made,” was necessary because “[her mother] did not understand why [her
family was] looking at her through a window and she needed to be fed and
was not.”239 As a blanket characterization, another resident wrote, “[t]he level
of care has gone down. Families are not allowed in so there is no
accountability on the part of the staff.”240
Early on in the pandemic, regulators recognized the need for in-person
visitation in compassionate care situations—sometimes defined as only endof-life and sometimes defined more broadly—but the statistical and qualitative

231.
See MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra note 14, at 2.
232.
Id.; see also discussion supra Part IV.
233.
MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra note 14, at 25–36 app. a. (listing responses
from nursing home residents in thirty-six states).
234.
Id. at 26.
235.
Id. at 28.
236.
See Kohn, supra note 14, at 5.
237.
See id. at 5; 6.
238.
MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra note 14, at 29.
239.
Id.
240.
Id. at 33.
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data available points to a need for more.241 In-person visitation with loved
ones is especially crucial for those unable to appreciate technologically
mediated communication due to dementia or other physical or mental
conditions, as illustrated by the recollection of one respondent who detailed
her experience:
I am very lonely. I’m an invalid so I am in bed most of
the day. . . . [I] feel like I am in prison. I miss my daughter
seeing me almost every day. Now she window visits about
[three] times a week. We have to talk on the phone because I
can’t hear through the closed window. I can’t hold the phone a
long time; only have use of my left hand. . . . My golden years
are in jail.242

Some states have begun to recognize such difficulties.243 Arkansas,
for example, recently broadened its definition of “compassionate care” for inperson visitation purposes and required that “a long-term facility shall
accommodate and support indoor visitation for reasons beyond compassionate
care visitation” if the facility had experienced “no new onset” of COVID-19
in the past fourteen days and was located within a county with a positivity rate
less than ten percent.244 Even as Illinois took action to facilitate technological
communication within nursing homes, for example, it cautioned, “[t]he virtual
visitation policies shall not be interpreted as a substitute for in-person
visitation, but shall be wholly in addition to existing in-person visitation
policies.”245
Thus, while initial caution is understandable in the face of infectious
disease, the goal during pandemics in the future should be to ensure that each
nursing home resident has unfettered in-person access to at least one advocate
or family member of their choice as soon as possible.246 Such access should
only be granted after levels of infectiousness, and methods to prevent and
241.
See discussion supra Section III.C.1; Konetzka, supra note 35, at 632–33;
Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-51 (Mar. 1, 2020); Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-52 (Mar. 9, 2020); Fla. Div.
Emergency Mgmt. Order No. 20-002 (Mar. 11, 2020).
242.
See MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra note 14, at 34 app. a. (quoting resident’s
response when a nursing home asked, “[i]s there anything else you would like to tell us about
how your life has changed since the Coronavirus restrictions?”). The sheer number of residents
who responded by stating they felt as if they were in prison or jail was striking. See id. at app.
a, at 25–36.
243.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-6-407(a)(1) (2021); ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3102.3(a) (2021).
244.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-6-407(d)(1)(3)(A).
245.
ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3-102.3(b)(2).
246.
See MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra note 14, at 5, 17.
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control spread, are determined.247 The technological solutions and creative
“work-arounds” to in-person visitation that this Article will discuss are
imperfect substitutes.248
B.
Modern Technology Must Be Leveraged to Mitigate the AntiTherapeutic Effects of Mandated Isolation in Future Pandemic Policymaking
In the first months of the pandemic, nursing home facilities quickly
recognized they could leverage technology to help keep residents connected
to the outside world.249 Tablet and phone-based applications such as
FaceTime and Zoom enhanced social interaction among residents and their
families, at least to the extent residents were comfortable with technology and
cognizant enough to appreciate its capabilities.250 Devices like iPads provided
vision-impaired residents with larger screens; Apple TV allowed residents to
stream to their televisions while resting comfortably in bed.251 Some facilities
implemented video diaries—routinely used in the ICU setting—which
produced valuable clinical information while helping residents and their
families “stay abreast of each other’s lives.”252 These practices mitigated at
least some of the profound negative effects of social isolation and afforded
caregivers meaningful opportunities to observe their loved ones’ conditions
and care.253
Despite the clear advantages technology can provide, this
development illuminated a sharp divide between technology “haves” and
“have-nots.”254 Absent policy providing facility-wide access to such
technology, its use to mitigate isolation hinges on the financial ability of each

247.
Id. at 5.
248.
See CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING HOMES,
supra note 116, at 32.
249.
Linda S. Edelman et al., Mitigating the Effects of a Pandemic: Facilitating
Improved Nursing Home Care Delivery Through Technology, JMIR AGING, May 26, 2020, at
1, 4; see also Judith Graham, In the Pandemic, Technology has Been a Lifesaver, Connecting
Them to the Outside World. But Others Don’t Have This Access, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2020),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/health/in-the-pandemic-technology-has-been-a-lifesaverconnecting-them-to-the-outside-world-but-others-dont-have-thisaccess/2020/07/31/8d46ddf2-d1ca-11ea-8d32-1ebf4e9d8e0d_story.html.
250.
Edelman et al., supra note 249, at 4; Graham, supra note 249.
251.
Edelman et al., supra note 249, at 5; Graham, supra note 249.
252.
Edelman et al., supra note 249, at 4–5.
253.
Id. It is important to note that this alternative does not account for physical
touch. See CORONAVIRUS COMM’N ON SAFETY AND QUALITY IN NURSING HOMES, supra note
116, at 32.
254.
Graham, supra note 249.
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resident.255 As a result, caregivers have described depending on technology
as a substitute for in-person visitation as “variable, uncertain, and dependent
on the kindness, availability, or flexibility of staff.”256 There is a clear and
urgent need for policy to ensure widespread access to the internet and videoconferencing software to mitigate the anti-therapeutic consequences of social
isolation in future pandemics.257
To that end, competing versions of the federal Advancing
Connectivity during the Coronavirus to Ensure Support for Seniors
(“ACCESS”) Act were introduced into the Senate and House of
Representatives in March and April of 2020, respectively.258 The Act’s
purpose was to “ensure that federal funding is available to expand telehealth
and virtual services at nursing facilities so seniors remain connected to their
health care providers and communities” and authorized an additional fifty
million dollars of federal funding toward that goal.259 Neither bill became law
in the 116th Congress.260
In the absence of federal action, which some have described as “slow,
misguided, and mostly absent,” states began to pass their own laws to afford
nursing home residents legal rights to the technology, sometimes “fill[ing] the
gap in inconsistent ways.”261 Connecticut legislators recently approved a law
requiring facilities to implement a technology of their choice for virtual
connections to family and friends.262 Under certain conditions and with lawful
consent, families are free to “install and use video monitoring and

255.
See id.
256.
Lucy E. Selman et al., ‘Saying Goodbye’ During the COVID-19 Pandemic:
A Document Analysis of Online Newspapers with Implications for End of Life Care, 35
PALLIATIVE MED. 1277, 1281 (2021).
257.
See Susan Jaffe, After Pandemic Ravaged Nursing Homes, New State Laws
Protect Residents, KHN (Aug. 20, 2021), http://khn.org/news/article/after-pandemic-ravagednursing-homes-new-state-laws-protect-residents/.
258.
Advancing Connectivity during the Coronavirus to Ensure Support for
Seniors Act, H.R. 6487, 116th Cong. § 1 (2020); Advancing Connectivity during the
Coronavirus to Ensure Support for Seniors Act, S. 3517, 116th Cong. § 1 (2020).
259.
Klobuchar, Capito Introduce Legislation to Increase Seniors’ Virtual
Connection to Health Care and Community Amidst Coronavirus Pandemic, U.S. SENATOR AMY
KLOBUCHAR WORKING FOR THE PEOPLE OF MINN. NEWS RELEASES (Feb. 3, 2021),
http://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/2/klobuchar-capito-introducelegislation-to-increase-seniors-virtual-connection-to-health-care-and-community-amidstcoronavirus-pandemic (quoting West Virginia Senator Shelley Moore Capito).
260.
See H.R. 6487; S. 3517.
261.
Konetzka, supra note 35, at 632–33; see, e.g., H.R. 6552, Gen. Assem.
(2021); Jaffe, supra note 257.
262.
H.R. 6552 § 1(6)(b)(1).
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communication equipment in their [loved one’s nursing home] room.”263
While facilities are mandated to provide electricity, internet access, and a
power source, the resident is ultimately responsible for the cost of technology
“and its installation, maintenance, repair, operation, deactivation, and
removal.”264 In August of 2021, a similar law was passed in Illinois, which
creatively funded a “lending library” of tablets, iPads, and other streaming
devices for residents to utilize.265 The law initiates a grant program with the
Illinois Department of Health, which will fund the grants with monies remitted
to the state as penalties for nursing home violations across Illinois.266 Such
legislative developments are essential to ensuring that residents have reliable,
equal access to technology when in crisis, which should be used to supplement,
not replace, limited in-person visitation in future pandemics.267
C.
Low-Cost, Facility-Level Solutions Mitigated the Anti Therapeutic
Effects of Mandated Isolation and Should be Replicated Early on in Future
Pandemics
Despite the regulatory barriers, many facilities, families, and
advocacy groups did their best to implement low- or no-cost solutions to keep
residents socially engaged.268 While imperfect, nursing homes across the
United States scrambled to implement resourceful “work arounds” to inperson visitation, increasing phone and video calls, facilitating visits through
windows, and hosting visitation outdoors whenever and wherever
allowable.269 Facilities tried to further mitigate the negative health effects of
social isolation by hosting their own parades, live concerts, and therapeutic
animal drop-ins.270 Whenever tenable, some facilities took their occupational
and physical therapy sessions outdoors, providing residents with “sensory
stimulation on top of functional improvements.”271
Families also worked alongside facilities to implement creative
solutions to stay connected, sometimes forced to fill in the gaps when facilities
263.
Rep. Harrison Supports Bill to Protect Nursing Home Residents, STATE
REPRESENTATIVE
CINDY
HARRISON
(May
11,
2021),
http://www.cthousegop.com/harrison/2021/05/11/rep-harrison-supports-bill-to-protectnursing-home-residents/.
264.
Id.; H.R. 6552.
265.
ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3–102.3(a), (d) (2021).
266.
See id.
267.
See ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3–102.3(b)(2).
268.
Abbasi, supra note 176, at 619.
269.
Id.
270.
Id.
271.
Id.

2022]

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN NURSING HOMES

368

were either lawfully or financially prevented from taking action.272 Families
were encouraged to, and often did, “drop off photo albums and send voice
recordings to help keep memories alive.”273 Importantly, families often
directly absorbed the cost of new and improved technology to increase video
conference opportunities with their loved ones.274
Advocacy groups, academics, and policymakers joined families and
facilities in formulating inventive solutions to mitigate the harm that visitation
restrictions and other impediments to socialization caused.275 For example,
the Stony Brook University School of Medicine undertook a service-learning
initiative to “mitigate the adverse health consequences that COVID-19 related
social isolation caused for older adults.”276 For two months, student volunteers
provided emotional support calls to elderly patients in the school’s geriatric
outpatient practice on a weekly basis.277 While this initiative neither took
place within nursing homes nor quantified the intended reduction in loneliness
felt by seniors receiving the calls, the project is highly generalizable and can
be easily replicated across sectors.278
While many of these solutions are contingent on available resources,
staffing, and “permission from the powers that be,” facilities must utilize
creative solutions to mitigate the anti-therapeutic effects of loneliness and
isolation whenever possible.279 During future pandemics, nursing homes must
utilize all of the tools at their disposal to protect their residents’ mental and
physical health and well-being, irrespective of future governmental
responses.280
VI.

CONCLUSION

272.
Id.
273.
Abbasi, supra note 174, at 619.
274.
See Edelman et al., supra note 249, at 4; Deborah Schoch, Nursing Homes
Scramble To Enable Televists Amid Coronavirus, AM. ASSOC. OF RETIRED PERS. (March 30,
2020),
http://www.aarp.org/caregiving/health/info-2020/nursing-home-televisits-during
coronavirus.html; Abbasi, supra note 176 at 619.
275.
See Steven M. Lewis & Lisa A. Strano-Paul, A COVID-19 ServiceLearning Initiative: Emotional Support Calls for the Geriatric Population, 69 J. AM.
GERIATRICS
SOC’Y
E4,
E4
(Dec.
31,
2020),
http://agsjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jgs.17003.
276.
Id.
277.
Id. at E4–E5.
278.
Id.
279.
See id.
280.
Lewis & Strano-Paul, supra note 273.
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As the pandemic lengthens its seemingly endless grip, states continue
to implement new ways to protect their public health (while inadvertently
igniting old conflicts with federalism).281 While CMS will continue to set the
minimum requirements of their Medicaid/Medicare programs, states are free
to implement additional protections “as long as their requirements go above
and beyond, and do not conflict with, federal requirements.”282 The success
or failure of policymakers in serving the therapeutic goals of nursing homes
during future pandemics will depend on their willingness and ability to
consider research on the mental health effects of visitation restrictions during
this one.283 Researchers should prioritize such work so that the policymakers
may consult it.284 While the short-term goal must be to prevent new death and
disease transmission cases for as long as a pandemic persists, the need to
include mental health effects in the calculation in crafting future policy is
glaring.285

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See Jaffe, supra note 255.
Id.
See id.; Konetzka, supra note 35, at 632–33.
Konetzka, supra note 35 at 632.
See id. at 633.
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INTRODUCTION

During the pandemic in 2021, I learned about the tragic death of a
fellow Asian American student, Robert Liu from my undergraduate alma
mater.1 An excellent student involved in campus activities, Robert tragically
took his own life after struggling with mental health issues.2 Learning about
*

Mr. Kim received his J.D. from the University of Minnesota and his LL.M. from Georgetown
University. He is an Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. At the time of
writing this article, Mr. Kim served as the board chair of the Asian & Pacific Islander American
Health Forum (“APIAHF”) and cited to numerous reports issued by APIAHF. However, the
views expressed throughout the article were solely his own. He would like to acknowledge Juliet
Choi, Kathy Ko Chin, Eileen Kostanecki, Jeff Le, and Lois Magner.
1.
IU Div. of Student Aff., Robert Liu Memorial Fund, CAPS Thank You,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 16, 2020), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2KbyOIBWkA.
2.
Robert Liu Memorial Endowment Fund, KELLY SCH. BUS.,
http://kelley.iu.edu/news-events/events/bloomington/rob-liu-memorial-gala/index.html (last
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an initiative in his memory to raise attention to on-campus resources for
students’ mental health led me to reflect on the stresses and strife that had
occurred as a result of the pandemic.3 While too many had suffered from the
global pandemic, both at home and abroad, many Americans were facing
stress and anxiety from political, economic, and social unrest that was
exacerbated by the precautions necessary to avoid the COVID-19 virus.4
In addition to this general anxiety affecting the populace, the Asian
American and Pacific Islander (“AAPI”) community has seen a series of
violent attacks on community members, including horrific shootings in
Atlanta and Indianapolis.5 This violent focus on AAPIs has led to discussion
among both policymakers and researchers about how to address anti-AAPI
racism, as well as recognizing the related health effects of living under the fear
of continued violence.6
visited Apr.16, 2022); Thomas Tracy & Graham Rayman, Indiana College Student, 20, Hangs
Himself Inside NYU Dorm Where He Was Staying for Internship, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 7,
2016, 7:34 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/cops-probe-death-nyu-student-20hung-dorm-article-1.2664666.
3.
See Oliver Kim, Addressing the Mental Health Needs of the AAPI
Community,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(Sept.
1,
2021),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210827.800655/full/.
4.
Id.
5.
See LU DONG ET AL., ADDRESSING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM IN THE ERA OF
COVID-19:
NEXT
STEPS
FOR
A
RESEARCH
AGENDA
2
(2021),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1594-1.html (“National polls indicated that
AAPIs reported higher levels of experience with hate crimes or hate incidents than the national
average in both 2020 and 2021, with about one in four AAPIs affected overall.” (footnote
omitted)); Jiayang Fan, The Atlanta Shooting and the Dehumanizing of Asian Women, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 19, 2021), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-atlantashooting-and-the-dehumanizing-of-asian-women; Amna Nawaz et al., After Indianapolis
Shooting, a Sikh Activist on Why We Need to Accept Realities of Racism in America, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Apr. 30, 2021, 5:54 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/after-indianapolisshooting-a-sikh-activist-on-why-we-need-to-accept-realities-of-racism-in-america; Kim, supra
note 3.
The term “AAPI” may suggest misleadingly that a particular issue affects Asian
Americans as well as Pacific Islanders and Native Hawaiians equally so hereinafter,
I will use “AAPI” when speaking collectively about Asian Americans, Pacific
Islanders, and Native Hawaiians and then “Asian American” when referring to issues
pertaining solely to this still-diverse group.

Kim, supra note 3.
6.
See Barbara Sprunt, Here's What the New Hate Crimes Law Aims to Do as
Attacks on Asian Americans Rise, NPR, http://www.npr.org/2021/05/20/998599775/biden-tosign-the-covid-19-hate-crimes-bill-as-anti-asian-american-attacks-rise (last updated May 20,
2021, 4:32 PM); Neil G. Ruiz et al., One-Third of Asian Americans Fear Threats, Physical
Attacks, and Most Say Violence Against Them Is Rising, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2021),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/21/one-third-of-asian-americans-fear-threatsphysical-attacks-and-most-say-violence-against-them-is-rising/; Kim, supra note 3.
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Because these tragic events remain fresh in our collective
consciousness, one could forget that these concerns existed long before the
pandemic.7 Rather, the pandemic has led to a more public questioning of
systemic issues and biases that exist in our healthcare system—including who
has access to mental health services and how they are allocated—that must be
addressed to make it more equitable across all communities.8 This Article will
first look at the mental health issues that the AAPI community faces, including
prior to the pandemic.9 The second part of this Article will then discuss how
the pandemic and concurrent events have exacerbated those mental health
issues within the AAPI community.10 Finally, Part V will provide a series of
recommendations for policymakers to consider to improve mental healthcare
delivery for the AAPI community.11
This Article is not suggesting a more pressing need for AAPIs over
other communities, but instead it attempts to demonstrate why the healthcare
system needs a more equitable approach to healthcare delivery through a
reflection on both pre-pandemic and current events that are particular to the
AAPI community.12 Such a system may result in better outcomes and thus
greater equity for many communities of color.13 In building that more
equitable system post-pandemic, we must recognize three interconnected, but
not necessarily exhaustive issues: Asian cultural attitudes towards mental
health, AAPIs’ station as a community of color, and understanding the longterm impact of the COVID pandemic on the community.14

7.
See, e.g., Natalie Varma, After Petition, Two AAPI Providers Were Hired
at CAPS, Students Say There's More Work Ahead, DAILY TAR HEEL (Nov. 15, 2021, 10:56 PM),
http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2021/11/university-aapi-caps-counselors; see also Robert
Liu Memorial Endowment Fund, supra note 2.
8.
See Kim, supra note; Varma, supra note 7.
9.
See discussion infra Part III.
10.
See discussion infra Part IV.
11.
See discussion infra Part V.
12.
See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
13.
See, e.g., Mary Schmeida & Ramona McNeal, Children’s Mental-Health
Language Access Laws: State Factors Influence Policy Adoption, 40 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL
HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 364, 369 (2012) (discussing efforts to address
language barriers that impede access to mental health services for children with limited English
proficiency).
14.
See discussion infra Sections III.A–C.
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OVERVIEW OF AAPIS IN THE UNITED STATES

The AAPI community is the fastest-growing racial group within the
United States and thus warrants increased attention in health law and policy.15
Even in the prior 2010 census, analysts noted that “Asians [had] passed
Hispanics as the largest group of new immigrants to the United States.”16 In
the most recent census, the Asian American community grew by eighty-one
percent, continuing its rapid growth.17 At such a rate, analysts predict that the
Asian American population will triple or quadruple from 2000 to 2060 and
will be the largest immigrant group by 2055.18
The Asian American designation is almost entirely made up of
nineteen distinct ethnicities.19 However, six groups—Chinese, Indian,
Filipino, Vietnamese, Korean, and Japanese—skew the overall Asian
American demographics because they make up eighty-five percent of the
15.
See Nicholas Jones et al., 2020 Census Illuminates Racial and Ethnic
Composition of the Country, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 12, 2021),
http://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/08/improved-race-ethnicity-measuresrevealunited-states-population-much-more-multiracial.html (“The Asian alone population grew by
35.5% between 2010 and 2020” and “[t]he Asian in combination population grew by 55.5%.”);
Michael Spencer et al., Discrimination and Mental Health-Related Service Use in a National
Study of Asian Americans, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2410, 2410 (explaining that Asian
Americans are “one of the most understudied” racial groups despite population growth).
16.
PEW RSCH. CTR., THE RISE OF ASIAN AMERICANS 1 (Paul Taylor ed., 2013).
17.
Abby Budiman & Neil G. Ruiz, Asian Americans Are the Fastest-Growing
Racial or Ethnic Group in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR., (Apr. 9, 2021),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/09/asian-americans-are-the-fastest-growingracial-or-ethnic-group-in-the-u-s/ (“Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial or ethnic
group in the U.S.”). The Pew Research Center analysis segregated the Asian American growth
from that of the Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander communities, which also saw rapid
growth. See id. (noting that the Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders population grew at
seventy percent and sixty-one percent.).
18.
Abby Budiman & Neil G. Ruiz, Key Facts About Asian Americans, a
Diverse and Growing Population, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 29, 2021),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/29/key-facts-about-asian-americans/
[hereinafter Key Facts About Asian Americans, a Diverse and Growing Population] (“Singlerace, non-Hispanic Asians are projected to become the largest immigrant group in the country,
surpassing Hispanics in 2055.”).
19.
See id.; Fact Sheets:
Asian Americans, PEW RSCH. CTR.,
http://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/collection/asians-in-the-united-states/ (last visited
Apr. 12, 2022) (noting that ninety-seven percent of the total Asian population are Bangladeshi,
Bhutanese, Burmese, Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Hmong, Indian, Indonesian, Japanese,
Korean, Laotian, Malaysian, Mongolian, Nepalese, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Thai, or Vietnamese);
A SNAPSHOT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ISSUES FOR ASIAN AMERICAN/NATIVE HAWAIIAN/PACIFIC
ISLANDER BOYS AND MEN: JUMPSTARTING AN OVERDUE CONVERSATION, SAMHSA 2 (2016),
http://store.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/d7/priv/sma16-4959.pdf [hereinafter A SNAPSHOT OF
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ISSUES] (listing the largest Asian ethnicities in the United States).

2022]

ADDRESS AAPI MENTAL HEALTH IN A POST-COVID ERA

374

Asian American community.20 As aforementioned, Asian Americans are often
immigrants, but the immigrant experience—when someone arrives in the
United States and through which the immigration process follows—differs
among ethnicities.21 Consequently, many AAPIs arrive not being fluent in
English and may have difficulty obtaining basic services, including
healthcare.22
Grouping people of Asian descent under the term “Asian American”
has its roots both in student activism and government bureaucracy, but this
designation is a recent phenomenon.23 In the 1960s, California students
established the Asian American Political Alliance to “bring together all the
different groups of Asian descent under one, larger umbrella.”24 In 1977, the
20.
Key Facts About Asian Americans, a Diverse and Growing Population,
supra note 18.
21.
See id. (noting that while “14% of all Americans — and 17% of adults —
were born” in another country, “six-in-ten Asian Americans (57%), including 71% of Asian
American adults, were born in another country”); Ruiz et al., supra note 6; RONALD TAKAKI, A
DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 7–8 (rev. ed. 2008) (discussing
the differences and similarities that different Asian ethnicities experienced during periods of
immigration and acculturation); A SNAPSHOT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 19, at
3–4 (discussing historical immigration patterns, including colonization, of different AAPI
groups to the United States).
22.
Kathy Ko Chin, HHS Must Improve Language Access to Make Meaningful
Access
a
Reality,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(July
22,
2016),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20160722.055907/full/ (“[At the time] about
one-third of Asian Americans (AA) and 14 percent of Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders
(NHPI), which includes people from the Marshall Islands, do not read, speak, write, or
understand English well.”); Key Facts About Asian Americans, a Diverse and Growing
Population, supra note 18 (noting that “[n]early all U.S.-born Asians (95%) were proficient in
English, compared with 57% of foreign-born Asians” and the former are more likely to speak
only English at home whereas the latter are more likely to speak a different language at home).
23.
See Maura Hohman, Do I Count as ‘Asian American’? What the History
Behind the Term Taught Me, TODAY, http://www.today.com/news/do-i-count-asian-americanwhat-history-behind-term-taught-t216055 (May 4, 2021, 3:11 PM); Anna Purna Kambhampaty,
In 1968, These Activists Coined the Term ‘Asian American’ — And Helped Shape Decades of
Advocacy, TIME (May 22, 2020, 12:00 PM), http://time.com/5837805/asian-american-history/;
FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 310 (2002); Sunmin
Kim, Fault Lines Among Asian Americans: Convergence and Divergence in Policy Opinion,
RUSSEL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS., Apr. 2021, at 46, 47 (“[T]he first half of the twentieth
century, immigrants moving to the United States from various parts of the continent labeled
Asia did not identify as Asians.”); Caitlin Yoshiko Kandil, After 50 Years of ‘Asian American,’
Advocates Say the Term is ‘More Essential than Ever’, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2018, 8:34 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/after-50-years-asian-american-advocates-sayterm-more-essential-n875601.
24.
Purna, supra note 23 (noting this organization’s name “is believed to be the
first public use of the phrase ‘Asian American.’”); see also Harvey Dong, Transforming Student
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federal government formally adopted the term “Asian or Pacific Islander” as
“[a] person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East,
Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands” as one of five
basic categories for race and ethnicity 25 “This area includes, for example,
China, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippine Islands, and Samoa.”26 That
inclusion was part of a larger effort over the next few years to “remov[e] the
barriers [for Asian Americans] to full participation in American life.”27
Many organizations have since adopted the term “Asian American” to
reflect a “pan-Asian” collectivism, and thus seem more reflective of the AAPI
community at large.28 Moreover, incidents of violence, such as those incurred
during the pandemic, have often brought AAPIs together for political strength
and public safety.29 Some, though, have questioned the usefulness of the term
given that it is so expansive that it hides disparities among the different

Elites into Community Activists, in ASIAN AMERICANS: THE MOVEMENT AND THE MOMENT 189–
93 (Steve Louie & Glenn K. Omatsu ed., 2001) (discussing initial mobilization efforts between
students and elderly residents that helped establish community and raise attention).
25.
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET DIRECTIVE NO. 15, RACE AND ETHNIC
STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING (1977)
http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/held/populations/bridged-race/directive15.html. The federal
government subsequently broke this category into “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander” two decades later with the express purpose of ensuring that “the data on the
Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islander groups will no longer be overwhelmed by the
aggregate data of the much larger Asian groups.” Revisions to the Standards for the
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782 (Oct. 30, 1997).
26.
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 25.
27.
Stephanie Hinnershitz, What Comes Next?, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK,
(Apr. 4, 2021), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/179780 (noting the first hearing by the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights specifically on Asian Americans and the first congressional
designation of an AAPI heritage week).
28.
Wu, supra note 23, at 311; Harmeet Kaur, The Problem With the Term
‘Asian
American,’
According
to
Jay
Caspian
Kang,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2021/10/14/us/the-loneliest-americans-jay-caspian-kang-cec/index.html
(last updated Oct. 14, 2021, 11:04 AM) (“Asian American identity politics are too often
dominated by the concerns of the upper middle-class children of immigrants . . . obscures more
pressing challenges facing the most vulnerable Asian Americans . . . .”); see also Naomi
Ishisaka, Why It’s Time to Retire the Term ‘Asian Pacific Islander’, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 30,
2020, 4:11 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/why-its-time-to-retire-the-termasian-pacific-islander/ (arguing to end the designation “AAPI”).
29.
Kandil, supra note 23 (discussing how the 1982 murder of Vincent Chin
due to anti-Japanese economic fears led to political mobilization); see also Kambhampaty,
supra note 23; DONG ET AL., supra note 5, at 11; Fan, supra note 5; Nawaz et al., supra note 5.
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ethnicities.30 Others argue that the term is necessary to connote inclusiveness
as part of American society and to dispute notions of Asians as outsiders.31
III.

AAPIS AND MENTAL HEALTH

As noted earlier, even prior to the pandemic, AAPIs had particular
needs related to mental health and access to such services.32 This section
provides mental health data on the AAPI community with some preliminary
findings over the pandemic.33 It also provides a general overview on the
reasons that many AAPIs resist seeking mental health services or even
acknowledging the need for such services.34
A.

Stoicism as a Familiar Cultural Theme

In addition to the unfair stigma associated with mental health that is
too common in society, many Asians share common cultural traits and
circumstances that downplay or even lead to hiding mental health needs.35
Seeing stoicism—enduring hardships without complaints—as a virtue, is a
common characteristic across different Asian cultures.36 Observers note that
viewing “eating bitterness” as a virtue can also cause Asian Americans to
“resist seeking out relief until the suffering becomes intolerable” as they “end
up experiencing undue agony.”37
Many practitioners and researchers have noted that this virtue causes
intense shame among Asian Americans who may need mental health
30.
WU, supra note 23, at 311; Kandil, supra note 23 (noting that aggregating
AAPI data failed to recognize disparities in health insurance coverage).
31.
Hohman, supra note 23.
32.
Varma, supra note 7.
33.
See discussion infra Section III. A–C.
34.
See discussion infra Section III. A–B.
35.
Koko Nishi, Mental Health Among Asian-Americans, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/pi/oema/resources/ethnicity-health/asian-american/article-mental-health
(last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
36.
Yenting Chen, Anti-Asian Hate: ‘Eating Bitterness’ and the Role of
Empathy,
MED.
NEWS
TODAY
(Mar.
23,
2021),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/anti-asian-hate-eating-bitterness-and-the-role-ofempathy (“Stoicism [as] a highly prized characteristic in many Asian cultures.”); see also Uma
S. Segal, Indian Families: The Diaspora in the United States and Canada, in ASIAN FAMILIES
IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 148 (2021) (reporting that despite how “Asian groups are
very dissimilar from each other . . . they share several values, expectations, and norms of
behavior,” which included “a sense of obligation and of shame”).
37.
The Problem with Eating Bitterness, UNTIGERING (Oct. 26, 2017),
http://untigering.com/the-problem-with-eating-bitterness/.
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services.38 Such shame may exacerbate the underlying mental health needs.39
Further, Asian Americans may exhibit prejudices against those exhibiting
mental illnesses.40 This sense of stigma only reinforces the shame that Asian
Americans may feel if they seek out mental health services and may make
them even more reluctant to utilize them.41 Some of these feelings may be
generational and subside as Asian Americans become more familiar with the
mental health system42 and more fluent in English.43
Embracing stoicism makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
acknowledge when a family member needs mental health services.44 For
instance, some Asian American parents may miss or even ignore their
children’s struggles; consequently, significant numbers of Asian American
youth struggle emotionally at levels equal to, or even higher, than other teens.45
One college student discussed how her immigrant parents could not
understand how “their daughter, who lived in a manicured middle-class
suburban home and always went to bed with a full belly, complain[ed] she felt
depressed.”46
B.

Identity as a Model Minority

38.
Segal, supra note 36, at 148.
39.
Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2415 (noting that “embarrassment about
seeking services” is one factor associated with lower utilization of mental health services).
40.
REBECCA L. COLLINS ET AL., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN MENTAL
ILLNESS
STIGMA
IN
CALIFORNIA
2
(2014),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/j.ctt14bs2bc.1.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af770b7349
d87618093b3a2abdd271630&ab_segments=&origin=.
41.
Id. at 3; Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2415.
42.
A SNAPSHOT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 19, at 5; Spencer
et al., supra note 15, at 2414.
43.
A SNAPSHOT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 19, at 5; Spencer
et al., supra note 15, at 2415; Lonnie R. Snowden et al., Limited English Proficient Asian
Americans: Threshold Language Policy and Access to Mental Health Treatment, 72 SOC. SCI.
& MED. 230, 231 (2011) (noting prior research that Asian Americans indicated that “linguistic
barriers to be as important, if not more important, than cultural barriers”).
44.
Isabelle Khoo, Why Asian Parents Don’t Understand Mental Health, and
How
to
Change
That,
HUFFPOST
(June
18,
2018,
4:41
PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/archive/ca/entry/asian-parents-mentalhealth_a_23462016?utm_campaign=canada_dau.
45.
Katherine Kam, Cultural Stigma Hurts Asian American Teens with
Depression, YR MEDIA (Sept. 10, 2013), http://yr.media/news/cultural-stigma-hurts-asianamerican-teens-with-depression/.
46.
Katherine Xie, What It’s Like to Be an Asian American with Depression,
MIGHTY (July 16, 2016), http://themighty.com/2016/07/living-with-depression-as-an-asianamerican/.
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Related to often holding a stoic outlook that downplays
“complaining,” the AAPI community has often been called the “model
minority” even as some AAPI advocates dispute the validity or utility of this
viewpoint.47 Mainstream society pushed the “model minority” label on the
entire Asian American community as if it were monolithic.48 This “model
minority” concept idealizes AAPIs as “hardworking, studious, committed to
family, and so on,” all seemingly positive notions that ought to be
complimentary.49 Observers note that AAPIs as a whole achieve a higher level
of educational attainment than any other racial group, including Whites, and
often, this achievement is attributed to Asian culture, similar to stoicism being
seen as a typical Asian virtue.50
Despite the positive sound, the “model minority” label has had
negative consequences for the entire AAPI community, particularly for those
who are more recent immigrants or in other vulnerable situations.51 Some
AAPI advocates even decry the label as a myth that can be harmful to all
AAPIs regardless of their community status.52 Because of the lack of data
disaggregation, this myth hides many disparities, including health disparities
such as mental health needs among AAPIs and inflates AAPIs’ socio-

47.
Ryan Kim, Struggling to Define Asian-American Culture in 2019, WASH.
SQUARE NEWS, Feb. 4, 2019, at 8; see also Xie, supra note 46; Teresa Wiltz, Beyond the ‘Model
Minority’ Image:
Asians in the US, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Oct. 8, 2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/10/08/beyond-themodel-minority-image-asians-in-the-us.
48.
Wiltz, supra note 47; see Roslyn Talusan, The Year We Weaponized the
Model Minority Myth, REFINERY29, http://www.refinery29.com/en-gb/model-minority-myth
(last updated May 4, 2021, 3:37) (“[T]he term ‘Asian American’ emerged as a radical,
deliberately anti-racist political identity. Though it collected dozens of ethnicities under one
group, grouping us together meant establishing our solidarity with other non-white
communities, declaring unity against all institutionalised oppression.”); Jeff Guo, The Real
Reasons the U.S. Became Less Racist Towards Asian Americans, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/29/the-real-reason-americansstopped-spitting-on-asian-americans-and-started-praising-them/.
49.
Nathan Joo et al., Asian-American Success and the Pitfalls of
Generalization, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu/research/asianamerican-success-and-the-pitfalls-of-generalization/.
50.
Id.; Chen, supra note 36; PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 16, at 1 (“[R]ecent
Asian arrivals [are] the most highly educated cohort of immigrants in U.S. history.”).
51.
See Wiltz, supra note 47 (“[AAPI Immigrants] ability to access
opportunities in the U.S. varies dramatically, depending on the circumstances that brought them
here and where they landed.”).
52.
WU, supra note 23, at 76–77; TAKAKI, supra note 21, at 415.
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economic status and economic success.53 AAPI advocates also argue that the
myth has divided, rather than helped to lift up, communities of color.54
Further, some ethnicities within the AAPI community are held up as
a model while simultaneously attacked as a nuisance.55 Sometimes this
paradoxical treatment is due to the intersection of both race and religion, but
it may emerge as a blanket animus against AAPIs without regard to ethnic
differences.56 Perhaps even worse, some AAPIs use the “model minority”
myth to justify inequities that they themselves have perpetrated on other
AAPIs.57
In terms of the impact on AAPIs’ health, trying to live up to this
idealized notion—particularly in a stoic culture—can lead to stress and,
therefore, unhealthy consequences.58 This stressful impact is not necessarily
unique to AAPIs; it is found in other communities seeking success, such as
women, particularly Black women, and people of color also reporting stress

53.
Thomas Le & Emma Zeng, Data Disaggregation Shows Startling Health
Disparities Among Asian Americans, BALT. SUN (Mar. 31, 2021, 6:30 AM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-0331-asian-health-disparities20210331-xciw35hutzg2pmbdduv73prdm4-story.html; TAKAKI, supra note 21, at 415;
Margaret Simms, “Model Minority” Myth Hides the Economic Realities of Many Asian
Americans, URB. INST.: URB WIRE (May 2, 2017), http://www.urban.org/urban-wire/modelminority-myth-hides-economic-realities-many-asian-americans; Agnes Constante, Filipino
Americans Reported Higher Covid Mental Health Toll than Asian Americans Collectively, NBC
NEWS (June 18, 2021, 12:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/85-filipinoamericans-reported-covid-mental-health-issues-more-any-n1271214; Ellen McGirt, The Asian
Glass Ceiling: Studying the Model Minority Myth, FORTUNE (June 4, 2018, 12:20 PM),
http://fortune.com/2018/06/04/asian-americans-model-minority-asian-glass-%20ceiling/.
54.
TAKAKI, supra note 21, at 8; see also Ellen D. Wu, Asian Americans and
the ‘Model Minority’ Myth, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0123-wu-chua-model-minority-chinese20140123-story.html; Joo et al., supra note 49 (“[H]olding up one racial or ethnic minority as a
‘model’ can too easily become an implicit criticism of other minorities.”).
55.
Segal, supra note 36, at 238.
56.
Id. at 238–39; WU, supra note 23, at 70, 76; PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note
16, at 1 (“[R]ecent Asian arrivals [are] the most highly educated cohort of immigrants in U.S.
history.”).
57.
See WU, supra note 23, at 70; Talusan, supra note 48 (“The ugly truth is
that the exploitation of Asian immigrants by other Asians is also part of Asian American history
. . . positioning lighter-skinned East Asians on top and darker-skinned South and Southeast
Asians at the bottom.”).
58.
Wiltz, supra note 47 (noting that some AAPIs, particularly recent
immigrants, “need a variety of social services such as language classes, mental health services
and food stamps. . . . [but] have difficulty accessing those services.”).
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and fatigue caused by constantly needing to excel to meet expectations.59
Commentators have noted that to live up to this notion, some Asian American
women are more fearful of “keeping face”—again, eating bitterness—than
calling the police or social services for help.60 Even among Asian American
women who discuss their abuse, a survey indicated that over a third felt
ashamed of revealing it.61
C.

Prevalence of Mental Health Needs in the AAPI Community

With these general observations about AAPIs in mind, we will
examine the state of mental health among AAPIs before and since the
pandemic.62 While research often does not disaggregate different AAPI
communities, they do provide a good overview of the community at large and
how it compares to other racial groups.63
The first national study of Asian Americans and mental health, the
National Latino and Asian American Study (“NLAAS”), was developed in
2004 and has served as an important tool to fill in research gaps for these two
growing communities in the United States.64 In a review of the NLAAS,
researchers found that AAPIs “have a sizeable burden of mental illness, with
a 17.30% overall lifetime rate of any psychiatric disorder and a 9.19% 1259.
See The Single Wives Club, Ending the Silence on Black Girl Magic and
Mental Health, HER AGENDA (Oct. 31, 2017, 3:30 AM), http://heragenda.com/black-girl-magicmental-health-break-the-silence-stigma; Andrea S. Kramer & Alton B. Harris, Why Women
Feel More Stress at Work, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 4, 2016), http://hbr.org/2016/08/whywomen-feel-more-stress-at-work.
60.
Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses
from the Battered Women's Movement and the Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151,
169–70 (1996); see Chen, supra note 36.
61.
MIEKO YOSHIHAMA & CHIC DABBY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN ASIAN &
PACIFIC ISLANDER HOMES 29 (2020), http://s3.amazonaws.com/gbv-wp-uploads/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/01204358/Facts-Stats-Report-DV-API-Communities-2015formatted2019.pdf; see also Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2410 (“[A National study] found
that Asian American women were less likely than White women to report perceived need for
mental health services, even when accounting for frequency of mental distress.”).
62.
See Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2410.
63.
See id.
64.
Margarita Alegria et al., Considering Context, Place and Culture: The
National Latino and Asian American Study, 13 INT’L J. METHOD PSYCHIATRIC RSCH. 208, 209
(2004). At the time of the study, Asian Americans accounted for 3.7% of the population. Id.
(citing Population by Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin for the United States: 1990 and 2000,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Apr.
2,
2001),
http://www2.census.gov/programssurveys/decennial/2000/phc/phc-t-01/tab01.pdf.)). The survey considered four categories of
AAPIs — “Chinese, Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Other Asians” — and were offered in English,
Chinese, Tagalog, and Vietnamese. Id. at 211.
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month rate.”65 Despite this rate, AAPIs were “one third as likely as Whites to
[utilize] mental health services.”66 Additional studies found similar utilization
disparities compared to other racial groups or the general population.67 One
study found “only 3.1% of Asian Americans use specialty mental health
services, compared with 5.59% of African Americans, . . . and 8.8% of the
general population,” and another study found that “only 8.6% of Asian
Americans sought any mental health services compared with 17.9% of the
general population.”68
Nearly a decade later, the federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (“SAMHSA”) released a new survey on AAPI and
behavioral health issues, including both substance use disorders and mental
health issues.69 The SAMHSA survey found that about 14.5% of AAPI adults
had some form of mental illness, and of those, one in five had a serious mental
illness.70 According to SAMHSA, mental illness grew from 2.9% in 2008 to
6.2% in 2019 among young AAPI adults between eighteen and twenty-five
years old and from 1.6% to 3.5% among AAPI adults between twenty-six and
forty-nine years old.71 Despite this high prevalence, SAMHSA found a huge
treatment gap for those seeking treatment of the 2.3 million adult AAPIs
65.
Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2410.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at n. 9-12.
68.
Id. (citing Jennifer Abe-Kim et al, Use of mental health-related services
among immigrant and US-born Asian Americans: results from the National Latino and Asian
American Study, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 91, 91 (2007)).
69.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2019 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE
AND HEALTH: ASIAN/NATIVE HAWAIIANS AND OTHER PACIFIC ISLANDERS (NHOPI) 4 (2020),
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/reports/rpt31100/2019NSDUHNHOPI/Asian_NHOPI.pdf. Of note, in the intervening decade since the Unitgering survey was
released, two major changes in mental health law occurred — the 2008 Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act and the 2010 Affordable Care Act — passed that should have
increased accessibility and coverage of services. The Problem with Eating Bitterness, supra
note 37; Justin C. Yang et al., Demographic, Socioeconomic, and Health Correlates of Unmet
Need for Mental Health Treatment in the United States, 2002–16: Evidence from the National
Surveys on Drug Use and Health, INT’L J. FOR EQUITY HEALTH, 2019, at 1, 2. Further, the AAPI
population had grown to 5.7% of the population. Profile: Asian Americans, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.
OFF.
MINORITY
HEALTH,
http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.aspx?lvl=3&lvlid=63 (last modified Oct. 12, 2021,
12:47 PM) (“According to the 2019 Census Bureau population estimate, there are 18.9 million
Asian Americans, alone, living in the United States. Asian Americans account for 5.7 percent
of the nation's population.”).
70.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 69, at 4; see also A
SNAPSHOT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that NLAAS had found
roughly similar trends among Asian American men (17.2%) and women (17.4%) reporting any
lifetime presence of a psychiatric disorder).
71.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 69, at 40.
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experiencing any mental illness; nearly four out of five did not receive
treatment.72
More data is needed to see the effect of the pandemic on these
findings. SAMHSA’s 2020 survey incorporated data that was collected and
discovered during the initial year of the pandemic, but it does not include data
stratified by race or ethnicity.73 A community survey did find that during the
pandemic, over one-third of community members said their mental health had
deteriorated, with over half of those being between the ages of eighteen and
thirty-four who confessed that their mental health seemed worse.74
IV.

THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON THE ASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY

In addition to the direct risk of contracting COVID-19, health experts
warn of widespread mental health issues caused by the stressors resulting
directly or indirectly from the pandemic: social isolation, economic anxiety,
and political and social unrest that have engulfed our collective psyche.75 Even
prior to the pandemic, many health policy experts argued that a person’s health
is greatly affected by social determinants such as the person’s financial
situation or physical safety.76
The COVID-19 pandemic has been devastating for many Asian
Americans’ mental wellbeing—“[t]he pandemic’s health and economic effects
would strain an identity rooted in stoicism, and the political and social
reactions would shatter an identity based on being the ‘model minority.”77 As
discussed below, Asian Americans are consequently more likely to be
concerned about the pandemic than the general public.78 These non-health
72.
See id. at 49.
73.
See id.
74.
Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders on COVID-19
and Getting Vaccinated, APIAHF (July 21, 2021), http://www.apiahf.org/resource/nationwidesurvey-of-aanhpi-on-covid-19/.
75.
See Stephanie Stevens, Six-Months After COVID-19: The Pandemic and
Mental Health, ACOG (Oct. 28, 2020), http://www.acog.org/news/news-articles/2020/10/sixmonths-after-covid-19-pandemic-and-mental-health.
76.
See id. (“[O]ne-third of Asian American consumers have taken no financial
actions at all in the wake of COVID-19.”); Press Release, Lincoln Fin. Grp., Asian Americans
Most Worried About Lost Income as a Result of COVID-19, Says New Lincoln Financial Study
(May 13, 2021), http://newsroom.lfg.com/asian-americans-most-worried-about-lost-incomeas-result-covid-19-says-new-lincoln-financial-study.htm.
77.
Kim, supra note 3.
78.
Gaby Galvin, Asian Americans Are Less Likely than Public Overall to
Know Someone with COVID-19. Their Mental Health Has Suffered Just the Same, MORNING
CONSULT (Nov. 23, 2020, 6:00 AM), http://morningconsult.com/2020/11/23/asian-americanscovid-19-impact-polling/.
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impacts and related issues have had a marked effect on AAPIs’ mental health
just as much as the pandemic itself.79
At a time when stressors are at a peak, many Asian Americans have
realized that they are caught in a catch-22: pathways to aid, especially for
mental health needs, are not readily available because of years of assuming the
community is this stoic “model minority.”80 Therefore, their issues—
particularly those most marginalized within the community—are invisible, not
discussed, or even seemingly nonexistent to the public at large.81
A.

The Pandemic’s Economic Impact on the AAPI Community

The pandemic’s economic impact has devastated sectors where
AAPIs are overrepresented.82 For instance, about one-in-four food and
accommodation services, and nearly one-in-five retail businesses, are Asianowned, despite Asian Americans making up only six percent of the United
States population.83 The leisure and hospitality sector saw the largest
percentage change in employment during the first year of the pandemic.84
Sectors with a higher percentage of small businesses with Asian ownership—
including healthcare, food services, and hospitality—saw a higher percentage
of federal pandemic aid.85 In addition, Asian Americans make up a greater
share of frontline and essential workers, particularly in healthcare, putting

79.
See id.
80.
Kimmy Yam, The Mental Health Toll of Being a ‘Model Minority’ in 2020,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2020, 5:00 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/mentalhealth-toll-being-modelminority-2020-n1249949.
81.
See id.
82.
Jeff Le, Asian Americans Could Be the Key to Winning Georgia. Are
Campaigns Flubbing Their Chance?, POLITICO (Dec. 23, 2020, 8:52 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/23/asian-americans-georgia-runoff-450214;
Press Release, Lincoln Fin. Grp., supra note 76 (“Almost a quarter of employed Asian
Americans work in sectors hit hard by the pandemic like hospitality and leisure, retail or
industries like personal care . . . .”). Further, the pandemic has had a disparate impact on AAPI
women just as the pandemic has had on women generally. CLAIRE EWING-NELSON, ALL OF THE
JOBS LOST IN DECEMBER WERE WOMEN’S JOBS 1 (2021), http://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/December-Jobs-Day.pdf.
83.
See Elaine Dang et al., COVID-19 and Advancing Asian American
Recovery, MCKINSEY (Aug. 6, 2020), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-socialsector/our-insights/covid-19-and-advancing-asian-american-recovery.
84.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-387, COVID-19: SUSTAINED
FEDERAL ACTION IS CRUCIAL AS PANDEMIC ENTERS ITS SECOND YEAR 11 (2021).
85.
Id. (noting that “industries [with] higher percentages of businesses with
owners classified as female, Black, Asian, or Hispanic” applied for paid leave and employee
retention tax credits).
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them at a heightened risk of coming into contact with COVID.86 Overall,
Asian Americans have seen conditions in the labor market slightly worsen for
them more than their white counterparts.87
Unfortunately, too many AAPIs do not know how to weather the
pandemic’s economic effects.88 A consumer survey conducted during the
pandemic found that four out of five Asian Americans were searching for ways
to protect themselves financially, but many do not know what to do to provide
some sense of economic security.89 Nearly two in five Asian Americans feared
financial hardship because of reduced hours or even layoffs due to economic
uncertainty, and a quarter of AAPI small businesses shuttered at the beginning
of the pandemic.90
B.

The Pandemic’s Relationship to a Rise in Anti-Asian Violence

Like many other communities of color, AAPI communities are no
strangers to understanding racism as a public health issue.91 Indeed, feelings
of discrimination consistently remained at relatively high levels before, and
after, the start of the pandemic.92 Again, while events during the pandemic
have raised awareness about the community health consequences of
86.
See NAT’L NURSES UNITED, SINS OF OMISSION 12 (2020),
http://www.nationalnursesunited.org/sites/default/files/nnu/graphics/documents/0920_Covid1
9_SinsOfOmission_Data_Report.pdf.
87.
Id.; Dang et al., supra note 83 (finding that the unemployment rate among
Asian Americans jumped more than 450% between February and June 2020, outpacing the rate
of other ethnic groups); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 84, at 52.
88.
See Press Release, Lincoln Fin. Grp., supra note 76.
89.
See id. (“[O]ne-third of Asian American consumers have taken no financial
actions at all in the wake of COVID-19.”).
90.
See id.; DONALD MAR & PAUL ONG, COVID-19’S EMPLOYMENT
DISRUPTIONS
TO
ASIAN
AMERICANS
7
(2020),
http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/resources/policyreports/COVID19_Employment_CNKAASC_072020.pdf.
91.
Kim, supra note 3; Press Release, Georges Benjamin, Ex. Dir., Am. Pub.
Health Ass’n., Racism is an Ongoing Public Health Crisis that Needs Our Attention Now (May
29,
2020),
http://www.apha.org/news-and-media/news-releases/apha-newsreleases/2020/racism-is-a-public-health-crisis.
92.
Ruiz et al., supra note 6.

Id.

Experiences with discrimination among Asian adults were widely
reported before the pandemic. About three-in-four Asian Americans (73%) say they
have personally experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly because of their
race or ethnicity, according to the April 2021 Pew Research Center survey. This share
is unchanged from June 2020 and is about the same as prior to the pandemic, when
76% of Asian adults in February 2019 said they had personally experienced
discrimination or unfair treatment because of their race or ethnicity.
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discrimination, this relationship was well established by pre-pandemic
research that found “an association between racial discrimination and mental
disorders among Asian Americans.”93
Further, the pandemic has seen a concurrent rise in violence against
Asian Americans: about four in five AAPI adults believed violence against
them is increasing, and thirty percent of AAPI adults feared being threatened
or physically attacked.94 Violent attacks against Asian Americans rose during
the pandemic, mainly driven by political attacks against China—identified as
the originating country for the novel coronavirus—along with a resurgence in
scapegoating the Asian community.95 Horrifically, these political slurs have
resulted in indiscriminate violence against Asian Americans, and fear of such
violence has affected the mental health and economic well-being of many
AAPIs.96
But for many in the Asian American community—and among
communities of color—hostility is not necessarily something new, but rather,
reflective of underlying issues that the pandemic has exacerbated.97 And like
other communities of color, the history of AAPIs in the United States is

93.
Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2410; Varma, supra note 7; DONG ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 2; Fan, supra note 5; see also discussion supra Part III (citing a series of studies
on the effect of discrimination on AAPI mental health).
94.
Ruiz et al., supra note 6; Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific
Islanders on COVID-19 and Getting Vaccinated, supra note 74.
95.
David Nakamura, With ‘Kung Flu,’ Trump Sparks Backlash over Racist
Language — and a Rallying Cry for Supporters, WASH. POST (June 24, 2020),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-kung-flu-trump-sparks-backlash-over-racistlanguage--and-a-rallying-cry-for-supporters/2020/06/24/485d151e-b620-11ea-aca5ebb63d27e1ff_story.html; see also Eun Kyung Kim, Prejudice Against Asian Americans Is Real
and
It’s
Ugly,
ROLL
CALL
(Mar.
29,
2021,
10:30
AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/2021/03/29/prejudice-against-asian-americans-is-real-and-itsugly/?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletters&utm_conten.
96.
Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders on COVID-19
and Getting Vaccinated, supra note 74; see Sydney Pereira, Woman Beaten in Anti-Asian Attack
on a Train in Manhattan, GOTHAMIST (Dec. 27, 2020, 7:35 PM),
http://gothamist.com/news/woman-beaten-anti-asian-attack-train-manhattan;
Carmen
Reinicke, How the Pandemic and a Rise in Targeted Hate Crimes Has Shifted Spending For
Asian Americans, CNBC (June 2, 2021, 9:44 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/02/thepandemic-has-shifted-spending-in-the-aapi-community.html (quoting an advocate stating that
“[t]he fear is very real, it has a mental health impact and also ultimately does of course impact
economic activity” because “[i]f people are afraid to leave their homes, how will they go out
and find a job or spend money in a local business?”).
97.
Li Zhou, The Long History of Anti-Asian Hate in America, Explained, VOX,
http://www.vox.com/identities/2020/4/21/21221007/anti-asian-racism-coronavirusxenophobia (last updated Mar. 5, 2021, 5:45 PM).
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complicated and running the gamut between outright exclusion to elevation as
a model minority and a wedge for identity politics.98
For instance, Americans’ increasingly negative views about China as
it becomes an economic competitor is one factor—along with the pandemic—
that has led to the scapegoating of Asian American-owned businesses.99 These
attitudes parallel the nativism that led to events ranging from the passage of
the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 to the Vincent Chin murder in 1982.100 The
COVID-19 pandemic, however, has exacerbated these tensions; aggressors
connect the virus to China as a justification for violence against Asian
Americans.101
As community leaders raise awareness about the broader AAPI
community’s needs, policymakers are responding to the immediate needs
brought on by the pandemic.102 For example, recently Congress passed the
COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act.103 But some critics argue that the law does not
address the underlying causes of anti-Asian sentiment nor the needs of the
community.104 Some advocates even opposed the COVID-19 Hate Crimes
Act, in part, because they argued it singled out policing as a solution for
98.
Id.
99.
See William A. Galston, A Momentous Shift in US Public Attitudes Toward
China,
BROOKINGS
INST.:
ORDER
FROM
CHAOS
(Mar.
22,
2021),
http://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/22/a-momentous-shift-in-uspublic-attitudes-toward-china/; Robert Farley, Can China’s Economy Overtake the United
States?, DIPLOMAT (July 23, 2021), http://thediplomat.com/2021/07/can-chinas-economyovertake-the-united-states/; Nakamura, supra note 95; MAR & ONG, supra note 90, at 4–5.
100.
See Chinese Immigration and the Chinese Exclusion Acts, U.S. DEP’T
STATE OFF. HISTORIAN, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/chinese-immigration
(last visited Apr. 15, 2022); Becky Little, How the 1982 Murder of Vincent Chin Ignited a Push
for Asian American Rights, HISTORY (May 5, 2020), http://www.history.com/news/vincentchin-murder-asian-american-rights.
101.
See Kambhampaty, supra note 23.
102.
See Emma Hinchliffe, Why Tammy Duckworth Issued Her Ultimatum Over
AAPI Cabinet Representation: ‘I Needed to Take Action’, FORTUNE (Apr. 19, 2021, 8:34 AM),
http://fortune.com/2021/04/19/tammy-duckworth-aapi-cabinet-interview/; Barbara Sprunt,
Congress Passes Bill to Counter the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate Crimes, NPR,
http://www.npr.org/2021/05/18/997847571/congress-passes-bill-to-counter-the-rise-in-antiasian-hate-crimes (last updated May 18, 2021, 9:40 PM).
103.
COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act, Pub. L. No. 117-13, §1, 135 Stat. 265, 265
(2021).
104.
See 75+ Asian and LGBTQ Organizations’ Statement in Opposition to Law
Enforcement-Based Hate Crime Legislation, GAPIMNY (May 18, 2021, 3:23 PM),
http://www.gapimny.org/75-asian-and-lgbtq-organizations-statement-in-opposition-to-lawenforcement-based-hate-crime-legislation/; Hinnershitz, supra note 27 (“In May of 2020, the
Commission on Civil Rights promised to prosecute civil rights violations and hold public
hearings on anti-Asian hate, but these initiatives had largely languished despite calls from the
AAPI community for legislators to take verbal and physical abuse seriously.”).
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combating bias while ignoring Black and brown communities’ concerns about
over-policing.105
V.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Again, for many communities of color, these stressors only brought to
light disparities in our healthcare system, particularly our mental health
system, that have long existed.106 Achieving equity will require not only
addressing supply-side barriers—for instance, how practitioners treat
AAPIs—but also demand-side barriers that make AAPIs reluctant to utilize
mental health services.107
As we emerge from the pandemic and in recognition of criticism of
current policies, policymakers should work toward “not only addressing the
mental health needs of the AAPI community. . . and the uptick in violence,”
but also making mental health services more equitable for all communities of
color. 108
The following are recommendations “that stakeholders—
policymakers, providers, and others—could adopt.” 109
A.

Engage in AAPI-Focused Research

To make policy decisions on allocations on resources and understand
communities’ health status, stakeholders need disaggregated data, but too
often, AAPI data is aggregated and thus may mask differences between AAPI
ethnicities.110 One often-cited example is the incidence of colorectal cancer
which appears to be similar between Whites and Asian Americans as a whole,
but when data on Asian Americans was disaggregated, researchers found that

105.
Jabara-Heyer NO HATE Act, S. 1086, 117th Cong. (2021); Kimmy Yam,
Why Over 85 Asian American, LGBTQ Groups Opposed the Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Bill, NBC
NEWS (May 14, 2021, 3:30 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/why-over-85asian-american-%20lgbtq-groups-opposed-anti-asian-n1267421; 75+ Asian and LGBTQ
Organizations’ Statement in Opposition to Law Enforcement-Based Hate Crime Legislation,
supra note 104.
106.
Amelia Seraphia Derr, Mental Health Service Use Among Immigrants in
the United States: A Systematic Review, 67 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 265, 265 (2016).
107.
See Gayle Y. Iwamasa, Recommendations for the Treatment of AsianAmerican/Pacific
Islander
Populations,
AM.
PSYCH.
ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/pi/oema/resources/ethnicity-health/asian-american/psychologicaltreatment (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
108.
Kim, supra note 3; Yam, supra note 80; 75+ Asian and LGBTQ
Organizations’ Statement in Opposition to Law Enforcement-Based Hate Crime Legislation,
supra note 104; Derr, supra note 106, at 265.
109.
Kim, supra note 3.
110.
Id.
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certain Asian ethnicities had lower screening rates.111 In other words, if AAPIs
are viewed as a whole, it would be difficult to notice that difference but if the
data is sliced further, it is possible to see significant variation.112
Stakeholders can diversify health data by encouraging an environment
of trust, security, and accountability between patients and the research
community.113 Policymakers can regulate and prohibit behavior that runs
counter to their policy goals.114 For example, a series of federal laws—
including section 185 of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and
Providers Act, section 3001 of the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act, and section 4302 of the Affordable Care
Act—were supposed to encourage more rigorous reporting requirements for
Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.115 Such
richer data sets would “represent a powerful new set of tools to move us closer
to our vision of a nation free of disparities in health and health care.”116
Given this lack of specificity about the AAPI community, AAPIs are
frequently left out of discussions on health equity.117 Aggregated data too
often “suggest[s] that all Asian Americans are healthy, affluent, and well
111.
Colorectal Cancer and Age, Race, and Ethnicity, GASTROENTEROLOGY
HEALTH PARTNERS (Dec. 9, 2020), http://www.gastrohealthpartners.com/colorectal-cancerand-age-race-and-ethnicity/; Sabrina T. Wong et al., Disparities in Colorectal Cancer
Screening Rates Among Asian Americans and Non-Latino Whites, 104 CANCER 2940, 2944
(2005).
112.
See Hee Yun Lee et al., Colorectal Cancer Screening Disparities in Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders: Which Groups are Most Vulnerable?, 16 ETHNICITY &
HEALTH 501, 510 (2011).
113.
See Tina J. Kauh, Racial Equity Will Not Be Achieved Without Investing in
Data
Disaggregation,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(Nov.
29,
2021),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20211123.426054/full/ (urging investments
into data disaggregation efforts, including ensuring community engagement).
114.
See id. (noting, as an example, that the majority of states fail to follow the
Office of Management and Budget’s standards for disaggregating COVID-19 data between
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders).
115.
Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-275, § 185, 122 Stat. 2494, 2587–88; Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 3001, 123 Stat. 226, 232 (2009); Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4302, 124 Stat. 119, 578–79 (2010); Megan
Daugherty Douglas et al., Missed Policy Opportunities to Advance Health Equity by Recording
Demographic Data in Electronic Health Records, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, July 2015 at 380, 380.
116.
Howard Koh, Improving Health Disparities Data for a Healthier Nation,
WHITE
HOUSE:
BLOG
(Nov.
2,
2011,
11:15
AM),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/11/02/improving-health-disparities-datahealthier-nation.
117.
Vivian Tseng, Racial Equity in Health Must Include Asian Americans, HILL
(May 29, 2021, 2:00 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/556088-racial-equity-inhealth-must-include-asian-americans.
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educated,” when they are, in fact, an economically diverse group.118
Consequently, this absence leads to a lack of financial and institutional support
for research into the AAPI health issues at large.119 Only half a percent of
foundation giving and less than a percent of corporate giving goes to AAPI
communities and causes.120
B.

Ensure Meaningful Coverage

Having health insurance coverage is an important factor in whether
someone, including an AAPI, will utilize mental health services.121 As the
AAPI population grows due to immigration, AAPIs face challenges obtaining
coverage similar to other immigrant communities.122 However, even
communities with long-existing ties to this country may see barriers to
obtaining coverage: for instance, certain Pacific Islanders who are part of the
Compact of Free Association were denied coverage via Medicaid until
Congress restored coverage.123
Coverage is not enough as stakeholders must ensure that such
coverage is meaningful and usable.124 AAPI immigrants face health literacy
challenges and language barriers in common with the larger immigrant
community, and given the diversity of languages within the AAPI community,
118.
Kauh, supra note 113.
119.
Id. (“[The lack of specific data] will continue to erase the experiences of
communities and mask how they are faring and, in turn, negatively affect how government and
philanthropic resources are allocated”); Amy Yee, Research on Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders
Is
Being
Stifled,
SCI.
AM.
(July
8,
2021),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/research-on-asian-americans-and-pacific-islandersis-being-stifled/.
120.
The AAPI Giving Challenge Raises $1.1 Billion Commitment for AAPI
Communities, ASIAN AM. FOUND., http://www.taaf.org/aapi-giving-challenge (last visited Apr.
3, 2022).
121.
Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2415 (noting that “lack of health insurance
is associated” with utilizing informal services rather than formal mental health services).
122.
See Health Coverage of Immigrants, KFF (July 15, 2021),
http://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/fact-sheet/health-coverage-of-immigrants/.
123.
See Compacts of Free Association, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR OFF. INSULAR
AFFS., http://www.doi.gov/oia/compacts-of-free-association (last visited Apr. 3, 2022); Dan
Diamond, ‘A Shining Moment’: Congress Agrees to Restore Medicaid for Pacific Islanders,
POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2020, 8:11 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/20/congressrestores-medicaid-pacific-islanders-449480.
124.
Kathy Ko Chin, Language Access Rights Under Threat, HEALTH AFFS.
BLOG
(Aug.
9,
2019),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20190809.457959/full/ (noting that a “right
to language access services” is critical for those with limited English proficiency “to
meaningfully understand their health care and health insurance”).
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AAPIs may not understand important documents needed for obtaining and
utilizing insurance if such documents are only in English and Spanish.125
Additional services such as call centers and peer support can improve care
access and utilization.126 Additionally, having such services also may reduce
perceived barriers—lack of fluency or speaking with an accent—that may
cause some AAPIs to avoid mental health services.127
C.

Develop a Responsive Workforce

Even for AAPIs with health insurance, finding a linguistically and
culturally appropriate provider can be challenging.128 As the American
Psychological Association has noted, this challenge has resulted in
“[m]isdiagnosis and underdiagnosis of mental illness among Asian Americans
and Pacific Islanders who have serious mental health and health implications
. . . .”129 Organizations such as the National Asian American Pacific Islander
Mental Health Association (“NAAPIMHA”) have set up online directories and
other resources to help connect providers with those in need.130
Delivery system reforms such as behavioral health integration hold
great promise for improving care, but policymakers are recognizing that such
efforts must equitably address the needs of communities of color.131 In 2012,
125.
See Chin, supra note 22.
126.
See id.; Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2414 (“[C]ommunity health
workers and peer support specialists could mitigate negative attitudes related to discrimination
. . . based on language proficiency”); Snowden et al., supra note 43, at 235 (finding that even
modest policies on language access “had a measurable impact on mental health service rates
among LEP Asian American Medicaid enrollees”); Schmeida & McNeal, supra note 13, at 365,
368 (discussing how language services can improve mental health services for children with
limited English proficiency).
127.
See Spencer et al., supra note 15, at 2414–15.
128.
A SNAPSHOT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 19, at 6–7 (noting
that “lack of culturally competent services” is a frequently cited barrier); see also State of
AAPIs: Language Diversity and English Proficiency (2014), AAPI DATA (May 28, 2014),
http://aapidata.com/state-aapi-language/; Elizabeth J. Kramer et al., Cultural Factors
Influencing the Mental Health of Asian Americans, 176 W.J. MED. 227, 227 (2002).
129.
Iwamasa, supra note 107.
130.
See AANHPI Service Providers in all Fifty States, NAAPIMHA,
http://www.naapimha.org/aanhpi-service-providers (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
131.
See Chiquita Brooks-LaSure et al., Innovation at the Centers for Medicine
and Medicaid Services: A Vision for the Next 10 Years, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Aug. 12, 2021),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210812.211558/full/
(providing
an
overview from federal healthcare officials that future demonstration projects around delivery
system reform “should make equity a centerpiece”); Shannon Firth, New Head of CMS
Innovation Center Prioritizes Fairness in Healthcare, MEDPAGE TODAY (Apr. 21, 2021),
http://www.medpagetoday.com/practicemanagement/practicemanagement/92195.
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the HHS Office of Minority Health released a white paper on how such
integration could reflect AAPI needs based on a summit hosted by
NAAPIMHA.132 But it has been nearly a decade since that OMH paper was
released, and HHS ought to review it to determine what progress has been
made and what must be done.133
D.

Create a Comprehensive Post-Pandemic Plan on Mental Health

Finally, the Biden Administration should seize the opportunity to
develop a strategic plan to guide regulatory options while working with
Congress, which has been holding multiple hearings on mental health.134 Such
a strategy is needed given the billions of dollars that have been allocated
toward mental health services in successive COVID relief packages.135 The
Biden Administration should build on its predecessor’s work: on October 3,
2020, then-President Trump issued an executive order on mental health that,
among other things, called for a plan from the agency heads.136 But because
this plan was released during the lame duck session between administrations,
it received little attention.137

132.
DJ IDA ET AL., INTEGRATED CARE FOR ASIAN AMERICAN, NATIVE
AMERICAN, NATIVE HAWAIIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER COMMUNITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR
ACTION: CONSENSUS STATEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (Teresa Chapa ed., 2012),
http://dbhds.virginia.gov/library/cultural%20and%20linguistic%20competence/provider%20m
aterial/diverse/integrated%20care%20for%20aanhpi%20communities%201%2024%2012.pdf.
133.
See id. at 1.
134.
See, e.g., Press Release, Senate Finance Committee, Finance Committee
Releases Bipartisan Report on Mental Health Care in America (Mar. 29, 2022),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/finance-committee-releases-bipartisanreport-on-mental-health-care-in-america-; Press Release, House Energy and Commerce
Committee, E&C Announces Hearing on Mental Health Legislation (Mar. 29, 2022),
https://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/ec-announces-hearing-onmental-health-legislation.
135.
JOHNATHAN H. DUFF ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46831, BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, 30
(2021), http://crsreports.congress.gov/product/npdf/R/R46831 (“The COVID supplemental
appropriations acts and ARPA together provided SAMHSA and other HHS agencies over
[eight] billion [dollars] to address behavioral health-related needs.”).
136.
Exec. Order No. 13,954, 3 C.F.R. §§ 3, 4(b) (Oct. 3, 2020).
137.
Kim, supra note 3; SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
EXECUTIVE ORDER SAVING LIVES THROUGH INCREASED SUPPORT FOR MENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH NEEDS REPORT 3 (2020), http://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/saving-livesmental-behavioral-health-needs.pdf.
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One area though that is missing from the prior administration’s plan
is a strategy on equity.138 The Trump administration’s recommendations
focused mainly on law enforcement needs, greater enforcement of mental
health parity, an expansion of telehealth, and care coordination across federal
agencies and with the private sector.139 However, given the successive
COVID relief packages’ investment in mental health, an active, equitable
strategy is more important than ever.140 In combination with President Biden’s
executive order on advancing equity across all federal programs, a new
strategy could and should recognize equity as a key component toward
building a new, better mental health system post-pandemic.141
VI.

CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic has had consequences for the AAPI
community as it has for our country and the world.142 But “[w]e can learn
from this pandemic and take something from the despair that it has caused” to
become a more resilient and equitable society.143 For the AAPI community,
we can not only reexamine the impact of health policy—particularly mental
health policies—on us but also our overall role in society and our cultural
understandings.144 At the same time, we must work with other stakeholders to
make sure that our healthcare system addresses healthcare disparities rather
than continuing past inequities.145 Such efforts directed toward our mental
health system will ensure that is more responsive and resilient to our country
while being more equitable for the AAPI community.146

at 3.

138.

See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 137,

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
DUFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 30.
Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021).
DONG ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
Kim, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article explores mental health coverage under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)1 “regarded as” prong, using a
hypothetical case study involving a virtual team environment during the
COVID-19 pandemic.2 Research suggests that during the pandemic, employer
awareness surrounding the mental health needs of their workforces has
increased.3 Mental health factors relating to the pandemic include: Social
isolation from in-home sheltering, increased health anxiety, increased
substance abuse, trauma or grief from losing loved ones, strain from new
responsibilities related to family, financial, self-care, and more.4
Greater employer awareness about employee mental health and
wellness may generally be considered a positive development.5 However, this
added vigilance may also give rise to novel considerations concerning the
ways that employers interpret and respond to anomalous employee behavior
and conduct, interactions with co-workers, and performance issues.6 This
might be especially true where employers rapidly adopted virtual or hybrid
work arrangements and performance management procedures in the wake of
the pandemic.7
Title I of the ADA, originally passed in 1990, prohibits employers
from discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.8
To determine coverage, the ADA provides a three-pronged definition of
disability in its employment discrimination framework, that includes: “[1] a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

1.
Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
2.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C); see also discussion infra Part III.
3.
See Heidi Mochari-Greenberger & Reena L. Pande, Behavioral Health in
America During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Meeting Increased Needs Through Access to High
Quality Virtual Care, 35 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 312, 315 (2021).
4.
Id. at 314–15; Petri J. C. M. Embregts et al., A Thematic Analysis into the
Experiences of People with a Mild Intellectual Disability During the COVID-19 Lockdown
Period,
INT. J. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
3,
4
(Oct.
5,
2020),
http://doi.org/10.1080/20473869.2020.1827214.
5.
Mochari-Greenberger & Pande, supra note 3, at 315.
6.
See id.
7.
Id. at 314.
8.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). This includes discrimination in the “hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id.
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activities . . . [2] a record of such an impairment; or [3] being regarded as
having such an impairment . . . .”9
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”)10 significantly
broadened coverage for psychiatric disabilities under prong one and two of the
ADA’s definition of disability, most notably by recognizing that an episodic
impairment that “substantially limits one or more major life activities” can be
entitled to coverage, and by prohibiting consideration of the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures like medication or therapy.11 However, prong
three—which is often crucial to plaintiffs—provides an exception for
employers where it is determined that an impairment was, in fact, or was
perceived as being, “transitory and minor.”12
Beyond demonstrating coverage as a person with a disability,
individuals pursuing “regarded as” claims related to perceptions of their
mental state face other uphill battles; particularly with regard to the required
elements of demonstrating they are “qualified” for the position in question and
were subjected to an adverse employment action “on the basis of disability.”13
For starters, we can imagine how subjective qualifications for a position, such
9.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C). An individual must only meet one of the
three definitions of “disability” to be covered under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2).
10.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 1, 122 Stat. 3553,
3553.
11.
Id. § 3; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (“[ADA] major life activities include, but
are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,
thinking, communicating, and working.”). The ADAAA also recognized limitations to “major
bodily functions” as a path to coverage, including: “functions of the immune system, normal
cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine,
and reproductive functions.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), (4)(D)–(E).
12.
See, e.g., Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/questions-and-answers-final-rule-implementing-adaamendments-act-2008 (noting that “an individual may find it easier to claim coverage under the
‘regarded as’ definition of ‘disability,’” following the ADAAA’s updated standards); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(3)(B).
13.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(g)(3), (l)(3), (m); The ADA: Questions and
Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/fact-sheet/adaquestions-and-answers (last modified Jan. 15, 1997) (“[A] qualified individual with a disability
is a person who meets legitimate skill, experience, education, or other requirements of an
employment position that he or she holds or seeks, and who can perform the ‘essential functions’
of the position with or without reasonable accommodation.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)–(b). “To
establish a prima facie case of [ADA employment] discrimination, a plaintiff must [also] show
that” the employer is a covered entity, that they are “qualified to perform the essential functions
of [the] . . . job held, with or without reasonable accommodation,” and that the employer
discriminated against them on the basis of their disability. Cash v. Magic City Motor Corp.,
No. 16-CV-00192, 2017 WL 281755, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 20, 2017).
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as “soft skills,” might impact colleagues’ and supervisors’ perceptions on
mental health issues in complex, intricate ways.14 Moreover, some courts have
found the ability to get along with others and “appropriately handle stress” to
be essential job functions, further obscuring and undermining coverage in
these contexts.15
Additionally, the Title I causation standard for demonstrating that an
adverse employment action was taken “on the basis of disability” can be
particularly burdensome in prong three cases, where employer perception—
and action on the basis of that perception—is a causal antecedent.16 Although
the ADAAA technically removed the requirement that plaintiffs need to
establish the employer’s beliefs about the severity of the perceived impairment
under prong three, functionally a lack of clarity remains in courts as to what
factual basis is needed to survive summary judgment on the questions of
whether an employer perceived an employee as having a psychiatric disability,
and whether they acted on the basis of that perception.17
This Article situates some of these nuances and legal pitfalls within
the context of a virtual workforce team and the performance management
settings during the pandemic, wherein the strain on American workers’ mental
wellness was particularly acute.18 Each paragraph in the case study is
numbered to guide readers through the subsequent analysis, which is
structured in order of prima facie elements and the ADA’s evidentiary burdenshifting framework.19
II.

HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY

14.
See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under
the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH & LEE. L. REV. 2027, 2053 (2013).
15.
See, e.g., Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc., 795 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2015).
16.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see Befort, supra note 14, at 2036; 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(g)(iii)(1).
17.
See, e.g., Walker v. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C., No. 10–CV–00195,
2012 WL 4794149, at *15 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2020); McNally
v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Co., L.L.C., No. 12–CV–00063, 2014 WL 300433, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan.
28, 2014) (finding that employers suggesting counseling for employee’s personal problems is
not enough, on its own, to satisfy “regarded as” standard); Cash, 2017 WL 281755, at *3
(finding insufficient link between high likelihood that employer regarded employee as having a
psychiatric disability and the adverse employment action).
18.
See discussion infra Parts II–III (referring to the hypothetical case study and
the analysis of it).
19.
See discussion infra Part II (referring to the analysis of the hypothetical case
study).
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1.
From July 2017 to July 2020, Kyle was an Account Executive
(“AE”) at a growing advertising-technology (“AdTech”) company called
KnowledgeWorks. KnowledgeWorks has 150 employees and is headquartered
in New York, New York, on the seventy-seventh floor of One World Trade
Center. After graduating college, Kyle moved from Tucson, Arizona to New
York City to take the position.
2.
KnowledgeWorks was founded in 2005. For most of the
company’s existence, leadership placed a heavy emphasis on in-person work,
with more than ninety percent of employees living in the New York City tristate area, and a strong corporate expectation of being present in the office, or
on client visits, from nine a.m. to five p.m., Monday through Friday.
3.
The AE role is entry-level. Like Kyle, AEs are typically
recent college graduates in their early to mid-twenties. At any given time, the
company employs about thirty AEs across three teams. By all accounts, the
corporate culture at KnowledgeWorks—especially among the AEs—is highly
social with frequent, company-sponsored happy hours, and client dinners and
outings, often multiple times per week.
4.
According to employee accounts, the social nature of the AE
role historically meant that the nine-to-five corporate culture was, in practice,
more flexible for AEs, who often worked offsite, attending client events. As
a colleague of Kyle’s later put it: [a]lthough the [AE] job was technically nineto-five, in practice, the constant client ‘wining and dining’ led to an air of
mystery about where colleagues were and what they were up to. Most AEs
agreed that the central importance of evening and weekend client events led to
longer workdays and workweeks than other roles, albeit, with less-regular
hours.
5.
According to the written job description, AEs are expected to
have a hunter’s mentality around generating new business by identifying
clients and growing existing accounts. To that end, AEs are encouraged to
take existing and prospective clients out to lunches, dinners, happy hours, and
other social events to aid in the sales cycle, and are provided with a company
spending account that is proportional to the size of their book of business.
6.
The position description also includes desired traits such as
quarterbacking skills and an ability to handle the stress of a fast-paced,
dynamic team environment. Off the record, many employees at the company
acknowledge that the nature of the industry often leads to a blurring of personal
and professional lines, with frequent social drinking and late nights with
colleagues and clients being accepted features of the corporate culture.
7.
From July 2017 to March 2020, Kyle was by all accounts a
star employee. In annual reviews from July 2018 and 2019, his supervisor
rated him as frequently exceeding expectations and described the relationship
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between his interpersonal style (e.g., warm, outgoing demeanor, magnetic
social skills, ideal teammate) and growing client list. In fiscal year 2019,
Kyle’s book of business delivered 160% compared to the forecasted plan. He
continued to exceed quarterly targets by an average of fifty percent through
February 2020.
8.
However, in March 2020, the AdTech industry—like so many
others—was upended by the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 10th, a
KnowledgeWorks employee tested positive for the virus. That day, the
company issued an immediate work-from-home (“WFH”) policy. Shortly
thereafter, a statewide stay-at-home order was issued in New York. Initially
KnowledgeWorks communicated to its workforce that the WFH policy would
last six weeks, but the policy became “indefinite” as the pandemic drew on.
Fortunately, KnowledgeWorks was able to avoid layoffs, despite slowing
profits.
9.
AdTech spending became unpredictable. Many clients ceased
spending altogether. Others doubled or tripled their budgets, speculating about
an uptick in screen usage as much of the population sheltered-in-place. Kyle’s
own book of business experienced similar volatility during this time, but
nothing more extreme than his colleagues in similar roles. In fact, although
Kyle lost four small to mid-sized clients in the early months of the pandemic,
he also successfully brought in two large new clients through his own personal
contacts and was one of only nine AEs who met their quota in Q2.
10.
At the time of the migration to online work, KnowledgeWorks
had many remote practices and communication tools in place. As a result, the
technical transition from in-person to virtual meetings was relatively seamless.
However, many employees privately reported that the transition was difficult,
both personally and professionally. For example, a company pulse survey,
administered by Human Resources (“HR”), showed that employee morale had
dipped from ninety percent satisfaction in January 2020, to thirty-three percent
in June 2020.
11.
According to the survey results, many employees reported
losing trust in colleagues as a result of the migration online. For instance, one
anonymous respondent noted: Before the pandemic, when a colleague was
being uncommunicative via email, or missed a meeting, I assumed they were
with a client…but now we know everyone is at home—or is supposed to be at
home—so radio silence feels more unprofessional. A majority of respondents
also lamented the loss of in-person, water cooler conversations, and expressed
feelings of social isolation and anxiety.
12.
In the early months of the pandemic, another common theme
amongst employees making the rapid shift to remote work was the lack of clear
guidance about performance management expectations. For some employees,
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this resulted in the perception of being micromanaged, stating that their
supervisor no longer respected work-life boundaries, and sometimes emailed
or texted at all hours of the day.
13.
For those in account roles, micromanagement even seemed to
threaten job security. As one respondent put it: Pursuing new business is
really an improvisational, instinctual, and interpersonal thing . . . your client,
above all, has to like you. They can always take their business elsewhere, and
rapport is harder to build with clients online. When I have three managers
expecting me to respond within the hour to instant messages or emails, and
join six virtual meetings a day, I have a tough time doing the things they
actually hired me to do.
14.
In response, in July 2020, KnowledgeWorks issued a formal,
internal “Work From Home Charter,” outlining: (1) a six-month pause in
performance evaluations; (2) increased flexibility to support family and selfcare needs; (3) new virtual employee-wellness and peer-support offerings; (4)
expectations for conduct in virtual meetings which included attendance,
meeting attire, and camera on requirements; and (5) a broader call for empathy
and checking in on colleagues’ physical and mental health, while respecting
personal privacy.
15.
Prior to this, starting in May 2020, Kyle’s relationship with
his colleagues and supervisors became increasingly strained. Kyle’s
colleagues began to notice behavior that seemed atypical and antisocial . . . a
major personality shift from his normal, gregarious self, as his supervisor later
put it. During this time, teammates noticed that Kyle was occasionally
dropping off weekly team meetings about ten minutes early without providing
a reason or even notifying teammates.
16.
As a teammate later explained: We all knew that some of our
co-workers had kids, or a sick parent, or even a pet to tend to. Dropping off a
call here and there was no biggie in those cases, but Kyle was a notorious
bachelor. Kyle also stood out among his teammates in that he rarely turned
on his video during team calls. In rare instances where Kyle did, usually at the
supervisor’s request, he appeared to be joining from a personal cellphone
rather than a work computer. On one occasion in June, Kyle was dressed in a
stained undershirt rather than business attire. On another occasion, a
disorganized shelf with liquor and what appeared to be medication bottles was
visible in his background.
17.
Kyle’s appearance became fodder for digital gossip, which
eventually reached his supervisor. According to meeting notes, during weekly
one-on-one check-ins with Kyle’s colleagues, the supervisor learned that there
was some consensus on the team that Kyle’s behavior was way off, and that he
was kind of all over the place. One colleague commented that Kyle seems
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burnt out and disheveled . . . maybe he’s still partying like it is 2019. Did you
see the booze and pills in his background the other day? In each instance, the
supervisor privately conveyed that they would monitor the situation to see if it
is an HR issue, but also recommended that Kyle’s peers show compassion,
because people are really going through a lot right now, and Kyle seems to be
having personal struggles.
18.
Things came to a head during a virtual client quarterly
business review on July 21, 2020, attended by Kyle, Kyle’s supervisor, a
product manager, and three senior-level clients. Kyle joined the meeting six
minutes late and at first had the camera on, where it appeared as though Kyle
was joining via phone from the back of a cab. When the screenshare began
for the presentation, Kyle turned off the camera and went on mute for the
remainder of the call. While Kyle was not the lead presenter, on two occasions
he was verbally unresponsive when directly addressed by the supervisor,
although Kyle did slowly respond with cursory, unfocused answers in the
meeting chat, according to the supervisor’s notes.
19.
The next week, Kyle’s supervisor set up a meeting to address
Kyle’s behavior on the client call, during which Kyle downplayed the
importance of his behavior on the call. Kyle explained that things were not
being handled any differently than before the pandemic, as evidenced by his
stronger-than-average client list. Kyle asserted that his clients know him by
now and joked that they are probably sick of seeing my face. During this
conversation, the supervisor said, I am worried about you, and asked how are
you doing, personally speaking? Kyle responded I’m fine, you know . . . the
same. Kyle went on to acknowledge, though, that the circumstances have been
weird, I’m sitting home alone 24-hours a day glued to a screen. I have trouble
sleeping. I am supposed to be reeling in big accounts but there is no personal
connection anymore. I am spinning plates, and all the virtual hangouts and
happy hours start to run together like I am watching myself in a video game—
it is not easy.
20.
At the end of the meeting, the supervisor expressed
compassion for Kyle’s circumstances, saying: I totally understand, you know,
we’re all going through a lot right now, many of us are in a weird head space
. . . but we cannot let that affect our relationships to colleagues and clients.
The supervisor then referred Kyle to attend a free, company-sponsored
webinar on Getting Well and Overcoming Social Isolation, and also mentioned
the company’s Employee Assistance (“EA”) Counselors, as well as a new
peer-support program, where employees can be anonymously connected
through an online system to colleagues with similar lived experience. In
referencing the EA counselors and peer-support programs, the supervisor

2022]

MENTAL HEALTH AND ADA’S “REGARDED AS” PRONG

402

specifically mentioned that peer support can be really helpful with issues like
substance abuse and anxiety or depression.
21.
After the meeting with Kyle, however, the supervisor
submitted their notes from the call to HR, adding a summary of the situation
that described a lack of accountability and disassociation in Kyle about his
performance issues. The summary documented all complaints from Kyle’s
teammates collected over the prior three months during one-on-one check-ins
and included the supervisor’s own assessment that Kyle had lost four clients
since the start of the pandemic, and is displaying erratic, worrying behavior
that is negatively impacting team morale and client relationships . . . There is
nothing to indicate these behaviors will improve any time soon. Without
further intervention, Kyle’s contract was terminated at the end of July 2020.
III.

ANALYSIS

It is expected that readers will have much different reactions to the
scenario above. New York—where the case study occurs—is an employmentat-will state, and the question of this article is not whether Kyle deserved to be
fired, or, alternatively, whether his colleagues should have shown him more
empathy.20 Rather, we aim to explore a tricky area of law pertaining to
employer awareness or acknowledgment of anomalous employee behavior,
and wherein the line exists that such acknowledgment crosses over into
regarding the employee as having an ADA disability.21
The above hypothetical describes some aspects of employment during
the pandemic that might feel familiar to those of us who transitioned to virtual
work in highly unfamiliar times.22 Even outside the context of the pandemic,
almost half of adults (46.4%) will experience a mental illness during their
lifetime.23 Beyond this, all research indicates that the American workforce,
broadly speaking, experienced unprecedented mental health challenges during
the pandemic.24 For example, there was a marked increase in reported
symptoms of anxiety and depression among adults in the United States, rising

20.
See discussion infra Part III.
21.
See discussion infra Section III.A; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).
22.
See discussion supra Part II.
23.
5 Surprising Mental Health Statistics, MENTAL HEALTH FIRST AID (Feb. 6,
2019), http://www.mentalhealthfirstaid.org/2019/02/5-surprising-mental-health-statistics/.
24.
Mady Peterson, Workplaces in Crisis: Employee Care Still Missing the
Mark, LIMEADE: BLOG, http://www.limeade.com/resources/blog/employee-experience-duringthe-pandemic-survey/ (last visited May 3, 2022).
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from 11% in 2019 to 41.1% in January 2021.25 During the pandemic, selfreported mental wellness in the workplace had a steep decline of twenty-seven
percent.26 Pandemic-related effects on employee wellness outside of work
time included forty-nine percent of employees struggling to find energy for
nonwork activities, forty-two percent of employees having less interest in
socializing with friends, forty-two percent reporting difficulty sleeping, and
thirty-three percent experiencing upticks in alcohol or substance use.27
In short, many Americans experienced some of the same issues related
to mental health that we might infer from Kyle’s scenario.28 It is between the
lines—within those inferences—that the legal questions become
complicated.29 As we discuss below, the case study does not merely turn on
whether Kyle is a covered person with a disability.30
Assuming that the employer is also a covered entity, Title I’s general
rule on employment discrimination requires that a plaintiff state a prima facie
case that includes evidence that they were qualified for the job in question.31
Another element the plaintiff would have to show is that they were subjected
to an adverse employment action “on the basis of disability.”32
Within the ADA’s Title I burden-shifting framework, once the prima
facie evidentiary basis has been satisfied, the employer then has the burden to
offer either affirmative defenses or a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”
for the adverse employment action.33 If the employer succeeds, the burden
shifts back to the employee to offer plausible evidence that the employer’s

25.
Nirmita Panchal et al., The Implications of COVID-19 for Mental Health
and Substance Use, KFF (Feb. 10, 2021), http://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issuebrief/the-implications-of-covid-19-for-mental-health-and-substance-use/.
26.
Shayna Hodkin, How COVID-19 Impacted Employee Wellness, BOB: BLOG
(Oct. 9, 2020), http://www.hibob.com/blog/covid-19-employee-wellness-survey/.
27.
Peterson, supra note 24.
28.
See discussion supra Part II.
29.
See discussion supra Part II.
30.
See discussion supra Part II.
31.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also Silver v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
290 F. Supp. 3d 234, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (stating that one of the required elements a plaintiff
has to prove is that “he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job . .
. .”) (quoting Cameron v. Cmty. Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2003)).
32.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability . . . .”).
33.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In ADA
cases, courts have transposed the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for
adjudicating a motion for summary judgment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. 88-352. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003) (describing the use of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in ADA cases).
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proffered legitimate rationale was merely a pretext for discrimination.34 Thus,
although the emphasis of this Article is on coverage under the “regarded as”
prong, we do consider all other required elements and evidentiary burdens of
an ADA claim as they interact with the employer’s “perception of disability.”35
A.

Did KnowledgeWorks “Regard” Kyle as Having a Disability?

To survive summary judgment and ultimately succeed at trial, an ADA
plaintiff must present evidence that they are a person with a disability within
the meaning of the law.36 Because this is one of the threshold elements for
determining coverage, alongside whether the employer is a “covered entity”
subject to the ADA, courts will usually consider this question first in cases
where the employer is clearly a covered entity.37
From the case study, there is no indication that Kyle has a known
disability meeting the ADA prong one definition of “actual disability,” nor is
there a clear indication that he has a “record of” such an impairment under
prong two—with the possible small exception that medication bottles are
observed in his background during a work call.38 However, as noted above,
the ADA definition of disability includes individuals who are “regarded as”
having a disability by their employer.39
In Kyle’s scenario, there are a few sources of evidence that his
colleagues and supervisors perceived him as someone who was—at the very
least—undergoing mental health challenges related to anxiety, depression, and
possible substance abuse.40 One important question is whether there is enough
evidence to indicate that these perceptions went beyond some generalized
acknowledgment of mental wellness struggles into the domain of regarding
34.
Howard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d. 343, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
2015); see McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting McBride
v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009)).
35.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C); see Patrick Hartman, “Interacting with Others”
as a Major Life Activity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV.
139, 154 (2012).
36.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see Silver, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 243.
37.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see, e.g., Gronne v. Apple
Bank for Sav., 1 F. App’x. 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2001). Whether KnowledgeWorks is a covered entity
is not in question within the case study. See discussion supra Part II. Title I applies to any
private employer with more than 15 employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Thus, the “covered
entity” element is not included in our analysis. See id.
38.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(B); see discussion supra Part II (referring to
paragraph 16 of the hypothetical case study); Gronne, 1 F. App’x at 66.
39.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).
40.
See discussion supra Part II.

405

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

him as having a mental impairment.41 To provide a few examples, at various
points Kyle’s colleagues reference:
1. Kyle’s atypical and antisocial behavior;42
2. A major personality shift from [Kyle’s] normal,
gregarious self;43
3. Behavior in Kyle that they perceive as way off and kind of
all over the place;44
4. Kyle’s potential partying habits, booze and pills, and
burn out, which could be read as an implicit reference to
substance abuse issues.45
Beyond workplace gossip, Kyle, at one point, also describes to his
supervisor a state of social isolation, depressed mood, sleep deprivation,
anxiety around performance, and dissociative feelings like watching [him]self
in a video game.46 In response, Kyle’s supervisor seems to confirm the
interpretation that Kyle is experiencing mental health issues by referring Kyle
to company-offered services; the supervisor also refers Kyle to employerfacilitated supports directly addressing issues related to anxiety, depression,
and substance abuse and even references Kyle’s dissociation and erratic,
worrying behavior when recommending his firing to HR.47
Although addiction is a cognizable disability under the ADA—with
certain limitations related to the current use of illegal narcotics or use of drugs
or alcohol on the job—Kyle’s path to making a substance abuse addiction
argument under prong three is probably weaker than an argument that he was
41.
See discussion supra Part II; Stragapede v. City of Evanston, 69 F. Supp.
3d 856, 862–63 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding that the employee met “regarded as” prong when fired
because of perceived mental impairment supposed by employer after a head injury, even though
head injury had no real effects).
42.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 15 of the hypothetical
case study).
43.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 15 of the hypothetical
case study).
44.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 17 of the hypothetical
case study).
45.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 17 of the hypothetical
case study).
46.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 19 of the hypothetical
case study).
47.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 20 and 21 of the
hypothetical case study).
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regarded as having some other psychiatric disability, like a depressive
disorder.48 Although, it is worth noting that substance abuse issues have a high
comorbidity with depression and/or anxiety disorders.49
While the case study is intentionally written so that Kyle’s colleagues
make no explicit reference to a diagnosable psychiatric condition, Kyle’s
supervisor does list some specific mental health concerns, apparently directed
at Kyle’s current state of mind, while informally referring Kyle to seek
support.50 Somewhat surprisingly, given the ADAAA’s renewed “regarded
as” standard, lower federal courts in some jurisdictions have held that
employer actions like recommending professional mental health counseling,
including company-offered employee assistance counseling, are not, on their
own, enough of a basis to evidence that an employer regarded an employee as
having a psychiatric disability.51
Similarly, lower courts have been hesitant to apply “regarded as”
coverage on the sole basis of language and utterances in the workplace related
to an employee’s mental wellbeing, especially where the language in question
has a broader, non-diagnostic, and colloquial meaning.52 In some relevant
contexts, courts in employment discrimination cases will ask whether a
reasonable person could attribute discriminatory animus to the statements.53
48.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C), (3)(A); Rodriguez v.
Verizon Telecom, No. 13-CV-6969, 2014 WL 6807834, at *3, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2014)
(discussing the fact that the employer regarded employee as disabled where the “manager falsely
concluded that he was under the influence based on the manager’s perception that plaintiff ha[d]
a history with addiction.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a). Some possible symptoms of major depressive
disorder that Kyle has exhibited include chronic depressed mood, diminished interest, insomnia,
fatigue, feelings of worthlessness, and inability to concentrate. See discussion supra Part II;
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 160–
61 (5th ed. 2013).
49.
Lori Davis et al., Major Depression and Comorbid Substance Use
Disorders, 21 CURRENT OP. PSYCHIATRY 14, 15 (2008).
50.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 20 of the hypothetical
case study, wherein the supervisor lists concerns including substance abuse, anxiety, and
depression).
51.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)–(3); see, e.g., McNally v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Co., No.
12-CV-0063, 2014 WL 300433, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2014); Sanchez v. City of San Antonio,
SA-18-CV-184, 2019 WL 691204, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2019). The Fifth and Seventh
Circuits have been noteworthy in this respect. See McNally, 2014 WL 300433, at *2; Sanchez,
2019 WL 691204, at *2.
52.
See Rifai v. CMS Med. Care Corp., No. 15-1395, 2016 WL 739279, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2016); McNally, 2014 WL 300433, at *3; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
53.
See, e.g., Butler v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 473, 493 n.8 (M.D.
La. 2012); Montgomery v. Coca-Cola Enter., Inc., No. 00-CV-2278, 2003 WL 138087, at *5,
*6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2003). This standard is often applied in hostile work environment cases.
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For some utterances, like saying that an employee is “going through a lot,”
courts have understandably held that there is not quite enough of a disability
meaning within such colloquialisms to infer disability discrimination without
substantial additional context supporting this interpretation.54
Surprisingly, post-ADAAA courts have even differed in their analyses
of whether a supervisor going so far as to call an employee “crazy” or “nuts”
is enough to create a factual basis that they regarded the employee as having a
disability.55 Importantly for Kyle, lower courts in the Second Circuit have
more readily found that employer actions, like referring an employee to
counseling and making statements about their mental wellness, satisfy the
“regarded as” element of the prima facie case.56 Additionally, one can
distinguish Kyle’s situation by the fact that his behavior and appearance were
the subjects of repeated gossip among colleagues that went further into
insinuating mental health issues.57 Furthermore, the key decision-maker in the
adverse employment action, Kyle’s supervisor, was aware of that gossip, and
beyond that, the comments made by Kyle’s colleagues were significantly
intertwined, in a casual sense, with the decision to terminate Kyle’s
employment, potentially offering direct evidence of disability
discrimination.58 Put another way, the gossip about Kyle appears to be
entangled with the adverse employment action taken against him, which
happens to be particularly important in claims brought under the “regarded as”
See id. One interesting question is whether Kyle’s colleagues contributed to a hostile work
environment. See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 17–21 of the hypothetical
case study). The Second Circuit has held that “hostile work environment” claims are cognizable
under the ADA. Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2019). Thus, it is
possible that Kyle’s teammates’ documented behavior towards, and about, him and its nexus to
his termination could be formulated as a type of adverse employment action. See discussion
supra Part II (referring to paragraph 17–21 of the hypothetical case study); Fox, 918 F.3d at 69.
54.
McNally, 2014 WL 300433, at *3.
55.
Compare Rifai, 2016 WL 739279, at *4 (finding that the defendant
sufficiently pled facts that he was regarded as disabled by employer, where around the time of
his firing coworkers took action “suggesting that [plaintiff] was crazy, suffered from a mental
impairment and was mentally unstable . . . .”) with Scott v. Napolitano, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1071,
1087 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that an employer calling an employee “crazy,” and a “nut,” and
saying that he has “some mental issues” was not enough to establish that the employer believed
that the employee had a mental disability).
56.
42 U.S.C § 12102(3); see, e.g., Wade v. Elec. Boat Corp., No. 16-CV-2041,
2019 WL 4805031, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2019).
57.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 17–21 of the
hypothetical case study).
58.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 17–21 of the
hypothetical case study); see, e.g., Velez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 389 F. Supp. 2d 253, 264
(D.P.R. 2005) (concluding that statements by non-decision makers, including that plaintiff was
“crazy,” needed to be meaningfully related to the adverse action at issue).
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prong.59 The ADAAA formally removed requirements that plaintiffs have to
fully establish their employer’s beliefs about the severity of the perceived
impairment, which had emerged as a significant barrier to successful “regarded
as” claims under the ADA, as originally codified.60
While plaintiffs are still required to demonstrate that their employer
regarded them as disabled, within the meaning of the ADA, and “not merely
. . . as having some measure of disability or impairment,” the ADAAA
modified the prong three definition to place additional logical and evidentiary
emphasis on the presence of disability discrimination, “whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 61 In other
words, any evidence suggestive of disability discrimination towards Kyle is,
by definition, also evidence that Kyle was regarded as having a disability under
prong three’s updated, more inclusive standard.62
59.
42 U.S.C § 12102(3); see, e.g., Wade, 2019 WL 4805031, at *7; McNally,
2014 WL 300433, at *3.
60.
42 U.S.C § 12102(3); ADA Amendments Act of 2008; see Hilton v. Wright,
673 F.3d 120, 129 (2d. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (stating under prong three, the plaintiff need not
“present evidence of how or to what degree [defendants] believed the impairment affected
him”); Walker v. Venetian Casino Resort, LLC, No. 10–CV–00195, 2012 WL 4794149, at *15
(D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2012); Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 12; see, e.g., Bradley Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just
Right”: The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83
IND. L.J. 181, 209 (2008).
61.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3; see DiGiosia v. Aurora Health Care,
Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1218 (E.D. Wis. 2014); see, e.g., Robinson v. Purcell Constr. Corp.,
859 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Brtalik v. S. Huntington Union Free Sch.
Dist., No. CV-10-0010, 2010 WL 3958430, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010)). Incorporating the
“because of” clause into the definitional section, the ADAAA, somewhat strangely, builds
causation into the very definition of disability itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C). The
updated ADAAA explicitly removes prior expectations that plaintiffs demonstrate the
employer’s perceptions of the severity of their disability and explicitly incorporates the presence
of discrimination directed at the plaintiff on the basis of disability, as evidence that they were
regarded as disabled. Id.
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such
an impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a
major life activity.

Id. at (3)(A)–(C) (emphasis added).
62.
See discussion supra Part II. Courts in the Second Circuit have allowed
evidence of disability discrimination in the adverse employment action to essentially
demonstrate sufficient evidence, per se, that the employee was regarded as being disabled in
prong three cases. See Wade, 2019 WL 4805031; Id. at 6 (“[C]onstruing the facts in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, both alleged adverse employment actions suggest that defendant
regarded plaintiff as unable to work without mitigating measures.”). This is likely the correct
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Many courts struggle with the new standard and even apply it
incorrectly, but the gist of the ADAAA’s renewed intent for prong three is to
cover instances where it can be inferred that the employer is acting on the basis
of myth, fear, or stereotype about a perceived disability, whether or not an
actual disability under the prong one and two definitions exists.63 Prior to these
revisions, prong three coverage was much more difficult for plaintiffs, in an
evidentiary sense, because it nevertheless required them to prove that the
employer perceived them as having an impairment that “substantially limits
. . . major life activities . . . .”64 Essentially, prior to the ADAAA, this standard
folded the prong one and two standards into prong three, but with the added
hurdle of demonstrating employer perception meeting that definition.65

application of the law, because the “regarded as” element was “meant to be construed in favor
of broad coverage.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
63.
See DiGiosia, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1217–18. Some courts are apparently
continuing to apply the wrong standard — most notably in the Seventh Circuit. See id. For
instance, in one post-ADAAA case, a Wisconsin federal court held that a plaintiff’s “regarded
as” claim failed due to lack of evidence that the employer, who required her to go on leave
because of personal issues, considered her bipolar disorder a disability within the meaning under
the ADA, under the major life activity of working. See id. at 1218. In doing so, the court stated
that the ADAAA’s new “regarded as” definition was “nonsensical.” Id. at 1218 n.4. This
appears to follow precedent from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that ignores the new
standard and requires that in order “[t]o meet the ‘regarded as’ prong, the employer must
believe, correctly or not, that the employee has an impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities.” Povey v. City of Jeffersonville, 697 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 2004)). The
courts’ error here is most evident in the fact that the prior case law they cite, references the
standard aspects of the Supreme Court case of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., which were
specifically overturned by the ADAAA. Povey, 697 F.3d at 622–23; Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–335, § 2(b), 122
Stat. 3553, 3554. The Sutton trilogy of cases was, in fact specifically mentioned in the
ADAAA’s preamble (purpose section). 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; see also
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v). Even if Kyle did need to demonstrate that his employer regarded
him as having a disability that substantially limited a major life activity, there might be sufficient
evidence of such. See discussion supra Part II. There is some factual basis for assessing that
Kyle’s supervisor felt that his mental condition was affecting his ability to work in a broad class
of jobs. See discussion supra Part II.
64.
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
65.
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). With the ADAAA,
the legislature sought to ensure that the prong three definition of disability provided more
inclusive coverage. Id.; ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Frequently Asked Questions, DEP'T LAB.
OFF. FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, http://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/faqs/americanswith-disabilities-act-amendments (last updated Jan. 1, 2009) (noting that, in passing the
ADAAA, the legislature sought to “dramatically expand” coverage under the ADA ‘regarded
as’ prong); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v), 1630.2(l)(1).
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The reality is that Kyle’s “regarded as” claim could go either way on
the threshold “regarded as” element.66 On the one hand, in isolation,
statements about an employee’s mindset—especially ones with debatable
colloquial meaning—and referrals to counseling have not always been
enough.67 On the other hand, prong three coverage differs from prong one and
two coverage in that it is more intertwined with evidence that the employer
acted with discriminatory intent.68 Hence, a court’s willingness to find that
Kyle met his evidentiary burden for the “regarded as” element might,
somewhat paradoxically, turn on the question of whether KnowledgeWorks
engaged in discrimination on the basis of disability, which will be discussed
in more depth in Section III.C.69
1.

If So, Was the Perceived Impairment “Transitory and Minor?”

A sub-issue under the question of whether Kyle was regarded as
having a disability by his employer is whether the impairment—real or
perceived—was “transitory and minor.”70 Although the ADAAA generally
addressed limiting judicial interpretations of the “regarded as” prong, it also
provided a new, narrowing exception for employers where an impairment was
in fact, or was perceived by the employer as being, “transitory and minor.”71
The COVID-19 pandemic has added complexity to “transitory and
minor” inquiries.72 Mental health disabilities are, in a legal sense, more
difficult to analyze within such frameworks, because mental illness is “less
linear in progression than physical illness [and] tends to be more erratic, less
predictable, and more sudden . . . [m]any mental illnesses tend to be episodic,
following a kind of ebb and flow one rarely sees in physical illness.”73 Under
the updated ADA framework’s “transitory and minor” exception for
employers, a “transitory” impairment is defined as “an impairment with an
66.
See discussion supra Part II; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478; 42 U.S.C. §
12102(3)(A)–(B).
67.
See McNally v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Co., No. 12–CV–00063, 2014 WL
300433, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2014).
68.
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 500; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C).
69.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)–(B); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478; see discussion supra
Part II.
70.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).
71.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)–(B).
72.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B); Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., 961 F.3d 242,
247–48 (3d Cir. 2020).
73.
Michelle Parikh, Note, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There is
Nothing Left for Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with
Mental Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 742–43 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
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actual or expected duration of six months or less,” while the term “minor” is
not explicitly defined in the law or regulations.74
Determining “whether the impairment at issue is or would be
‘transitory and minor’ is to be determined objectively,” which means not based
on the employer’s own subjective assessment of how serious or long the
disability would last, and the employer has the burden of demonstrating that
the impairment is—in the case of an actual impairment—or would be—in the
case of a perceived impairment—both “transitory and minor.”75 Courts have
also made clear that determinations of “transitory” and “minor” are separate
questions, so a perceived or actual impairment that is transitory but not minor,
or minor but not transitory, will not cause a “regarded as” claim to fail.76
If Kyle raises a sufficient evidentiary basis that KnowledgeWorks
regarded him as disabled, the good news for him is that there is little evidence
to suggest that KnowledgeWorks perceived his mental health impairment to
be both transitory and minor.77 First, his colleagues and supervisor had been
identifying and documenting notable changes in his behavior in May of 2020.78
When Kyle’s employment was terminated three months later, Kyle’s
supervisor noted that there is nothing to indicate these behaviors will improve
any time soon.79
Additionally, even if it is asserted that Kyle’s mental state was
symptomatic of the conditions of the pandemic, like social isolation, the
ongoing nature of the COVID-19 public health crisis places no apparent
bounds on the duration that Kyle might experience these challenges.80 As
such, the employer’s own statements, the apparently continuous, or chronic,
nature of Kyle’s mental health state prior to being fired, and the broader
74.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f).
75.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f). “It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination
by an individual claiming coverage under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the definition of disability
that the impairment is in the case of an actual impairment or would be in the case of a perceived
impairment ‘transitory and minor.’” Id.
76.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f); see, e.g., Eshleman, 961 F.3d at 247–48. Even after
the ADAAA, some courts have nevertheless continued to “blend” transitory-ness and minorness into a single combined inquiry, and similarly continue to conflate the meaning of
“episodic” and “transitory.” Eshleman, 961 F. 3d at 247–48; see, e.g., Kelly v. N.Y. State Off.
of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378, 394–95, 399 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) (applying the “transitory
and minor” exception on the sole basis that plaintiff’s “mental health issues were . . . according
to her own complaint, sporadic.”).
77.
See discussion supra Part II.
78.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 15 of the hypothetical
case study).
79.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 21 of the hypothetical
case study).
80.
See discussion supra Part II.
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context of the pandemic, give little reason to assume that Kyle’s impairment,
real or perceived, was transitory in nature.81
This alone would defeat the “transitory and minor” exemption to
regarded as coverage, but it is nevertheless worth asking: was Kyle’s
impairment “minor”?82 As noted above, minor-ness is—legally speaking—
less bright line than transitory-ness.83 To determine whether an impairment is
“minor,” courts have typically applied standards that ask whether the
impairment meaningfully affects an individual’s abilities to perform their
primary work functions.84 It is important to remember here that under the
regarded as prong, an impairment can be non-minor in two ways: either as a
medical fact related to an actual impairment or in the employer’s perception
that the impairment was non-minor.85
As with the transitory determination, there is little in the facts above
to suggest that KnowledgeWorks viewed Kyle’s mental condition as minor.86
In fact, the extent to which they perceived Kyle’s mental state as affecting his
ability to perform his primary work functions was very much the crux of their
reason for terminating his employment.87 In particular, Kyle’s supervisor—
and to a lesser extent Kyle’s other colleagues—appears to draw a causal link
between Kyle’s mental state and his ability to perform the essential job
functions of teamwork and getting along with others.88 In short, it seems
unlikely that Kyle’s perceived impairment in this set of facts would be
considered minor.89
One final thing to observe in the “transitory and minor” analysis is that
it illustrates what some legal scholars have described as a “Goldilocks
Dilemma” in ADA coverage.90 Succinctly put, the “Goldilocks Dilemma”
81.
See discussion supra Part II.
82.
See discussion supra Part II; Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., 961 F.3d 242, 246
(3d Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(b).
83.
Eshleman, 961 F.3d at 246.
84.
See Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 254–55, 259–60
(3d Cir. 2014) (finding that impairment was “minor” where plaintiff’s broken bone affecting
use of pinky finger did not render her unable to perform her primary work function of typing,
although it did slow down her typing).
85.
See Kelly v. N.Y. State Off. of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378, 394–
95 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Eshleman, 961 F.3d at 249; Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir.
2012) (per curiam); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
86.
See discussion supra Part II.
87.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 20–21 of the
hypothetical case study).
88.
See discussion supra Part II.
89.
See discussion supra Part II.
90.
Areheart, supra note 60, at 181; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(b).
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refers to the fact that many of the ADA’s requirements for coverage contain
contradictory and potentially self-defeating evidentiary standards for
plaintiffs.91 As we will see in the next section, Kyle has the required
evidentiary burden of demonstrating that he is a qualified employee able to
perform the essential functions of the position in order to receive Title I
coverage.92 Yet, in so doing, Kyle might also be providing evidence and
assertions that would lead a court to determine that his impairment was indeed
minor, insofar that it did not affect his ability to perform primary work
functions.93
As we move from the question of whether Kyle was “a person with a
disability” to the next required element that Kyle be “qualified” for the
position, bear in mind that empirical analyses of pre- and post- ADAAA
litigation outcomes found that summary judgments for employers on the basis
of a lack of disability status were down significantly since the passage of the
ADAAA.94 However, there was an increase in rulings that an individual is not
“qualified for” employment, a trend that might elucidate some of the
contradictory evidentiary requirements for plaintiffs to demonstrate that they
are disabled enough to be covered by the law, but not so disabled that they
cannot perform the essential functions of the job.95 One challenge for plaintiffs
in ADA claims is demonstrating that the level of disability was “just right” to
satisfy both required elements.96
B.
Was Kyle a “Qualified Employee” Able to Perform the Essential
Functions of the Job?
To prove a claim of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must
show that “[the plaintiff] was otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of [the] job, with or without reasonable accommodation.”97 This
element can be broken down further by considering (1) what are a job’s
essential functions, and (2) what are reasonable accommodations for the

91.
Areheart, supra note 60, at 181.
92.
See discussion supra Part II; McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120,
125 (2d Cir. 2013).
93.
See discussion supra Part II.
94.
Befort, supra note 14, at 2031–32; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3), (l)(3),
(m) (2021).
95.
Befort, supra note 14, at 2030, 2032.
96.
Areheart, supra note 60, at 209.
97.
McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125 (quoting Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445
F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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essential functions of that particular job.98 Thus, an employer also violates the
ADA by refusing to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee with
a disability that would otherwise allow the employee to perform the essential
functions of their job.99
The Second Circuit has explained: “[a]lthough a court will give
considerable deference to an employer’s determination as to what functions
are essential, there are a number of relevant factors that may influence a court’s
ultimate conclusion as to a position’s essential functions . . . . ‘[u]sually, no
one listed factor is dispositive.’”100 Determining the essential functions of a
job is a “fact-specific inquiry into both the employer’s description of a job and
how the job is actually performed in practice.”101
ADA regulations set forth a factor-based list to analyze whether a
function is an essential function of a job:
Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but
is not limited to:
(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.102

The move to remote work during the pandemic has complicated the
analysis of what constitutes an essential job function.103 Pre-pandemic, it
could reasonably be said that the essential functions of the AE role included:
attending weekly client social or networking events, such as lunches, happy
hours, dinners, and other outings; being available on evenings and weekends
to attend client events, rather than following a structured nine to five schedule;
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 125.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 126 (quoting Stone v. City of Mt. Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.

101.
102.
103.
case study).

Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 12 of the hypothetical

1997)).
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generating new business by identifying clients and growing existing accounts;
and demonstrating an ability to handle stress in a fast-paced, dynamic team
environment.104 Kyle was clearly able to perform the essential functions of his
job pre-pandemic.105
The company transitioned to a work-from-home policy (“WFH”) in
March 2020 due to the pandemic.106 Several questions relating to the essential
functions of the AE role emerge, namely: what are the essential functions of
the AE role in a virtual environment when, historically, the AE role required
in-person socialization and networking?107 How long does a WFH policy need
to be in effect before the essential functions of the job can be considered to
have changed?108 Immediately?109 Should an employee be measured against
the essential functions of the job they were originally hired to do, or are they
required to meet new virtual job requirements whenever they take effect?110 Is
there a transitional period during which an employee should be given leeway
to adapt to different essential functions?111 Do the essential functions only
formally change once employees receive official guidance about new policies
and job requirements?112 How is job performance measured in a virtual
environment?113
Kyle appears to have been personally struggling in a WFH
environment.114 Also, there is some evidence that he was professionally
struggling, although that evidence is less clear since it depends upon a
determination of what the essential functions of the AE role are in a WFH
environment.115 Kyle was outgoing and gregarious prior to the pandemic, and
his colleagues and supervisor noticed a major personality shift once everyone
104.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 4–5 of the hypothetical
case study).
105.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 7 of the hypothetical
case study).
106.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 8 of the hypothetical
case study).
107.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 1–21 of the
hypothetical case study).
108.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 1–21 of the
hypothetical case study).
109.
See discussion supra Part II.
110.
See discussion supra Part II.
111.
See discussion supra Part II.
112.
See discussion supra Part II.
113.
See discussion supra Part II.
114.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 9, 15, and 16 of the
hypothetical case study).
115.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 9 of the hypothetical
case study).
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began working remotely.116 As it applied to his job performance, there were
complaints that he did not turn on his camera during team calls, looked
disheveled during a team call on at least one occasion, joined calls from his
personal cellphone rather than work computer, joined virtual meetings late or
dropped off early, and was unprepared for at least one major client meeting.117
Prior to the pandemic, he was a star employee who frequently exceeded
expectations and had a successful and growing client list.118 He continued to
exceed quarterly targets by an average of fifty percent throughout February
2020.119 Kyle’s book of business experienced volatility at the beginning of the
pandemic, as did the entire AdTech industry, as he lost four small to mid-sized
clients while bringing in two new, large clients.120 He was one of only nine
AEs who met their quota in Q2 of 2020.121 Further, KnowledgeWorks only
issued a formal WFH policy setting forth job procedures and expectations, like
requiring cameras turned on during meetings, for virtual work in July 2020,
which included a six-month pause on performance evaluations.122
Kyle would likely argue that the fundamental, essential function of his
job is to obtain new clients and thus grow his book of business—in other
words, to increase profits.123 And Kyle would further argue that that is
precisely what he did even in a WFH environment, as he met his quota in Q2
of 2020 and brought on two large clients during that time, which made up for
the loss of four smaller clients.124 He would argue that certain requirements
for virtual team meetings are either not essential functions of the AE role or
only became essential functions when KnowledgeWorks issued its formal
WFH policies in July 2020, so nothing before that time may be used against

116.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 7 and 15 of the
hypothetical case study).
117.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 15–19 of the
hypothetical case study).
118.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 7 of the hypothetical
case study).
119.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 7 of the hypothetical
case study).
120.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 9 of the hypothetical
case study).
121.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 9 of the hypothetical
case study).
122.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 14 of the hypothetical
case study).
123.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 5 of the hypothetical
case study).
124.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 9 of the hypothetical
case study).
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him.125 Lastly, Kyle would argue that even if he had not been performing the
essential functions of his job, that there were reasonable accommodations that
KnowledgeWorks could have implemented to assist Kyle in performing his
job during the pandemic.126
Oppositely, KnowledgeWorks would likely argue that virtual team
meetings became an essential function of Kyle’s job once the company
transitioned to working from home, and that Kyle knew what was expected of
him, such as turning on his camera during meetings, but repeatedly refused to
do so.127 The company would further argue that Kyle failed to perform an
essential function of his job during the July 21, 2020, virtual client quarterly
business review, by joining the call late from the back of a cab, turning off his
video, being verbally unresponsive when asked questions, and brushing off his
supervisor’s concerns about his behavior after the call.128 The company would
argue that there is no reasonable accommodation that would have assisted
Kyle on the July 21 call and that KnowledgeWorks had the right to terminate
him based thereon.129
The consideration of the essential functions of a job is, as noted, a factintensive inquiry.130 Shifting to remote, virtual work has complicated this
analysis further.131 These issues will likely be before the courts in the years to
come as pandemic-related issues are litigated.132
C.
Was Kyle Subjected to an Adverse Employment Action “On the Basis
Of” Disability?
To establish a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, any
adverse employment action must have been made “on the basis of disability,”
meaning that there was no “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the

125.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 14 of the hypothetical
case study).
126.
See also discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 14 of the
hypothetical case study).
127.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 8 and 18 of the
hypothetical case study).
128.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 18 and 19 of the
hypothetical case study).
129.
See McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2013);
The ADA: Questions and Answers, supra note 13.
130.
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995).
131.
See id.
132.
See discussion supra Part II; McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125–26; The ADA:
Questions and Answers, supra note 13; Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 140.
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adverse employment action.133 Courts have interpreted this within a causal
framework, requiring that the adverse employment action and the alleged act
of discrimination be causally “linked” or “connect[ed].”134 Within this
causation standard, employer thought processes around employment decisions
are often difficult to infer in an evidentiary sense.135 This is, in part, because
one key responsibility of human resources professionals is to mitigate
corporate liability; establishing whether an action was made “on the basis of
disability” can be difficult, as it is never in an employer’s best interest to
document such a rationale.136
Most circuits now employ a heightened causation standard that goes
beyond a mere “link” or connection, requiring that the employee’s disability
was either a “determining factor” or “motivating factor” in the employer
adverse action.137 Within that standard, some circuits, including the Second
Circuit, allow for a “mixed motive” showing—that discrimination was one
motivating factor in the adverse employment action—while other courts have
held that “proof of mixed motives will not suffice.”138 One area of agreement,
where courts have been clear, is that an employer’s “mere awareness” of a
disability condition is not enough to satisfy the evidentiary basis for this

133.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
134.
See Howard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 343, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); Parker v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2001);
Pearson v. Unification Theological Seminary, 785 F. Supp. 2d 141, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
135.
See Pearson, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 152–53.
136.
See, e.g., Triant Flouris & Ayse Yilmaz, The Risk Management Framework
to Strategic Human Resource Management, INT’L. RSCH. J. FIN. & ECON., Feb. 2010, at 25, 27;
Cash v. Magic City Motor Corp., No. 16-CV-00192, 2017 WL 281755, at *7 (W.D. Va. Jan.
20, 2017) (finding an insufficient link between the likelihood the employer regarded employee
as disabled and the decision to reduce his pay).
137.
Lampkin v. Ajilon Pro. Staffing, 608 F. App’x 285, 287 (5th Cir. June 29,
2015) (per curiam); see also Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir.
2000); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997); Andrews v. City of Hartford,
700 F. App’x 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Estate of Martin v. Cal. Dep’t of Veterans
Aff., 560 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2009).
138.
See Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 2019)
(holding that “on the basis of” in the ADA requires a showing of a but-for causation, not that
the disability is the sole cause of the employer’s action); see also Serwatka v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010); Parker, 204 F.3d at 337.
[T]he “substantially identical . . . causal language” used in Title VII and the ADA . .
. indicates that the expansion of Title VII to cover mixed-motive cases should apply
to the ADA . . . . [Thus], a plaintiff need not demonstrate that disability was the sole
cause of the adverse employment action. Rather, he must show only that disability
played a motivating role in the decision.

Parker, 204 F.3d at 337; Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 963 (7th Cir.
2010).
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element.139 While courts in employment discrimination cases generally
consider the temporal proximity of the employer’s statements related to a
protected status and the adverse employment action in question; temporal
proximity is not, on its own, dispositive.140 Courts have generally held that
temporal proximity becomes more important in instances where a plaintiff
relies exclusively on timing to plead causation.141 This is not true for Kyle,
who has additional smoking gun causal evidence stemming from his
coworkers’ and supervisor’s statements that appear to directly draw upon his
mental state in legitimizing his firing.142
For this element, Kyle has a few things going for him: (1) the temporal
proximity between his firing and the employer’s direct statements made with
knowledge about his mental health is very close—as close as the same day—
and (2) he is in a “mixed motive” jurisdiction and has a set of facts that suggest
that his mental condition was either explicitly cited by decision-makers as a
determinative factor in his firing, or, at the very least, was referenced in a
manner that “otherwise gives rise to an inference of disability
discrimination.”143 This is because Kyle’s supervisor directly connects his
mental state with his performance issues, namely that he “lost four clients since
the start of the pandemic and is displaying erratic, worrying behavior that is
negatively impacting team morale and client relationships.”144 In other words,
there is sufficient evidence that Kyle’s mental and emotional state were part

139.
See Angell v. Fairmount Fire Prot. Dist., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1252 (D.
Colo. 2012) (“[M]ere awareness of disability, without more, is not sufficient to show that
disability was a ‘determining factor’ in the employer’s adverse action.”); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(l)(3) (“Establishing that an individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ does
not, by itself, establish liability.”).
140.
See Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 721 (2d Cir. 2002);
Volovsek v. Wis. Dep’t of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 344 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2003);
Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[There is no] bright line to define the outer
limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship
. . . .” (quoting Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001)).
141.
See Vale v. Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist., 80 F. Supp. 3d 426,
441 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per
curiam)).
142.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 17–21 of the
hypothetical case study).
143.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 15–21 of the
hypothetical case study); Vale, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 441 (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273); Andrews,
700 F. App’x at 926–27; Parker 204 F.3d at 337; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
144.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 21 of the hypothetical
case study).
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of the employer’s motive in firing him.145 There is enough here to draw the
conclusion that the supervisor perceived a causal link between Kyle’s
declining mental health—or rather, his colleagues’ perception of that
decline—and his declining work performance.146 The fact that the supervisor
regarded Kyle as having a mental health condition was not only “linked” or
“connected” to the subsequent adverse employment action taken against Kyle,
but was, in fact, a determinative factor in that decision.147
Notably, Kyle’s supervisor made little effort to mediate the
interpersonal issues between Kyle and his coworkers and arguably allowed for
stereotypes about what they perceived as a declining mental condition to drive
his termination decision.148 As we will discuss in the next section, even if
145.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 21 of the hypothetical
case study); Lizotte v. Dacotah Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1171 (N.D.N.D. 2010) (“The
employer’s motive and intent are at the heart of a discrimination case, so the central inquiry is
whether disability ‘was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made.’”)
(quoting Sabree v. United Bhd. of Loc. Carpenters & Joiners Loc. No. 33, 921 F.2d 396, 403
(1st Cir. 1990)).
146.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 21 of the hypothetical
case study); Lizotte, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
147.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 21 of the hypothetical
case study); Lizotte, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
148.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 16–20 of the
hypothetical case study). One interesting consideration is whether KnowledgeWorks might
have triggered a duty to accommodate Kyle. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B). “Failure to
accommodate” claims are not cognizable under the “regarded as” prong because, in theory,
some “regarded as” plaintiffs will not even have a disability in need of accommodation. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). However, if Kyle were to bring a claim under prong one or two, and if
he really was experiencing a diagnosable psychiatric condition, then discrimination against
Kyle, as a qualified individual on the basis of disability, can include a failure to accommodate.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B). Additionally, there is the question of whether accommodating
Kyle in some way might have allowed him to continue performing the essential functions of the
position, since Title I states that a qualified individual is one “who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position that such individual holds
or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). There are instances where the existence
of a disability is obvious enough to an employer that they have a duty to initiate the interactive
process themselves. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); see Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 F. Supp.
2d 157, 174–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In this case, there is some indication that the employer had
awareness that the employee was experiencing mental health issues. See discussion supra Part
II (referring to paragraph 20 of the hypothetical case study). At one point, the supervisor even
specifically mentioned and referred Kyle to company peer-support offerings focused on
substance abuse, anxiety, and depression, which itself might be considered a type of ADA
accommodation. See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 20 of the hypothetical case
study). See, e.g., Hinnershitz v. Ortep of Pa., No. 97-7148, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20264, *14
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1998); Shaw v. Ill. Sportservice, No. 19 C 8415, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
148701, *34 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2021). If we view the interactive process as having been initiated,
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some of KnowledgeWorks’s available defenses are successful in shifting the
evidentiary burden back to Kyle, there is evidence to suggest that any
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Kyle’s firing was pretextual.149 Most
clearly, pretext is evidenced by the subjective assessment of Kyle’s
performance issues in relation to others in his same job category and the extent
to which that assessment is repeatedly connected to Kyle’s mental health by
the supervisor.150
D.
Is There Evidence that KnowledgeWorks’s Proffered Reason for
Terminating Kyle was Pretextual?
Under the ADA, if a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the
defendant must present evidence demonstrating affirmative defenses or a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (“LNR”) for the alleged adverse
employment action.151 Aside from rebutting Kyle’s argument that his
employer regarded him as having a disability, and alleging that Kyle was not
qualified for his position, the clearest path that KnowledgeWorks has in terms
of defenses is to assert a LNR for the decision to terminate Kyle’s
employment.152 It is highly unlikely that the affirmative ADA defenses of
“direct threat” or “undue hardship” would be available to the employer in this
case, which leaves them with LNR as the best defense.153
In this case, KnowledgeWorks has a plausible evidentiary basis for
asserting this defense on the theory that they fired Kyle purely, or mostly, on
the employee would be entitled to a reasonable amount of time to implement the accommodative
framework to see if it allowed him to perform the essential functions of the job. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3). Furthermore, the employee would also be entitled to return to the employer in
good faith with recommendations for alternative accommodations. See id. In Kyle’s case, there
would be a number of potential alternative accommodations, such as flexible scheduling,
tolerance of alternative communication methods (e.g., using chat function instead of speaking
on camera to reduce anxiousness), and more. See Devin Boyle, How to Be Inclusive of
Employees with Mental Health Disabilities, GOV’T EXEC. (May 24, 2021),
http://www.govexec.com/management/2021/05/how-be-inclusive-employees-mental-healthdisabilities/174235/.
149.
See discussion supra Section III.D; Miller v. Eby Realty Grp., LLC, 396
F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2005).
150.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 20–21 of the
hypothetical case study).
151.
Lizotte, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1162; see 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
152.
See discussion supra Section III.A; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
153.
See discussion supra Part II; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p), (r); Green, 411 U.S. at
802.
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the basis of his poor performance, both in terms of losing clients and his
inability to collaborate effectively with teammates and incorporate
performance feedback appropriately.154 If KnowledgeWorks is successful in
asserting this defense, the burden then shifts back to Kyle to provide evidence
that the proffered LNR was merely pretextual.155 “Pretext exists when an
employer does not honestly represent its reasons for terminating an
employee.”156 Under the ADA and other similar federal frameworks
governing workplace discrimination, “pretext” is defined as “a dishonest
explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error.”157
There is plenty in this case study to suggest that Kyle’s colleagues
were becoming exasperated with his behavior and finding him to be a poor
teammate.158 While we have previously established that getting along with
others may be an essential function of a position—particularly in a position
where teamwork and client-facing performance are key performance
indicators referenced in the job description and elsewhere—there is also
evidence of dishonesty regarding Kyle’s other performance indicators.159
Most notably, the supervisor’s assertion that Kyle was losing clients
because of his behavioral issues is not supported by any specific factual
basis.160 Moreover, the case study states explicitly that there was nothing
anomalous about losing clients during the uncertain early months of the
pandemic, and that Kyle performed in the top third of AEs during the period
in question and was one of only nine out of thirty AEs to meet their quota in
Q2. 161 For this reason, the emphasis on Kyle’s client attrition might already
154.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 9 and 17 of the
hypothetical case study); Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
155.
See discussion supra Part III; Green, 411 U.S. at 802; Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51–52 (2003); McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d
Cir. 2013) (citing Green 411 U.S. at 792–93).
156.
Miller v. Eby Realty Grp., LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2005).
157.
Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 326 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995) (defining pretext as “a lie,
specifically a phony reason for some action.”).
158.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 15–17, 21 of the
hypothetical case study).
159.
See discussion supra Part I; Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc., 795 F.3d 941,
944 (9th Cir. 2015).
160.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 21 of the hypothetical
case study).
161.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 21 of the hypothetical
case study). As with the causal element of the prima facie case, temporality is often something
that courts will consider when ascertaining whether a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
proffered by an employer was indeed pretextual. Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713,
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indicate some dishonesty underlying the formally-offered explanation for his
firing.162 Kyle’s recent performance on quantitative metrics was also mostly
in line with his prior highly-positive performance reviews; while more
qualitatively, his attributes as a collaborator and teammate were not regarded
as being up to that prior standard.163 Performance evaluations are often highly
important in disputes about pretext in employment discrimination; the fact that
KnowledgeWorks paused performance evaluations during the pandemic—as
many other employers did—might also weigh in.164
Additionally, while there are legitimate employer interests in
removing employees who do not get along with others and erode group morale,
there are also reasons to question Kyle’s colleagues’ and supervisor’s response
to his behavior.165 First, there is indication that the company failed to provide
appropriate guidance on how to transfer some of the improvisational,
qualitative aspects of the AE position into online formats.166 Second, the
relative “mystery” and irregular schedules of the AE position prior to the
pandemic were, in some ways, considered to be related to essential functions
of the job: namely, the extent to which socializing with clients necessitated
flexibility for AEs in terms of office presence and scheduling.167
IV.

CONCLUSION

721 (2d Cir. 2002). For instance, if facts taking place prior to an employer’s knowledge of an
employee’s disability support an employer’s later proffered LNR or otherwise tends to validate
it, the court will often rule in favor of the employer. See, e.g., Lopez–Lopez v. Robinson Sch.,
958 F.3d 96, 110 (1st Cir. 2020); see discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 9 of the
hypothetical case study).
162.
See discussion supra Part II.
163.
See discussion supra Part II.
164.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 14 of the hypothetical
case study); A Shield or a Sword? The Role of Performance Evaluations in Employment
Litigation,
AKERMAN:
BLOG
POST
(July
16,
2018),
http://www.akerman.com/en/perspectives/hrdef-a-shield-or-a-sword-the-role-of-performanceevaluations-in-employment-litigation.html.
165.
See discussion supra Section III.B; e.g., Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc., 795
F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2015); Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issue, EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N
(Aug.
25,
2016)
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-retaliation-and-relatedissues#A._Background.
166.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 13 of the hypothetical
case study).
167.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 3–6 of the hypothetical
case study).
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This Article has provided a vignette of working life during the
pandemic that is not far from many people’s reality.168 As employers continue
to modify operations through work-from-home and virtual arrangements,
particularly in white collar and knowledge-based sectors, one critical question
is: how can they work to improve the mental health and overall wellness in
their workforces, while at the same time ensuring that the invigorated focus on
mental health issues does not lead to new modalities of discrimination?169 The
case study in this Article intentionally selected a male employee with no
obvious marginalized intersectional identities related to race, gender identity,
sexual orientation, etc.170 We invite readers to consider how their
interpretation of these facts might have changed if Kyle’s demographics were
altered.171
From the employer’s perspective, one intentional inclusion in the
hypothetical above was that the employer possessed survey data evidencing
that a large segment of their workforce was experiencing mental health
challenges similar to Kyle’s.172 At various points, Kyle’s supervisor even
expressed solidarity in this experience.173 While there are some universal
“themes” in the experience of mental health during the pandemic, they differ
dramatically across individuals.174 To a certain extent, generalized discourse
and training can have counter-intuitive effects, such as creating the impression
of a universality of experience regarding mental health that simply does not
exist.175
While this Article has emphasized some of the nuances of particular
theories of disability coverage and discrimination under one particular
legislative framework, the legal challenges described also speak to the need
for employers to ensure that newly developed virtual teams and performance
management practices are broadly disability-inclusive, and formally and
168.
See discussion supra Part II.
169.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 14 and 20 of the
hypothetical case study); Wade v. Elec. Boat Corp., No. 16-CV-2041, 2019 WL 4805031, at *7
(D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2019).
170.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraph 1 of the hypothetical
case study).
171.
See discussion supra Part II.
172.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 10–11 of the
hypothetical case study).
173.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 17 and 20 of the
hypothetical case study).
174.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 14 and 20 of the
hypothetical case study); Embregts et al., supra note 4, at 2–4.
175.
See discussion supra Part II (referring to paragraphs 14 and 20 of the
hypothetical case study); Embregts et al., supra note 4, at 2–4.
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informally accommodating to individuals with temporary and chronic
psychiatric disabilities.176 These practices also need to be grounded in a social
model of disability that acknowledges the potentially disabling nature of
contextual factors in society and in the workplace.177

176.
177.

See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part III.
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INTRODUCTION

In its broadest sense, this Article builds on the Author’s prior
scholarship by analyzing the language used in Florida Statutes to refer to
alcohol-related activities, alcohol-related states, and alcohol-related health
conditions—also known as alcohol-related language—to determine whether
this language may be contributing to the stigmatization of individuals with

* William J. Alley Professor of Law and Director, MLS and LLM in Healthcare Law Programs,
The University of Oklahoma College of Law, Norman, Oklahoma. The Author thanks Dean
Katheleen Guzman for her generous financial support of this project, Ms. Elaine Bradshaw for
her outstanding library and resource assistance, and Mr. Luke Helms for his thorough research
assistance. The Author also thanks the organizers and participants of the following conferences
and symposia for their comments and suggestions on the ideas presented in this Article:
American Bar Association, American Medical Association, and American Society of Addiction
Medicine, Barriers to Evidence-Based Health Care for People with Substance Use Disorders
Conference (Chicago, Ill., May 13, 2021); American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics,
Health Law Professors Conference (Boston, Mass., June 8, 2021); Southeastern Association of
Law Schools Annual Meeting (Amelia Island, Fla., July 30, 2021); Georgia State University
College of Law Faculty Workshop (Atlanta, Georgia, September 28, 2021); and Nova Law
Review Symposium (“Under Pressure: Legal and Systemic Responses to the Psychological
Trauma Associated with COVID-19”) (Davie, Fla., March 11, 2022).
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alcohol use disorder (“AUD”).1 As background, the American Psychiatric
Association (“APA”) defines AUD as a “problematic pattern of alcohol use
leading to clinically significant impairment or distress . . . .” 2 In her prior
scholarship, the Author recognizes that AUD is a major public health concern
in the United States due to its association with premature morbidity, mortality,
and disability, as well as its association with negative social events including
1.
See infra Part II; Stacy A. Tovino, Distilling the Language of the Law, 111
KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 54–55) (on file with author). An example of a
Florida Statute that refers to an alcohol-related activity (driving while intoxicated) would be
Florida Statutes Section 322.2616(1)(a), which makes it unlawful for an individual under the
age of twenty-one who has a blood-alcohol level of 0.02 or higher to drive or to be in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle in Florida. FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(1)(a) (2021). An example
of a Florida provision that refers to an alcohol-related state (the state of intoxication or the state
of being “drunk”) would be the Florida Standard Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases, which
references the state of “[i]ntoxication” and explains that “[i]ntoxication is synonymous with
‘drunk.’” FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 29.1. Finally, an example of a Florida statute that
refers to an individual with an alcohol-related health condition (alcohol use disorder) would be
Administrative Order Number 6.305-/711, in reference to Civil Drug Court, which refers to
“alcohol and drug abusers.” In re Civil Drug Court, Fla. Admin. Order No. 6.305-7/11 (July 6,
2011), https://www.15thcircuit.com/sites/default/files/administrative-orders/6.305.pdf.
2.
Tovino, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 490 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]).
The Diagnostic & Statistical Manual provides the definition of AUD and lists eleven diagnostic
criteria, two of which must be met within a twelve-month period for a diagnosis of AUD. Id.
at 490. The eleven diagnostic criteria for AUD include:
1. Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended.
2. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control alcohol
use.
3. A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain alcohol, use alcohol,
or recover from its effects.
4. Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use alcohol.
5. Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work,
school, or home.
6. Continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal
problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of alcohol.
7. Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced
because of alcohol use.
8. Recurrent alcohol use in situations in which it is physically hazardous.
9. Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent
physical or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated
by alcohol.
10. Tolerance, as defined by either of the following: a. A need for markedly increased
amounts of alcohol to achieve intoxication or desired effect. b. A markedly
diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of alcohol.
11. Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following: a. The characteristic
withdrawal syndrome for alcohol . . . . b. Alcohol (or a closely related substance,
such as a benzodiazepine) is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms.

Id. at 490–91. The presence of at least two of these eleven criteria indicates an individual has
AUD. Id. at 490. An individual’s AUD shall be classified as mild if two to three criteria are
met, moderate if four to five criteria are met, or severe if six or more criteria are met. Id. at 491.
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partner violence, child abuse and neglect, lost productivity, traffic accidents,
and other injuries.3 In her prior scholarship, the Author also reports that AUD
remains severely undertreated in the United States despite the availability of
effective pharmacological and psychosocial interventions.4 The Author
further explains that the stigma associated with AUD has been found to be an
important reason why individuals with AUD do not seek treatment.5
In order to better understand the structural, including law and policybased, sources of stigma associated with AUD, the Author’s prior scholarship
carefully: (1) reviews research studies investigating the relationship between
3.
Tovino, supra note 1, at 1–2 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE
GUIDELINE FOR THE PHARMACOLOGICAL TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH ALCOHOL USE
DISORDER 3–4 (2018) (ebook) (stating that AUD is a major public health problem)); Seung Ha
Park & Dong Joon Kim, Global and Regional Impacts of Alcohol Use on Public Health:
Emphasis on Alcohol Policies, 26 CLINICAL & MOLECULAR HEPATOLOGY 652, 652, 654 (2020)
(explaining the health consequences of alcohol use disorder); Jürgen Rehm et al., AlcoholRelated Morbidity and Mortality, 27 ALCOHOL RSCH. & HEALTH 39, 39 (2002); Alcohol Use
and Your Health, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/alcohol-use.htm (last visited Apr. 05, 2022)
(referencing illustrative social impacts, including injuries and violence); DONNA M. BUSH &
RACHEL N. LIPARI, SUBSTANCE USE AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BY INDUSTRY, 1 (2015),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK343542/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK343542.pdf.
(referencing additional social impacts, including lost productivity, absenteeism, and accidents);
Gerhard Gmel & Jürgen Rehm, Harmful Alcohol Use, 27 ALCOHOL RSCH. & HEALTH 52, 52
(2003) (referencing “decreased worker productivity, increased unintentional injuries,
aggression and violence against others, and child and spouse abuse.”).
4.
See Tovino, supra note 1, at 2, 2 n.7 (“Despite its high prevalence and
numerous negative consequences, AUD remains undertreated” and “recommending
pharmacological treatments, including naltrexone, acamprosate, and disulfiram” (citing AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 2, at 4–6)); Understanding Alcohol Use Disorders and Their
Treatment,
AM .
PSYCH.
ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/topics/substance-use-abuseaddiction/alcohol-disorders (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (recommending psychosocial
interventions, including cognitive behavioral therapy and motivational enhancement therapy);
Alcohol Facts and Statistics, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM,
http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/brochures-and-fact-sheets/alcohol-facts-and-statistics
(last visited Apr. 2, 2022) (stating that only 7.2% of individuals ages twelve and older with pastyear AUD received any treatment and that less than 4% of individuals with AUD were
prescribed a government-approved medication to treat their condition).
5.
See Tovino, supra note 1, at 3–4; Janet Zwick et al., Stigma: How It Affects
the Substance Use Disorder Patient, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, PREVENTION, & POL’Y 1,
July 2020, at 1, 1 (defining stigma as “a mark of disgrace connected to a situation or quality of
a person.”); Katherine M. Keyes et al., Stigma and Treatment for Alcohol Disorders in the
United States, 172 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY, 1364, 1370 (2010) (discussing the stigma associated
with AUD and explaining that such stigma is associated with a decreased likelihood of service
use); Georg Schomerus et al., The Stigma of Alcohol Dependence with Other Mental Disorders:
A Review of Population Studies, 46 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM, 105, 110 (2011) (concluding that
AUD “is a particularly severely stigmatized mental disorder”).
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language and stigma in the context of AUD and other substance use disorders
(“SUDs”); (2) finds that slang, outdated, and non-person-first terms can invite
negative judgments about individuals with AUD; (3) collects and catalogues
illustrative state statutes containing slang, outdated, and non-person-first,
alcohol-related language, including “abuser,” “addict,” “alcoholic,” “drunk,”
“drunkard,” “intemperate,” “inebriate,” and “wastrel”; and (4) reports several
original research findings relating to such language.6 These research findings
relate to the prevalence of alcohol-related language in particular subject matter
areas, including health and social services law as well as occupational
licensure law; the variety of positive and negative legal consequences assigned
to particular alcohol-related activities, states, and conditions; and the multiple
means by which statutory language permeates public discourse, both
tempering and perpetuating stigma against individuals with AUD.7
The Author’s prior scholarship also highlights the alcohol-related
language recommendations of researchers, professional medical societies, and
government agencies.8 These professional language recommendations
suggest the use of neutral, person-first phrases when a third party has no
knowledge of how a particular individual self-identifies in the context of the
individual’s alcohol use.9 In the context of individuals with AUD, the goal of
person-first language is to communicate that AUD is just one aspect of a
person’s life, not the only or defining aspect.10 An example of person-first
language would be “individual with AUD,” “individual with alcohol use
disorder,” or even “individual with addiction,” but not “abuser,” “addict,”
“alcoholic,” “alcohol abuser,” “alcohol user,” “drunk,” “drunkard,”
“inebriate,” “intemperate,” or “wastrel.”11 These professional language
recommendations also suggest the word “use” rather than “abuse” preceding
or following the word “alcohol” due to the malintent, cruelty, and violence
associated with the word “abuse.”12 Finally, the words “habit,” “habitual,”
and “habitually”—as in “habitual drunkard” or “habitually intoxicated”—are
not recommended because these words inaccurately imply that individuals

6.
See Tovino, supra note 1 at 7–8, 13.
7.
See id. at 7, 13.
8.
See id. at 12–13.
9.
See id. at 11 (citing Nora D. Volkow et al., Choosing Appropriate Language
to Reduce the Stigma Around Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders, 46
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 2230, 2231 (2021)).
10.
See Tovino, supra note 1, at 11; Volkow et al., supra note 9, at 2231.
11.
See Tovino, supra note 1, at 11; Volkow et al., supra note 9, at 2231.
12.
See Tovino, supra note 1, at 11–12; Volkow et al., supra note 9, at 2231.
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with AUD choose to use alcohol and/or can choose to stop using alcohol.13
These words also may undermine the seriousness of an individual’s AUD.14
As explained in the Author’s prior scholarship, one source of
professional language recommendations is the National Institute on Drug
Abuse (“NIDA”), which specifically recommends the use of the phrase
“person with alcohol use disorder” rather than “addict,” “alcoholic,” “drunk,”
or “user.”15 A second source of professional language recommendations is the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, which requests administrative
agencies use language comporting with the most recent edition of the APA’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”), which uses
the phrase “alcohol use disorder” but not “abuse,” “addict,” “alcoholic,”
“alcoholism,” “dependence,” or “habit.”16 A third source is Canada’s Centre
on Substance Use and Addiction, which supports the phrase “individual with
alcohol use disorder” but opposes the words “abuse” and “addict.”17 A fourth
source is the American Society of Addiction Medicine (“ASAM”), which
promotes person-first language rather than “addict” or “alcoholic.”18 ASAM
specifically asks writers to use precise medical language rather than slang and
other non-medical language such as “drunk,” “smashed,” or “bombed.”19 A
final illustrative, but not exhaustive, source is the American Psychological
Association (“APA”), which opposes language that “diminishes ‘the integrity

13.
See, e.g., Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When Talking About
Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/nidamed-medical-healthprofessionals/health-professions-education/words-matter-terms-to-use-avoid-when-talkingabout-addiction (last updated Nov. 29, 2021) (explaining the reasons why the word “habit”
should not be used in the context of individuals with AUD and offering preferred terminology;
further explaining that the word “habit” undermines the seriousness of AUD).
14.
See id.
15.
See id.; Tovino, supra note 1, at 11.
16.
See Tovino, supra note 1, at 12 (citing Memorandum from Michael P.
Botticelli, Dir., Off. of Nat’l Drug Control Pol’y to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 9,
2017)).
17.
See id. (citing CANADIAN CTR. ON SUBSTANCE USE & ADDICTION,
OVERCOMING
STIGMA
THROUGH
LANGUAGE:
A
PRIMER
7–8
(2019)
http://www.ccsa.ca/sites/default/files/2019-09/CCSA-Language-and-Stigma-in-SubstanceUse-Addiction-Guide-2019-en.pdf.).
18.
See id. (citing Instructions and Guidelines, J. ADDICTION MED.,
http://journals.lww.com/journaladdictionmedicine/Pages/Instructions-andGuidelines.aspx#languageandterminologyguidance (last visited Apr. 3, 2022)). “[T]he use of
humanizing, non-stigmatizing, medically-defined, precise, and professional consensus-driven
terminology is important.” Id.
19.
Id.
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of persons as whole human beings’ such as . . . [an] ‘alcoholic person.’”20 The
APA also opposes language with “‘superfluous or negative overtones’ such as
‘stroke victim’ and, by extension, ‘alcohol sufferer.’”21
This Article builds on the author’s prior scholarship by identifying and
analyzing alcohol-related language used in Florida law and by proposing ways
in which Florida statutory language may be improved.22 This Article proceeds
as follows: Part II of this Article identifies illustrative Florida statutes that
contain alcohol-related words and phrases that do not conform to the
professional language recommendations described above.23 Part III of this
Article makes several key findings relating to Florida’s statutory language and
proposes ways in which Florida lawmakers can improve these statutes.24
These proposals include using medically current and respectful statutory
language in legislation introduced on a going-forward basis, as well as
amending outdated and stigmatizing language set forth in already-enacted
legislation.25 Part III of this Article also contains a sample bill that may be
introduced to the Florida Legislature to implement these proposals.26 The
conclusion highlights the importance of encouraging individuals with AUD to
seek, enter, and remain in treatment, including by diminishing structural
sources of stigma associated with AUD.27
II.
A.

FLORIDA LAW

Criminal Law

A number of Florida statutes contain slang, outdated, and/or nonperson-first alcohol-related language.28 Some of these statutes are sourced
within Florida’s criminal laws.29 For example, Florida has an entire chapter
20.
See Tovino, supra note 1 at 12–13 (citing Guidelines for Nonhandicapping
Language in APA Journals, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N: APA STYLE, http://apastyle.apa.org/6th-editionresources/nonhandicapping-language (last visited Apr. 3, 2022)).
21.
Id. at 13.
22.
See infra Part II.
23.
See id.
24.
See infra Part III.
25.
See id.
26.
See id.
27.
See infra Part IV.
28.
See discussion infra Part II. This Article focuses on the words and phrases
that are used in Florida statutes. Id. The words and phrases used in Florida case law, Florida
regulations, and other primary and secondary legal authorities are beyond the scope of this
Article. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 856, 893, 938.23, 985 (2021).
29.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 856, 893, 938.23, 985 (2021).
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of criminal offenses organized under the partial title “[d]runkenness.”30
Interestingly, the text of the disorderly intoxication statute codified within the
chapter uses the word “intoxicated” (not “drunkenness”), although the Middle
English (i.e., outdated) “[d]runkenness” language does appear on a print-out
of the statute. 31 The “[d]runkenness” chapter is not the only Florida statutory
title or provision to use a version of the word “drunk.”32 Florida also has a
standard criminal jury instruction for the crime of “disorderly intoxication.”33
The jury instruction specifically explains, by way of definition, that
“[i]ntoxication is synonymous with ‘drunk.’”34
In addition to statutes relating to disorderly intoxication, Florida also
has criminal laws that reference alcohol-related funds and grants.35 These laws
repeatedly use the word “abuse.”36 For example, one Florida statute authorizes
each of its sixty-seven counties to establish a “County Alcohol and Other Drug
Abuse Trust Fund” responsible for disbursing assistance grants to “alcohol and
other drug abuse treatment or education programs.”37 The statutory language
30.
FLA. STAT. § 856.
31.
FLA. STAT. § 856.011(1). “No person in the state shall be intoxicated and
endanger the safety of another person or property, and no person in the state shall be intoxicated
or drink any alcoholic beverage in a public place or in or upon any public conveyance and cause
a public disturbance.” Id. Although Florida outlaws public intoxication, it is worth noting that
other states forbid the criminalization of public intoxication. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
47.37.010 (2021). It is the policy of Alaska, for example, that individuals should be treated
instead of criminally prosecuted for their public consumption of alcoholic beverages. Id.
Colorado has the same policy; that is, individuals may not be subject to criminal prosecution
because of their public consumption of alcohol and that they should be treated instead. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 44-3-503(1)(e) (2021). The District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont similarly
prohibit the prosecution of individuals with AUD for the public consumption of alcohol and/or
the adoption or enforcement of laws that include “being a common drunkard” as an element of
an offense. See D.C. CODE § 24-601 (2021) (directing all public officials in the District to
alleviate chronic “alcoholism,” to handle public intoxication as a “public health problem rather
than as a criminal offense,” and to recognize that “a chronic alcoholic is a sick person who
needs, is entitled to, and shall be provided appropriate medical, psychiatric, institutional,
advisory, and rehabilitative treatment services of the highest caliber for his illness.”); IDAHO
CODE § 39-301 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4059 (2021); MINN. STAT. § 340A.902 (2021);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-24-106(1) (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-1,119(1) (2021); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 458.260(1) (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-4(A) (2021); 23. R.I. GEN. L AWS §
23-1.10-16(a) (2021); TENN. CODE. A NN. § 33-10-203(b) (2021); VT. S TAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4801
(2021).
32.
FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.), 29.1.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
See e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 893.165, 938.23.
36.
Id.
37.
FLA. STAT. § 893.165.
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authorizing the establishment of these funds repeatedly uses the phrase
“alcohol abuse.”38 Another Florida statute encourages applications for
community juvenile justice partnership grants that would support communitybased programs, including “drug and alcohol abuse” prevention programs.39
Again, the statutory language encouraging these applications uses the phrase
“alcohol abuse.”40
Florida also has criminal laws that allow certain individuals charged
with or convicted of certain crimes to request treatment instead of
prosecution.41 These laws tend to use the phrases “alcohol abuse” and “alcohol
abusers.”42 Florida’s Fifteenth Judicial Circuit recognizes, for example, the
“urgent need to provide treatment modalities for drug and alcohol abuse
outside of the criminal justice system, i.e., without the taint of arrest and
conviction.”43 To this end, the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit has established a
community drug court for the purpose of committing “alcohol and drug
abusers to treatment programs.”44
Finally, Florida uses “abuse” language in its pretrial detainee release
provisions.45 For example, one Florida provision expands the pretrial release
program of Florida’s Eighteenth Judicial Circuit.46 This statute releases
certain pretrial detainees who have been charged with certain offenses as long
as the detainees do not present a danger to the community because of “drug
abuse, alcohol abuse” or other mental illness.47
B.

Education and Family Law

38.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 893.165, 938.23.
39.
FLA. STAT. § 985.676(2)(a)(5).
40.
See id.
41.
See FLA. STAT. § 397.334 (2021).
42.
Id.
43.
Fla. Admin. Order No. 6.305-7/11, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
44.
Id. The language used by Florida in these treatment court provisions is
similar to the language used by nearby states in their treatment court statutes, including
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. ALA. CODE § 12-23-2 (2021) (referencing the extent of
the problem of “alcohol and drug abuse” among Alabama residents and the association of
“alcohol abuse” and criminal activity); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5303(1), (3)–(4) (2021) (referring
to “alcohol and drug abuse programs,” “alcohol and drug abusers,” and “alcoholic or drug
addicts"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-23-5(c) (2021) (referring to “substance abuse” professionals).
45.
In re Criminal — Pretrial Release Program — Expansion of the Release
Authority of the Pretrial Release Program, Fla. Admin. Order No. 09-07-B Amended (Feb. 18,
2009),
http://www.brevardclerk.us/_cache/files/b/8/b846b2ed-0a5f-48be-9ba9a78ae781d1b4/2B22C3B561E83A021CEBA1B4A3D0332A.09-07-b-amd-click-here-.pdf.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.

2022] ON FLORIDA LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ALCOHOL USE DISORDER

434

Like Florida’s criminal laws, a handful of education laws also
incorporate the language of “abuse.”48 For example, one Florida statute makes
available to school districts funds for use in preventing “destructive lifestyle
conditions, such as alcohol and drug abuse” and for referring students for
“drug and alcohol abuse” treatment.49 A second Florida statute creates within
the state’s Department of Education a recovery network program designed to
assist educators who are impaired as a result of “alcohol abuse” and “drug
abuse.”50
One Florida family law also incorporates the language of “abuse.”51
This law, sourced within Florida’s child protection statutes, expresses a desire
“[t]o prevent and remediate the consequences of . . . substance abuse disorders
on families . . . [by] reduc[ing] the occurrences of . . . substance abuse
disorders, including alcohol abuse or related disorders . . . .”52
C.

Health and Social Services Law

Florida has a number of health and social services laws that contain
alcohol-related language.53 Relevant statutes may be broken down into those
that identify and define key health care and social services terms as well as
those that establish programs through which health care and social services
may be delivered.54 The word “abuse” is routinely used in Florida statutes that
identify and define key health care and social services terms and in statutes
that establish programs through which relevant services may be accessed.55
For example, Florida defines “clinical assessment” in its statutory “Substance
Abuse Services” chapter as the collection of information regarding, among
other things, an individual’s “abuse of alcohol or drugs.” 56 By further
example, the Florida statute establishing the state’s Department of Health and
48.
See e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 381.0057 (2021), 1012.798(1) (2021).
49.
See FLA. STAT. § 381.0057(3)(b).
50.
FLA. STAT. § 1012.798(1).
51.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.001(6)(b)(2) (2021).
52.
Id.
53.
See e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 397.311(7), 20.43(7)(b), 154.011(4).
54.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 397.311(7), 20.43(7)(b), 154.011(4).
55.
See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 397.311(7).
56.
Id. Here, Florida is similar to Alabama, Delaware, and Georgia. ALA. CODE
§ 22-21-260(8) (2021) (defining “health services” to include “alcohol [and] drug abuse”
services); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 22, 2203(16) (2021) (titling a relevant act “The Substance
Abuse Treatment Act”, using the phrase “substance abuse,” and defining such as the “chronic,
habitual, regular, or recurrent use of alcohol . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7 (2021) (devoting an
entire statutory chapter to the “Hospitalization and Treatment of Alcoholics, Drug Dependent
Individuals, and Drug Abusers” and defining such terms).
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authorizing the Department to use federal and state funds to plan and conduct
health education campaigns refers to preventing “alcohol abuse or other
substance abuse.”57 Likewise, another Florida statute requires all sixty-seven
Florida counties to offer primary care services to Medicaid recipients and other
qualified individuals with low income through a primary care program.58 This
statute specifically prohibits such programs from denying access to prenatal
care to certain pregnant women, including women with “alcohol abuse”
issues59
Similarly, another Florida statute requires boards of county
commissioners to establish county public safety coordinating councils that
include one physician member “who practices in the area of alcohol and
substance abuse . . . .” and an additional mental health professional member
“who practices in the area of alcohol and substance abuse . . . .”60 Along the
same lines, another Florida statute creates, within the Florida Department of
Children and Families (“DCF”), a “Criminal Justice, Mental Health, and
Substance Abuse Reinvestment Grant Program,” one purpose of which is to
improve the provision of DCF services to adults and juveniles who have
“substance abuse disorders.”61 This statute also establishes the “Criminal
Justice, Mental Health, and Substance Abuse Statewide Grant Review
Committee that must include “one representative of the Florida Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Association.”62 Yet another statute that recognizes the “historical
inequity in the funding of substance abuse and [other] mental health services”
requires certain funding for alcohol, drug abuse, and other mental health
services.63 Still, another statute that contains Florida’s “Community
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Act” references “drug abuse and
alcoholism programs.”64 A final illustrative statute creates an impaired health
care practitioner program that provides services to health care practitioners
who are impaired due to, among other conditions, “abuse of alcohol.”65
D.

Insurance Law

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

FLA. STAT. § 20.43(7)(b).
See id. § 154.011(4).
Id.
Id. § 951.26(1)(b)(1)(f)–(g).
Id. § 394.656(1).
FLA. STAT. § 394.656(2)(j).
Id. § 394.908.
Id. §§ 394.75(4)(m), 394.65.
Id. § 456.076(1)(d)–(e).
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Florida insurance law also contains some alcohol-related language
that incorporates the language of “abuse.”66 For example, Florida requires its
Medicaid managed care plans to establish “a medically approved alcohol or
substance abuse recovery program” and to identify enrollees with “alcohol or
substance abuse.”67 Although most insurance statutes that contain alcoholrelated language are designed to help individuals with AUD and other
substance use disorders obtain coverage of relevant treatments and services,
some statutes cancel or limit coverage in circumstances involving an alcoholrelated activity, alcohol-related state, or alcohol-related health condition.68 In
Florida, these statutes use the words “drunk” and “habitual.”69 For example,
one Florida statute permits health insurance policies to include a statement
exempting the insurer from liability for losses resulting when the insured is
“drunk.”70 A second Florida statute exempts from Florida workers’
compensation law disabilities and diseases due to “habitual use of alcohol.”71
E.

Liquor Control Law

A few Florida liquor control laws contain alcohol-related language,
including the phrase “habitual drunkard.”72 For example, Florida has a
“[h]abitual drunkards” statute that prohibits any person from selling, giving
away, disposing of, exchanging, or bartering any alcoholic beverage to an
66.
Id. § 409.973(3).
67.
FLA. STAT. § 409.973(3). In this regard, Florida is similar to Arizona,
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Vermont, and West Virginia. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1406(C)
(2021) (requiring group disability insurers to cover “drug abuse or alcoholism” services without
regard to whether the services are rendered in a psychiatric or general hospital); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3578(a)(3), 3578(b) (2021) (requiring certain large group health plans to cover
“drug and alcohol dependencies” defined to include “substance abuse disorder or the chronic,
habitual, regular, or recurrent use of alcohol . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-28.3 (2021)
(requiring accident and sickness insurers that cover “alcoholism or drug addiction” to cover care
provided in facilities that specialize in the treatment of “alcoholics or drug addicts”); 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/367d.1 (2021) (requiring certain group health plans that cover “alcoholism or
other drug abuse or dependency” to cover certain substance use disorder treatment providers);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(f)(2)(A) (2021) (requiring health insurers to cover “alcohol and
substance abuse” treatments if they are provided by certain individuals, including “substance
abuse counselors,” in certain facilities); W. VA. CODE § 5-16-8(9) (2021) (requiring insurance
provided to public employees to include incentives designed to discourage “alcohol and
chemical abuse”).
68.
FLA. STAT. §§ 409.973(3), 627.629 (2021).
69.
Id. §§ 440.02(1), 627.629.
70.
Id. § 627.629.
71.
Id. § 440.02(1).
72.
Id. § 562.50.
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individual who is “habitually addicted” to alcoholic beverages if the person
has been given written notice by certain enumerated family members that the
individual is a “habitual drunkard.”73 Florida’s Sixth Judicial Circuit
(covering Pasco and Pinellas Counties) has also adopted a local rule that
authorizes the posting of liquor control signs that contain similar “habitual
drunkard” language.74 According to the local rule, these signs may say:
“[s]ales to habitual drunkards or intoxicated persons prohibited.”75
F.

Military and Veterans Law

A few Florida military and veterans laws contain alcohol-related
language, including “drunkenness” and “habitually inebriated.”76 For
example, one Florida statute gives the commanding officer of troops on active
duty the power to incarcerate and detain any person guilty of “drunkenness”
within one mile of a camp, garrison, or station.77 A second Florida statute
prohibits veterans’ homes from receiving or retaining an individual who is
“habitually inebriated.”78
G.

Occupational Licensure Law

A number of Florida occupational licensure laws contain alcoholrelated language.79 Most of these laws use the word “drunkenness.”80 For
73.
FLA. STAT. § 562.50. In this regard, Florida is similar to California, which
also makes it unlawful for any person to sell, furnish, or give an alcoholic beverage to any
“habitual or common drunkard.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602(a) (2021).
74.
See in re Local Ordinance Violations and Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission Violations Uniform Fine Schedule, Fla. Admin. Order No. 2018-068 PI-CTY
(Dec.
12,
2018),
http://www.jud6.org/legalcommunity/LegalPractice/AOSAndRules/aos/aos2018/2018068.pdf.
75.
See id.
76.
FLA. STAT. §§ 250.33, 296.06(2)(c).
77.
Id. § 250.33. Here, Florida is similar to Alaska (which provides that certain
“drunk” members of the militia may be punished) and Alabama (giving the commanding officer
of a troop in active service the power to incarcerate and detain persons “guilty of drunkenness”).
See ALASKA STAT. § 26.05.860(b) (2020); ALA. CODE § 31-2-126 (2021).
78.
FLA. STAT. §§ 296.06, 296.07. Here, Florida is similar to Iowa (which
prohibits veterans’ homes from receiving or retaining persons who are “acute inebriate[s]”) and
South Dakota (which prohibits veterans’ homes from receiving an “inebriate”). IOWA CODE
ANN. § 35D.2(2) (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 33A-4-34 (2021).
79.
FLA. STAT. § 296.06(2)(c).
80.
See id. §§ 401.411(1)(k), 467.203(1)(g), 468.1295(1)(aa), 490.009(1)(p)
(2021).
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example, one Florida statute prohibits an individual from practicing as an
emergency medical technician or paramedic without reasonable skill and
without regard for the safety of the public by reason of “drunkenness.”81 A
second statute allows midwives to be disciplined or denied licenses due to
“drunkenness.”82 A third statute allows speech-language pathologists and
audiologists to be disciplined or denied licenses due to “drunkenness.”83
Additional statutes allow psychologists and other mental health professionals
to be disciplined or denied licenses due to “drunkenness.” 84 The same is true
for Florida nursing home administrators, veterinarians, and school district
staff.85 Florida also may deny an application for registration or the
certification of a real estate appraiser who has become temporarily
incapacitated from acting as an appraiser due to “drunkenness.”86 Although
the word “drunkenness” is most frequently used in Florida occupational
licensure law, the word “abuse” is occasionally used.87 For example, Florida
may deny a license to a private investigator or private security officer if the
investigator or officer has a history of “alcohol abuse.”88
Additional Florida occupational licensure laws define the scopes of
practice of the different mental health professionals, typically using the phrase
“alcoholism and substance abuse.”89 Florida’s clinical social worker licensing
law, for example, defines the practice of clinical social work as including
treatment of “alcoholism and substance abuse.”90
H.

Public Officer and Civil Servant Law

Several Florida laws applicable to public officers and civil servants
contain alcohol-related language.91 Without exception, these statutes use the
word “drunkenness.”92 The Florida Constitution, for example, permits the
Governor to suspend from office certain state, militia, and county officers for
81.
Id. § 401.411(1)(k).
82.
Id. § 467.203(1)(g).
83.
Id. § 468.1295(1)(aa).
84.
FLA. STAT. §§ 490.009(1)(p), 491.009(1)(p).
85.
Id. §§ 468.1755(1)(l), 474.214(h), 1012.33(4)(c).
86.
Id. § 475.624(7).
87.
See id. § 493.6108(3).
88.
Id.
89.
See FLA. STAT. § 491.003(7).
90.
Id.
91.
See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a); FLA. STAT. §§ 100.361(2)(d)(4),
112.501(2)(a), 112.51(1), 455.209(1), 456.008(1).
92.
See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a); FLA. STAT. §§ 100.361(2)(d)(4),
112.501(2)(a), 112.51(1), 455.209(1), 456.008(1).
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“drunkenness.”93 A separate Florida statute provides that “drunkenness” is a
ground for elected and appointed municipal officials, as well as municipal
board members, to be removed from office.94 The Florida Governor also has
permission to suspend certain health professional board members, as well as
certain Business and Professional Regulation Board members, for
“drunkenness.”95 The Florida Governor also may suspend members of the
Nominating Commission for the Florida Courts of Appeal, members of the
Nominating Commission for the Florida Supreme Court, members of the
Florida Commission on Offender Review, members of the Florida Board of
Professional Surveyors and Mappers, and members of the Florida Barbers’
Board for “drunkenness.”96
I.

Tort Law

A few Florida tort laws contain alcohol-related language.97 These
laws rely on the phrase “habitually addicted” as well as the word “abuse.”98
For example, Florida allows the imposition of liability on persons who
willfully and unlawfully serve a person “habitually addicted” to alcohol.99
Florida also provides civil immunity to Florida Lawyers Assistance and
certain other lawyer assistance programs that provide assistance to attorneys
who may be impaired due to “abuse of alcohol or other drugs.”100
93.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a).
94.
FLA. STAT. §§ 100.361(2)(d)(4), 112.501(2)(a), 112.51(1). In this regard,
Florida is similar to Idaho and Texas. IDAHO CODE § 50-1604(4)(e) (providing that civil
servants may be removed or discharged from office for a variety of reasons, including
“[d]runkenness”); TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 24 (using “drunkenness” as a reason for county judges,
county attorneys, court clerks, justices of the peace, constables, and other county officers to be
removed from office).
95.
FLA. STAT. §§ 455.209(1), 456.008(1).
96.
See id. §§ 455.209(1), 456.008(1), 472.007(7)(a), 476.054(6), 947.03(3);
FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. §§ X, IX (2021).
97.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 397.484, 768.125.
98.
Id. §§ 397.484, 768.125.
99.
Id. § 768.125. In this regard, Florida is similar to Colorado, Pennsylvania,
and Rhode Island. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (2021) (providing that any individual
whose person or property is injured by a “habitually intoxicated” person has a cause of action
against any third party who sold or gave alcohol to the “habitually intoxicated” person); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(7) (2021) (waiving sovereign immunity and allows for the imposition
of liability on the state for damages that result when a state liquor store employee sells liquor to
a person “known to be an habitual drunkard” or of “known intemperate habit”); 3 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 3-11-2 (2021) (allowing a cause of action against a liquor licensee who fails to follow
a family member or employer’s request not to sell a person liquor when such failure results in
damages).
100.
FLA. STAT. § 397.484.

2022] ON FLORIDA LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ALCOHOL USE DISORDER

J.

440

Vehicle and Transportation Law

Florida has a handful of vehicle and transportation statutes that
identify negative legal consequences that flow from certain alcohol-related
activities, alcohol-related states, and alcohol-related health conditions.101
These statutes tend to incorporate the word “abuse” and the phrase “habitual
drunkard.”102 Additional Florida vehicle and transportation laws use alcoholrelated language to specify the education or treatment that must occur before
license issuance or license reinstatement can occur.103 These laws typically
incorporate the words “abuse” and “alcohol[ism].”104 Still, other Florida
vehicle and transportation laws refer to drunk driving.105 For example, one
Florida statute references a “drunk driver” visitation program.106 Under this
program, a court may order an individual who is on probation and under
supervision to visit either a trauma center or a hospital (to observe victims of
motor vehicle accidents involving alcohol), a licensed substance use disorder
provider (to observe individuals in terminal stages of substance use disorder),
or the county coroner’s office (to observe victims of vehicle accidents
involving alcohol).107 A second Florida statute requires applications for motor
vehicle registrations and registration renewals to include language permitting
voluntary contributions to the “Florida Mothers Against Drunk Driving,
Inc.”108
K.

Miscellaneous Laws

A handful of additional, miscellaneous Florida laws contain alcoholrelated language, especially the words “abuse” and “alcoholism.” 109 Florida
guardianship law, for example, allows a guardian to be removed for “substance
abuse.”110 Florida tax law, by further example, allows a county to impose
additional taxes on beverages sold at establishments licensed to sell liquor.111
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. §§ 322.095(1), 322.2616(1)(a), 397.484, 768.125.
See id. §§ 322.095(1), 397.484, 768.125.
Id. §§ 322.095(1), 322.2616(2)(c).
See id. §§ 322.095(1), 322.2616(2)(c).
See FLA. STAT. § 322.0602.
Id. § 322.0602(2)(a).
Id. § 322.0602(4)(a).
Id. § 320.02(16)(b).
See id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 744.474(4); 90.503(a)(1)–(4).
FLA. STAT. § 744.474(4).
Id. § 212.0306(1)(b).
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The proceeds from these taxes then may be used for “alcohol and drug abuse”
services.112 Florida evidence law contains a psychotherapist-patient privilege
that defines “psychotherapist” as someone who is engaged in, among other
activities, the diagnosis or treatment of “alcoholism and other drug
addiction.”113 Florida welfare law, by final illustrative example, exempts any
participant who requires residential treatment for “alcoholism, drug addiction,
[or] alcohol abuse” from work activities while participating in treatment.114
III.

FINDINGS AND PROPOSALS

This Article has collected illustrative Florida statutes that contain
alcohol-related language.* A number of key findings may be drawn from
these statutes.* First, these statutes are not drawn exclusively from health law,
as this Author—a health law scholar—initially anticipated.115 Instead, these
statutes were found within a wide variety of Florida subject matter codes,
including those relating to criminal law, education law, family law, health and
social services law, insurance law, liquor control law, military and veterans’
law, occupational licensure law, public officer and civil servant law, tort law,
and vehicle and transportation law, as well as other miscellaneous areas of the
law.116
Second, these statutes rely heavily on certain words.117 Florida’s most
common alcohol-related word, regardless of subject matter code, appears to
be “abuse” (as in “alcohol abuse,” “abuse of alcohol,” or “substance
abuse”).118 As explained in the introduction to this Article, however, the word
“abuse” can suggest malintent, cruelty, and violence even though many
individuals with AUD are neither cruel nor violent and would like to stop
drinking. 119 The word “abuse” also has been found to have a high association
with negative judgments about individuals with AUD and other substance use
disorders as well as punishment.120 Finally, the word “abuser” has been found
to “increase stigma, which can affect quality of care and act as a barrier to

112.
Id. § 212.0306(3)(b).
113.
Id. § 90.503(a)(1)–(4).
114.
Id. § 414.0655(1).
115.
See discussion supra Sections II.A–K.
116.
See discussion supra Sections II.A–K.
117.
See discussion supra Sections II.A–K.
118.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 414.0655(1); 90.503(a)(1)–(4).
119.
See discussion supra Part I.
120.
See Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When Talking About
Addiction, supra note 13.
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treatment-seeking individuals suffering from addiction.”121 It is illogical and
inappropriate to use a word associated with negative judgment, stigma, and
punishment in treatment court statutes, health and social services statutes, and
other statutes designed to help people.122 Instead of using the word “abuse”
(as in alcohol abuse) or “abuser” (as in alcohol abuser), this Article
recommends that the Florida Legislature use “individual with alcohol use
disorder” or similar neutral, person-first language.123
Florida’s second most common alcohol-related word appears to be
“drunkenness.”124 As demonstrated above in Parts II.F–G of this Article,
Florida occupational licensure law as well as Florida public officer and civil
servant law rely heavily on the word “drunkenness.”125 In these contexts,
“drunkenness” triggers loss of occupational or professional licensure as well
as removal by the Governor from public office.126 As discussed in Section
II.A, however, the slang word “drunk” has its roots in a Middle English word,
“fordrunken,” which appeared in Chaucer’s tales.127 Now outdated, lacking a
medical or other technical definition, and neither used nor approved by the
APA nor any other professional medical association to refer to the alcoholrelated health condition of an individual, “drunkenness” is simply
inappropriate in professional language, including Florida’s statutes.128
In addition to “abuse” and “drunkenness,” other alcohol-related words
and phrases that are occasionally used in particular Florida statutes include, in
alphabetical order, “alcoholism,” “drunk,” “drunk driver,” “habitual,”

121.
Addictionary,
RECOVERY
RSCH.
INST.,
http://www.recoveryanswers.org/addiction-ary/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (explaining why the
word “abuser” should not be used in the context of addiction).
122.
See Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When Talking About
Addiction, supra note 13.
123.
See id.; Addictionary, supra note 121 (“Consequently, instead of describing
someone as a ‘drug abuser,’ it may be less stigmatizing and more medically accurate to describe
them as ‘a person with . . . addiction or substance use disorder.’”).
124.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.51(1), 112.501(1)(a), 401.411(1)(k), 456.008(1),
467.203(1)(g), 468.1295(1)(aa), 490.009(1)(p).
125.
See discussion supra Sections II.F–G; FLA. STAT. §§ 401.411(1)(k);
467.203(1)(g); 468.1295(1)(aa); 490.009(1)(p).
126.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.51(1); 112.501(2)(a); 401.411(1)(k); 467.203(1)(g);
468.1295(1)(aa); 490.009(1)(p).
127.
See discussion supra Part II.A; Ola Khazan, A History of 'Drunk' Words,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/01/a-history-ofdrunk-words/384325/.
128.
See Understanding Alcohol Use Disorders and Their Treatment, supra note
4; FLA. STAT. § 112.51(1) (referencing the use of the word “drunkenness” within the statute).
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“habitual drunkard,” “habitually addicted,” and “habitually inebriated.”129
The phrases “drunk driver” and “habitual drunkard” are not person-first and
can be improved.130 For example, the Florida Legislature could use “an
[individual who] driv[es] while intoxicated” coupled with a technical (i.e.,
numerical, blood-alcohol-content-based) definition of “intoxicated” instead of
“drunk driver.”131
By further example, the Florida Legislature could use an “individual
with alcohol use disorder” instead of “habitual drunkard.” 132 Moreover, the
word “alcoholism” is not used by the APA in its current (i.e., fifth) edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-5”).133 The
phrase “alcohol use disorder”—used by the APA in the DSM-5—could be
substituted by the Florida Legislature for the word “alcoholism.”134 Finally,
the words “habit[],” “habitual[],” and “habitually” are inappropriate when
used in the addiction context.135 As explained in the Introduction to this
Article, these words inaccurately imply that an individual with AUD is
choosing to use alcohol and/or can choose to stop using alcohol.136 The word
“habit” can also undermine the seriousness of an individual’s AUD.137
Interestingly, no Florida statute uses the phrase “alcohol use disorder,”
which is the name the APA currently gives to the health condition that is
colloquially known as “alcoholism.”138 In this respect, Florida is different than
other jurisdictions, which have incorporated the phrase “alcohol use disorder”
into their statutes.139 For example, the Nevada Legislature states in one of its
statutes that: “the handling of persons with an alcohol use disorder within the

129.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 768.125, 562.50; 401.411(1)(k), 322.0602, 296.07,
327.35(6)(i).
130.
See id. §§ 562.50; 322.0602; Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid
When Talking About Addiction, supra note 13.
131.
See FLA. STAT. § 322.0602; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West 2021).
132.
See id. § 562.50; Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When Talking
About Addiction, supra note 13.
133.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 490.
134.
See id. at 490; APA Dictionary of Psychology, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N,
http://dictionary.apa.org/alcohol-use-disorder (last visited Apr. 3, 2022); FLA. STAT. §
414.0655(1).
135.
See FLA. STAT. § 296.07; Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When
Talking About Addiction, supra note 13.
136.
See discussion supra Part I; Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When
Talking About Addiction, supra note 13.
137.
Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When Talking About Addiction,
supra note 13.
138.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 490; but see COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-81-102 (2022).
139.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 458.250 (2021); FLA. STAT. § 414.0655(1).
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criminal justice system is ineffective, whereas treating an alcohol use disorder
as a health problem allows its prevention and treatment . . . .”140
The third key finding of this Article is that a number of positive and
negative legal consequences are triggered by Florida’s alcohol-related
language.141 Examples of positive legal consequences include receipt of
educational and other grant funding, access to educator addiction recovery
programming, treatment rather than prosecution, access to women’s primary
care services, access to impaired healthcare practitioner programming, and
civil immunity.142
Examples of negative legal consequences include prosecution for
crimes such as public intoxication and driving or boating under the influence,
detention or incarceration, refusal of admissions to a veterans’ home,
professional discipline or loss of occupational licensure, suspension or
removal from public office, the imposition of liability, loss of a driver’s
license, and loss of ability to serve as a guardian.143 It is simply inappropriate
to use slang, outdated, and/or non-person-first, alcohol-related language in the
context of a Florida statute offering a positive legal outcome.144 For example,
an applicant for health and other social services (or an applicant for any other
positive legal outcome) would be put in the awkward position of having to
identify with a slang, outdated, or other non-preferred terms to access such
services (or to gain such outcome).145 When services are made available to
certain individuals via statute, it would seem appropriate to encourage, not
discourage (through stigmatizing or other inappropriate language), individuals
to apply for and accept such services.146 In the context of negative outcome
statutes, it still seems to the Author to be inappropriate to use slang, outdated,
and non-person-first statutes in professional language, including state laws,
especially when referring to an individual’s mental health condition.147
This Article’s fourth finding is that there are multiple means by which
Florida’s statutory language permeates public discourse, creating

140.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 458.250.
141.
See discussion supra Part II.
142.
See discussion supra Section II.A–C, I.
143.
See discussion supra Sections I.A.F–K.
144.
See discussion supra Sections II.A–J; Words Matter — Terms to Use and
Avoid When Talking About Addiction, supra note 13.
145.
See discussion supra Section II.C.
146.
See e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 893.165(1); 938.23(1); 985.676(2)(a)(5);
320.02(16)(b).
147.
See discussion supra Sections II.A–J; Tovino, supra note 1, at 6, 11; Words
Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When Talking About Addiction, supra note 13.
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opportunities to perpetuate stigma against individuals with AUD.148 Many of
the statutes referenced in Part II create or establish departments, health, and
social services programs, boards, funds, grants, and signs among other
programs and materials.149 These programs and materials can be accessed or
seen by a wide variety of government officials, health care, and other
professionals, and lay individuals, creating a direct line between alcoholrelated statutory language and a variety of legal rights, benefits, privileges,
obligations, duties, and penalties applicable to individuals with AUD.150 The
Florida statutes referenced in Part II are not simply outdated laws that have no
bearing on present-day society.151 These statutes play a direct, active, and
important role in assembling and regulating public life.152 That said, two
proposals may help improve Florida statutes that contain alcohol-related
language.153
This Article first proposes that Florida lawmakers use medically
current and respectful language in new legislation introduced to the Florida
Legislature from this point forward.154 For example, a lawmaker who wishes
to make available additional health care and social services can make such
services available to “individuals with alcohol use disorder” rather than
“alcohol abusers,” “habitual drunkards,” “habitual[] inebriate[s],” or “habitual
addicts.”155 By further example, a lawmaker who wishes to penalize
individuals who engage in certain alcohol-related activities can use technical
language (e.g., “driving while intoxicated” coupled with a technical definition
of “intoxicated” that is expressed either in grams per milliliter or a percentage
of blood-alcohol content) rather than slang language (e.g., “drunk driv[ing]”
or “habitual drunkard”).156 To help implement this proposal, this Article
suggests that a Florida lawmaker introduce legislation requiring both

148.
See discussion supra Part I.
149.
See discussion supra Sections II.A–J; FLA. STAT. §§ 893.165(1), 938.23(1),
985.676(2)(a)(5), 320.02(16)(b).
150.
See discussion supra Part II.; FLA. STAT. § 397.305(1)–(3).
151.
See discussion supra Part II.
152.
See FLA. STAT. § 397.305(5).
153.
See discussion supra Parts I, II.
154.
See discussion supra Parts I, II.
155.
See discussion supra Sections II.A, E; FLA. STAT. §§ 951.26(1)(b)(1)(f)–
(g); 562.50; 296.07; Words Matter — Terms to Use and Avoid When Talking About Addiction,
supra note 13; Fla. Admin. Order No. 2018-068 PI-CTY, supra note 74.
156.
See discussion supra Part I; Fla. Admin. Order No. 2018-068 PI-CTY,
supra note 74; FLA. STAT. §§ 322.2616(2)(b)(5)(c), 322.0602(2)(a); 562.50; TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 49.04.
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lawmakers and legislative counsel to use medically current and respectful
statutory language when drafting and filing bills on a going-forward basis.157
A draft of such legislation might provide:
Florida Senate - 2022

SB ___

By Senator __________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A bill to be entitled
An Act Relating to Language and Alcohol
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Section ______, Florida Statutes, is created to
read:
Section ______, Florida Statutes, Alcohol-Related Language
Section 2. Florida lawmakers and legislative counsel shall, to the extent
practicable, ensure that persons with alcohol use disorder are
referred to in the Florida Statutes Annotated using language that
is commonly viewed as respectful and sentence structure that
refers to the person before referring to the person’s alcohol use,
alcohol-related activities, alcohol-related states, or alcohol-related
health condition.
Section 3. Words and terms that are preferred for use in the Florida
Statutes Annotated include, without limitation, persons with alcohol use
disorder, persons with substance use disorder, persons with addiction,
persons with mental health conditions, and other phrases that are
structured in a similar manner.
Section 4. Words and terms that are not preferred for use in the Florida
Statutes Annotated include, without limitation, “abuse,” “abuser,”
“addict,” “alcoholic,” “alcoholism,” “drunk,” “drunkard,” “habit,”
“habitual,” “habitually,” “inebriate,” “intemperate,” “wasted,” and
“wastrel,” as well as other outdated, slang, and non-person-first words
and terms.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect January 1, 2023.

Second, this Article proposes that the Florida Legislature amend all
slang, outdated, and non-person-first alcohol-related language used in alreadyenacted statutes.* To implement this proposal, lawmakers can locate the
footnotes of this Article to see the specific Florida statutory provisions that
157.

See discussion supra Part III.

447

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

contain slang, outdated, and non-person-first language and introduce
legislation that would substitute preferred words and phrases.*
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article builds on the Author’s prior scholarship by analyzing the
language used in Florida statutes to refer to alcohol-related activities, alcoholrelated states, and alcohol-related health conditions.* This Article finds that
Florida’s most common alcohol-related word, regardless of subject matter
code, appears to be “abuse” (as in “alcohol abuse,” “abuse of alcohol,” or
“substance abuse”).158 Florida’s second most common alcohol-related word
appears to be “drunkenness.”159 In addition to “abuse” and “drunkenness,”
other alcohol-related words and phrases that are occasionally used in particular
Florida statutes include, in alphabetical order, “abuser,” “alcoholism,”
“drunk,” “drunk driver,” “habitual,” “habitual drunkard,” “habitually
addicted,” and “habitually inebriated.”160 These words and phrases are
outdated at best, and stigmatizing at worst.* This Article proposes that the
Florida Legislature use current, person-first terminology in new legislation
introduced from this point forward.* This Article also proposes that the
Florida Legislature amend outdated, slang, and non-person first terminology
located within existing Florida law.161 If implemented by the Florida
legislature, these proposals may help to diminish structural or law-based
stigma in the context of individuals with AUD.˙

158.
159.
160.
161.

See supra Part III; e.g., FLA. STAT. § 414.0655(1).
See supra Parts II.H–I; e.g., FLA. STAT. § 856.
See supra Part II; Tovino, supra note 1, at 7,14.
See supra Part III.
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